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Abstract
The aim of the study was to contribute to the 
development of situational leadership theory by assessing 
the impact of what one considered to be significant 
situational or structural forces impinging on the leadership 
style of an influential occupational group - Chief 
Accountants - previously not subjected to such analysis.
The choice of subjects was predominantly influenced by 
the author’s exposure early in his working life to training 
in a professional accountant's office.
The method used incorporated the ma,il questionnaire 
and the interview. The respondents who completed the 
questionnaire numbered 212 and were almost equally 
distributed over small, medium and large sized companies. 
Intensive interviews were conducted with 32 respondents.
Within the limitations of the research methodology the 
following constitute the major findings.
Contrary to a'general impression which suggests that 
accountants are directive in orientation, the Chief Accountant 
places almost equal emphasis on both restrictive and permissive 
leadership styles. What is particularly interesting is that 
he modifies his style to suit prevailing situations,1 or 
structural circumstances. He behaves differently in 
programmed and task decision situations than in non-programmea 
and personnel decision situations. Other situs/bionally or 
structurally determined circumstances affecting leadership 
style are: job tenure; specialisation and specialism;
calibre of subordinate staff; psychological closeness of 
the leader: employee-oriented behaviour; span of control;
size of company and finance function; and hierarchical level. 
Type of decision and certain independent variables are also 
important as.mediating variables.
A situational perspective of the leadership role of a 
key functional manager could prove useful in encouraging
others to conduct similar analyses in other functional 
areas, hopefully resulting in comparative analysis. 
Then significant strides forward could be made in the 
development of a global situational leadership theory.
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
This is a study concerned with the development of 
situational leadership theory in relation to the role and 
immediate work environment of the Chief Accountant or Financial 
Controller in industry. The author’s interest in leadership- 
springs from a research study for a master’s degree when 
leadership styles were analysed in relation to a number of 
individual, managerial and organisational variables. The 
rationale for embarking on the present study can be gleaned 
from a concluding remark contained in the master’s thesis:
”....... future research might begin by constructing a typology
of typical decisions taken by managers within a work organisation. 
Each type of decision would then be related to the leadership 
continuum, and finally, within this framework the identification
and measurement of situational variables.............  could be
pursued. It is felt that such an approach.............. would
enlarge and enhance our understanding of leadership styles in 
industry ” (McKenna 1972).
Ever since the arrival on the scene of the contingency 
model of leaderships (Fiedler 1967) situational approach to 
leadership has assumed a new importance, though a very minor 
situational concern has been expressed by influential participative 
management theorists (Likert 1961$ McGregor 1967)* A perusal of 
the recent literature on leadership shows clearly the growing 
importance attached to the need to consider situational variables 
(e.g. Kavanagh 1972$ Bass et al 1975? Vroom 1976).
Proponents of the OHIO State School of leadership felt it 
necessary to postulate situational propositions, which they 
consider more closely reflect the concern of the school, in the 
face of criticism relegating 'Initiating Structure' and 
’Consideration’ - dimensions of leadership behaviour - to a 
position of historical importance (Kerr et al 1974)• They 
concede, quite rightly, that we have not yet arrived at a point 
of theoretical adequacy in our quest for a leadership theory.
This viewpoint is reinforced hy Yukl (1971)? who maintains that 
leadership research has often failed to include intermediate 
and situational variables which one should consider in order to 
understand how a leader’s actions can affect his subordinate’s 
productivity.
It is both conceptually and physically impossible to define 
and study the numerous important variables which comprise the 
situational environment. It is consequently necessary to select 
environmental elements which are measurable and exert a significant 
effect on leadership style. The situational and structural 
variables chosen for the present study reflect the judgement of 
the author as to what constitutes important immediate environmental 
variables. They consist of typical decisions facing the Chief 
Accountant; the extent of specialisation and specialism within 
the finance function; the status, power and influence attached 
to the Chief Accountant’s position; the qualities and skills 
deemed important and the extent to which they are possessed by 
his subordinate; the psychological distance between the Chief 
Accountant and his least preferred subordinate; the nature of 
his role within the organisation; his level within the 
organisational hierarchy; his span of control; the length 
of time spent in his present position; and the size of the 
finance function and the organisation. These would then be 
related to a measure of leadership style; the latter would also 
be related to dimensions of leadership behaviour. Some, but 
not all, of the situational or structural variables mentioned 
have been considered previously in connection with leadership 
(Heller 1971? Ritchie and Miles 1970; Blankenship and Miles 1968). 
This then seems to be a concrete and positive approach to leadership 
theory since it endeavours to incorporate the U.K. structural 
(Woodward 1965? Pugh et al 1969) tradition and the U.S.A. 
interpersonal (McGregor I960; Likert 1961) tradition in a 
single framework. Evidence related to the leadership styles 
of accountants as an occupational group is rather scant and tends 
to emphasise style without any acknowledgement of the impact of 
situational or structural variables. McKenna (op cit) reports 
that accountants more than non-financial managers experienced a
- 3 -
restrictive leadership style. Heller (op cit), for example, 
suggests that finance and production managers are prone to a 
centralised style, -which is less likely to he the case with 
personnel and general managers, and attributes this phenomenon 
to constraints on the degree of freedom sufferred by the former 
group) of managers. These constraints are not however made 
explicit, save reference to different leadership patterns in 
production and non-production departments (Fleishman et al 1955)? 
and differentiation in style and productivity between foremen 
in assembly line production departments as opposed to other 
departments (Argyle et al 1958) • Perhaps nearer the mark is 
Heller's reference to a directive style being complementary to 
highly structured tasks (Shaw and Blum 1966)•
There is, therefore, good justification for undertaking a 
leadership study of a key manager in the finance function - the 
Chief Accountant - so as to assess in a more methodical and rigorous 
fashion 'constraints' on his degree of freedom.
1.2 ACCOUNTANTS AS A DISTINCTIVE OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
Initial interest in the social and technical dimensions of 
the Accountant's role in both a professional and industrial 
environment was activated and nurtured whilst the author was 
pursuing a programme of training in the offices of accountants 
in the early 1960's. Subsequently endowed with a little more 
wisdom and experience one felt compelled to penetrate the sober 
and sometimes dull exterior of the accountant and unearth some 
of the attributes or qualities often the subject of a satirical 
representation of his personality. This was facilitated by two 
research programmes which afforded me the opportunity to gain a 
deeper insight into the influences shaping the attitudes and work 
orientations of accountants.
As a professional group accountants are an influential body 
of people engaged in the collection, processing and interpretation 
of accounting and financial data, and offering a service to 
management both on an internal and external basis. It has become 
almost commonplace in recent times for educators and others 
interested in the academic maturation of the profession of
accountancy.to level criticisms, in many cases justified, at 
the standards of education prior and post entry to professional 
training. Vatter .(1963) recognises that accountancy has a • 
right to claim professional status and asserts that with the 
growth of sophisticated techniques and the development of mature 
ways of looking at things, more exacting educational standards 
for entrants to the profession are required. A similar 
perspective is taken hy Lowe (1964) who stresses that there are 
signs of accounting information systems being no longer self- 
sufficient. This is also a view shared by Trueblood (1963) 
with the added comment that accounting will become an integral 
part of a complex of disciplines or methodologies. The computer 
will relieve the accountant of the task of processing routine 
data, opening up the way for a new breed of people with analytical 
and scientific minds, less inclined to rely on hunches based on 
historical data with more emphasis given to quantification of 
variables and recognising the importance of a multidisciplinary 
approach (Lowe op cit) . This has obvious importance in pointing 
the way to the development of exacting education standards, with 
a shift to teaching the individual to be adaptive, to be receptive 
to new ideas and at the same time have the mental faculties to sift 
through ideas and assess their relevance.
Over a decade ago in the U.S.A. Trueblood (op cit) advocated a 
better balance between business and liberal arts subjects on degree 
programmes with a bias in favour of accountancy and deprecated 
programmes emphasising descriptive material. In this country 
there is a growing recognition that, given the movement of the 
abler students from the Grammar and Comprehensive Schools to 
higher education, the professional educational process must 
acknowledge the particular needs, abilities and problems of the 
graduate. Perrin (1971) rightly states: "in recent years the
leading spirits in the profession have recognised that the 
recruitment of graduates is essential to prevent the profession 
sliding backwards in terms of both the absolute and relative 
intelligence and abilities of its entrants, and also in terms of 
the profession's perceived status and authority in the world at 
large." He also maintains that the accountancy profession prided
itself in the fruits of 1 craft training* which led to the 
mastery of relevant techniques together with the acquisition 
of the 'conventional wisdom' of the profession. The drawback 
in educational terms of this outlook is the absence of the 
opportunity "to learn to conceptualise, to search out and 
evaluate alternatives and perhaps above all to challenge 
convention with reasoned arguments." This type of observation 
appears to have a firm historical factual basis to it and is 
substantiated by an earlier experience of two chartered accountants 
who pursued a graduate programme of study in business administration 
at an American University. Extolling the challenges and benefits 
of the courses offered and favourably commenting on the calibre of 
staff they were exposed to, Hughes and Barclay (1967) went on to 
say: "To someone who received his main theoretical training by
dull correspondence course at the sterile hands of a firm of 
accounting tutors, the difference is striking. The constant 
interaction of wits in discussion with fellow students, the 
clarification of ideas through the necessity of defending them 
before ones peers: all this makes the articled clerk's formal
education emasculated by comparison." Perhaps it is fair to 
say that this view is not now fully representative of the quality 
of the educational process as a one year full-time foundation 
course with a tendency towards academic rigour is widespread and 
obligatory for those proposing to qualify as chartered accountants. 
Proposals put forward in the Solbmon's report - Prospectus for a 
Profession - highlight an urgency and perha,ps determination to 
raise standards in both spheres of education and training with 
the recommendation that non-graduates proposing to enter the 
profession should first pursue a full-time course of at least two 
years duration leading to a Diploma of Higher Education (Solomons 
and Berridge 1974)• Apparently the latter proposal is considered 
by one of the accounting bodies as unsatisfactory on the grounds 
of the maintenance of standards; other proposals are also 
contentious for a number of practical reasons; for example, the 
proposal that students of all accountancy bodies should spend a 
mandatory period of time in both a practising office and in 
industry or commerce or the public service.
A typical accusation directed at the type of training 
received is that the training tends to promote conservative 
practice rather than an innovative mentality (Tricker 1967)•
There is little douht that preoccupation with educational and 
training standards is generating serious attempts to upgrade 
standards of education and training. This momentum is welcome 
in a period of rapidly developing technology and its application 
in a number of areas including accounting. In due course, 
perhaps future events will in some way dilute the substance of 
a justifiable assertion by Perrin (op cit): "Indeed the profession
has sometimes been accused of a distinctly anti-intellectual bias ■ 
and at least a few of its members have seemed to glory in accepting 
the accusation as a compliment."
Various speculations centre on the question of whether certain 
personality types choose accountancy as a career or alternatively 
whether certain socialisation processes mould individuals of 
different personality patterns to produce certain identifiable 
behaviour characteristics of the accountant. Accountants as a 
group are likely to be practical, realistic, resolute, make 
decisions and take action on their own, responsible, direct a 
group on a practical and realistic no-nonsense basis, but are 
uncultured, sometimes phlegmatic, hard, cynical and smug 
(Barden 1970). One might venture to suggest that the process 
of training, of which more will be said later, requiring the 
accountant to place excessive attention to detail, patience, 
much concentration, a good memory and an ability to handle 
figures accurately, is anything but an experience designed to 
inspire and develop a humanistic perspective and a flexible mode 
of operation.
It is felt that entrants to well defined professional 
occupations, such as chartered accountancy and law, display 
some interest in or attachment to the idea of pursuing a 
professional career prior to entry. Super (1953) Las argued 
that in choosing an occupation an individual is in effect choosing 
something which will realise his self-concept; this view has 
received support in a number of empirical studies•
Of particular relevance is the work of Lancashire and Cohen 
(1970) who conducted follow-up studies on groups of people who 
had earlier undergone vocational guidance at the NIIP. The 
selected sample - chartered accountants and solicitors - unlike 
a random sample, representing people who had followed a diverse 
range of occupations, had shown a stronger interest in the idea 
of an office professional career prior to their consultation and 
there was a slightly greater tendency for their father to have the 
same profession as that recommended to the son. This could he 
attributable to childhood and adolescent identification with an 
adult who acted as a role model for the prospective accountant 
(Super op cit). Alternatively, the accountant may have perceived 
his family and friends as having favourable attitudes towards the 
profession (Englander i960). In an exploratory study conducted 
by the author it was found that the promise of job satisfaction 
was ranked as the most important determinant of career choice; 
this could be a function of early socialisation, and the answers 
to the open-ended questions firmly endorsed the influence of 
parents, family or friends (McKenna op cit).
The influence of socialisation processes during training in 
a professional office warrants examination, because these processes 
initiate and cultivate a professional perspective, total adherence 
to which can lead to dysfunctional consequences in certain areas of 
industrial accountancy. Hastings (1968) maintains that the 
professional socialisation process which the articled clerk in 
training is exposed to is likely to contribute to the development 
of an attachment to the following values: Caution; Exactitude;
Anti-theoretical Pragmatism; Professional Exclusiveness; 
Quantification and Rationality. Though Hastings’ study is 
specific to the value system of chartered accountants, it is 
reasonable to suppose that other professional accountants are 
similarly endowed with at least some of the values. After all, 
many generations of chaptered accountants have contributed to the 
moulding and shaping of the work and social environment within the 
finance function in industry, either internally as executive 
accountants or externally through the advice offerred supplementary 
to their role as auditors. The latter influence may be felt in 
the form of procedural determination or modification.
The professional attitudes will invariably have to he 
tempered to suit the demands of roles in industrial organisations 
(Scott 1966), or alternatively the professional accountant may 
experience conflict and strain (Millerson 1964)• Attachment 
to the professional values hy the chartered accountant was found 
to he affected in varying degrees hy subsequent socialisation in 
organisations outside the professional office .(Hastings op cit).
But in any assessment of the extent to which the industrial work 
role affects professional values one would have to he cognisant of 
the degree of harmony or conflict between both the individual’s 
conception and demands of his adopted role and the adjustment 
needed to fulfil the demands of the role.
Those engaged in financial accounting and internal audit work 
are expected to show a strong attachment to 'exactitude' and 
'anti-theoretical pragmatism', though the extent to which the 
accountant is attached to this set of values is dependent upon 
the demands made on him to shift his attitudinal position on 
acquiring his first industrial experience. A firm challenge to 
the relevance of professional values at this stage could have the 
effect of significantly modifying them. Those engaged on all 
work activities are likely to have Caution1 firmly ingrained in 
their outlook, unless they are dependent upon non-accountants for 
promotion. A lesser attachment to 'professional exclusiveness* 
is likely to materialise if the organisation considers other 
professional accountants to he on par with chartered accountants, 
or where the chartered accountant has little contact with his 
Institute's affairs. 'Quantification' may he considered functional 
hut 'exactitude' and 'anti-theoretical pragmatism' are on balance 
dysfunctional in the practice of industrial accountancy. However, 
there is a danger in overstating the functional nature of 
'quantification1.
The substance of the above research evidence is reinforced 
hy the observations of those who are or have been close to the 
practical scene. Because of his unpreparedness to grapple with 
situations exposed to risk and uncertainty the accountant in 
management tends to maintain the cautious attitudes he had at 
the lower levels when dealing with problems nearer the top of
1
the organisation (Tricker op cit). Exactitude is evident in 
the willingness of the accountant to he precise about detail and 
Wilson (1965) states that the accountant's mind tends towards 
complete accuracy in contrast with the techniques of the statistician 
which consider' how an acceptable level of accuracy can be achieved. 
Anti-theoretical pragmatism is symbolised in a convention-based 
approach rather than a flexible analytical approach to problem­
solving. Elgin (1965) reports the comments of the then Assistant 
Controller of the Ford Motor Company to the effect that a costing 
variance analysis exercise calls for high analytical ability in 
determining'the true causes and the detection of ominous trends, 
but that "often the pure accountant was too immersed in the 
technicalities of his work and that young graduate economists are 
often better at tracking down the real cause." By over-stressing 
the desirability of quantification of data one may all too easily 
ignore that which cannot be quantified. This does not appear to 
silence voices calling for strict adherence to the quantification 
process. For example, Lee (1968) in his exhortations to the 
accountant to accept future challenges advises him to preserve his 
objectivity and apply impartial numerical expressions to historical 
and predictive data. In fact, this advice is unlikely to fall on 
deaf ears as the accountant is more adept at quantifying than 
verbalising.
It will be noted that more than a fair share of comment in the 
discussion focuses on the chartered accountant rather than on the 
other recognised professional accountants. This appears to be 
inevitable as a preponderance of emphasis in the literature is 
firmly balanced in favour of chartered accountants, probably due 
to their historical and present status and the easily identifiable 
and structured nature of the articled clerk's training. Finally, 
one may deduce from the discussion so far that the accountant's 
education and training could be instrumental in engendering a basic 
conservatism in outlook with a leaning towards the practice of a 
restrictive style of leadership. The latter sentiment is succinctly 
expressed by Hastings (op cit) when commenting on the accountant's 
attachment to the value of 'caution'. He states that the accountant 
who supervises the processes involved in the operation of accounting 
systems "shows a particular tendency to check the work of
subordinates and in particular to limit the discretion of 
subordinates who are not qualified accountants".
¥e are now beginning to appreciate more than ever before 
the behavioural assumptions underlying the conception and design 
of accounting systems and the human reactions they are likely to 
promote. These will be reflected in the appropriate sections of 
the text, but at this stage before examining the work activities 
of the Chief Accountant, a brief reflection on the concept of cost 
seems opportune. A Professor of Accounting - McRae (1971) - 
adopting a viewpoint of Likert argues that conventional accounting 
measures of performance ignore the value of the current psychological 
state of the human organisation, and that, for example, the damage 
perpetrated by the short-term profit go-getter is not reflected in 
the accounting records in circumstances where the quality of human 
resources are severely dented after his .departure. Somewhat 
idealistically Argyris (1964) maintains that a proper management 
accounting system ought to measure gold bricking, rate-setting, 
apathy and non-involvement, lack of openness, conformity, mutual 
distrust, extreme commitment and interdepartmental rivalries.
Closely allied to these alleged shortcomings are that accounting 
systems do not adequately reflect the value of the human resource 
to the organisation in terms of the expenditure incurred on it, 
its opportunity cost and the benefits accruing from its deployment 
(Brummet et al 1968) • An innovative suggestion, if not at present 
practicable, is one encouraging departments to bid against each 
other for the service of organisational personnel and in the 
process’ place values on the individual's worth; the accepted 
bid would then form the asset value base (Hekimian and Jones 
1967)• Ho doubt Likert (1967) would disagree fundamentally with 
this position on the grounds that certain key psychological variables 
e.g. loyalty, mutual trust, co-operation - developed in working 
group relationships, on which the efficient operation of the 
enterprise rests-, have not been considered. Either approach is 
a tentative move to clear the way for a more realistic assessment 
of the real vs,lue of human resources in organisations. Measurement 
of human resources still remains problematic (Rhode et al 1976)? 
though Craft and Birnberg (1976) are of the belief that
Human Resource Accounting may prove useful internally rather than 
externally as a means of evaluating the effectiveness- of personnel 
and managerial programmes,
WORK ACTIVITIES OP CHIEF ACCOUNTANTS
One immediately encounters a difficulty when attempting to 
identify and describe areas of work typically considered to 
constitute the job description of the Chief Accountant. The 
role of the Chief Accountant in different industrial environments 
may not always show the similarities one might expect to find 
because of a tendency nowadays in some companies to elevate the 
status of the traditional Chief Accountant by giving him authority 
for certain functions previously carried out by a person of the 
status of Financial Director. It would probably then be the 
practice to give the position the classification of Financial 
Controller. Tfeston (1954) in his analysis of the Finance Function 
states that no one title typified the role of executive with 
responsibilities for the finance function. The chief financial 
executive was frequently referred to as, for example, Controller, 
Treasurer, or a combination of the two, or Vice-President Finance. 
Dauten (1955) cites a paper analysing the duties of the major 
executive in the financial area. This is a global description 
and reads as follows: "In general most companies* concepts of the 
treasurer*s job involve financial planning, cash management, 
banking relations, handling credit and collections and the custody 
of company assets. The controllership function encompasses 
accounting, control, auditing, tax management and financial 
interpretation. And where there is a vice-president of finance 
or a finance committee, they are usually responsible for financial 
planning, the establishment of financial policy, the assignment of 
functions to the financial staff and overall control."
Respondents in a survey of the duties of one hundred and fifty 
Chief Financial Officers employed in Canadian Corporations performed 
duties similar to the ones referred to above, but ranked cash 
management-relationship with financial institutions, investment 
policy, insurance and pension fund management and debt collection 
management - as the most important duty, (Levesque 1976).
No doubt this preference highlights the importance of cash flow
in conditions of economic recession. However, many of the 
respondents felt that many so-called minor duties might well 
hecome major responsibilities in the future. Weston (op cit) 
shares this view to some extent when he maintains that job 
areas, often referred to as subsidiary activities, connected 
with stimulating sales, salary administration and personnel 
management activities in general, could be legitimately considered 
to be within the province of the chief financial executive. It 
hardly needs stating that the work area of the major financial 
executive is not clearly defined.
The lack of clarity in definitions of the role of the major 
financial executive, below the level of Finance Director, is 
mentioned by implication by Tricker (op> cit) in a British context 
when he admits that this level of responsibility can be divided 
between the Financial Controller and the Finance Manager. The 
Financial Controller participates in corporate strategic planning, 
engages in a continuous appraisal and interpretation of influences 
external to the business, and co-ordinates market forecasts, sales 
objectives and resource allocations into profit plans. As a member 
of the top management he also participates in the setting of 
objectives and development of policies; in the organisation of 
planning and control systems; in establishing, administering and 
developing procedures for resource and expense budgeting; in the 
setting of operating standards and levels of performance; and 
the appraisal of capital projects and subsequent control of 
performance. He would also be actively involved in the final 
interpretation of information for management purposes and with 
the aid of management accounting control techniques he provides 
assistance in the processes of organisational planning, control 
and co-ordination. He assesses managerial performance using 
budgetary performance standards, evaluates performance in key 
results areas and relies on appropriate feedback from the control 
mechanisms he manages. Acquisitions management is an area likely 
to occupy a fair share of his time if the company is expanding by 
merger strategy.
The functions of the Finance Manager, on the other hand, 
are - often in conjunction with the Financial Controller - to 
schedule and programme the monetary requirements of the company
as specified in its plans; to provide the company with finance 
by helping to raise capital and other forms of long-term finance, 
and arranging customers1 credit facilities and collection of 
debts; to provide the necessary organisation for money-handling 
facilities1. - the receipt, custody, banking and payment of company 
monies; and finally, to recommend the investment fund policy 
to be pursued by the company. The role of the Chief Accountant 
is likely to incorporate aspects of both the role of the Financial 
Controller and Finance Manager in some companies.
In eighteen of the thirty-two companies visited by the author, 
in the course of the research study, the person in charge of the 
finance function at the operational level, traditionally classified 
as a Chief Accountant, performed duties which were a cross between 
the stereotype duties of both the Chief Accountant and Financial 
Controller. This was found to be the case to a greater extent 
in small companies, slightly less in larger companies and to a 
lesser extent in medium sized companies. The normal expectation 
is that the Chief Accountant assumes responsibility for the 
recording of historical happenings, preparation of periodic accounts 
and the performance of predictive and interpretive duties within 
guidelines set by a Financial Controller or Financial Director.
On the other hand, the role of the Financial Controller, as 
commented on earlier, is very much concerned with planning and 
controlling the financial element of business operations and 
influencing company policy. A respondent from a medium sized 
company maintained that the roles of Chief Accountant and Financial 
Controller could be merged in a small company. Another respondent 
from a medium sized company, who acted the role of Financial 
Controller but bore the title of Financial Director, felt that 
Chief Accountants in large companies often perform the typical 
duties of a Financial Controller. In another situation, a 
Financial Director in a small company acted in the capacity of 
a Chief Accountant. It is then not surprising for some 
respondents to express views such as: "titles mean little:
they are just internal labels; titles are often created for 
political reasons: a Financial Controller is brought in to
compensate for an inefficient Chief Accountant."
The manner in which titles are distributed among the sample is 
shown in Table 7? Appendix ‘B ’. The title of Chief 
Accountant will be used frequently in the body of the text as 
a generic term to denote respondents.
Tfhatever his title, the person endowed with operational 
responsibility for day to day management of the Finance Function 
©versees the working of a number of accountancy sub-systems. 
.Hastings op cit, identifies a number of industrial accountancy 
sub-systems as: wages calculation and payment; staff salary
preparation; customer accounts and creditor settlement; 
expenditure records and control; departmental operations 
reporting; sales analysis; inventory recording and valuation; 
financial accounts preparation; product, job or process costing; 
pricing; long-range economic forecasting; internal credit; 
organisation and methods; systems and procedures; data-processing 
(ADP and punch cards); investment appraisal; short-term 
investing; fund raising; cashier work. Though this may 
appear to be an exhaustive list, certain basic functions (e.g. 
debtors control) may not form part of the structure of the finance 
function, as is the case with companies trading as retail establish­
ments. Hastings believes one can find different types of 
accounting operators in the finance function and they can be 
classified as follows:-
Data Analyst 
Systems Designers 
Accounting Systems Manager 
Auditor
Industrial accountants acting with the delegated authority of 
the Chief Accountant are likely to have the greatest degree of 
involvement in the roles of both Data Analyst and Accounting 
Systems Manager, though it is not unusual to find accountants 
playing the role of Internal Auditor, checking the operation of 
various systems to verify established rules and procedures.
Design of accounting, systems of modification is sometimes within 
the province of the Chief Accountant btit not always.
The type of activity associated with data analysis consists 
of: inspecting and passing supplier’s accounts for payment;
preparing departmental budgets and operating statements;
calculating the effect of a variation in product mix on 
profitability; examining a capital expenditure proposal to 
see whether it yields a return on investment which would justify 
its approval; calculating the relative advantages of buying or 
leasing certain capital equipment; consolidating the financial 
accounts of subsidiary companies to produce the annual accounts; 
and preparing a tax computation. Management of accounting systems 
finds expression in, for example, the supervision of a cost office 
and controlling staff who are responsible for invoicing, keeping 
sales ledgers, analysis of sales and despatching invoices and 
statements of account.
Finally, as if to confuse matters one stage further, but 
fortunately from the point of view of the study, only in a few 
instances did one find the structure of the finance function 
varying quite dramatically from conventional practice by the 
fragmentation of accounting activities. This can be best 
expressed in diagramatioal form - see Figure 1.3 - to depict the 
situation in one company.
Figure 1.3 
Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics Company 
Finance Function
Director
Plant
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Credit
Controller
Chief
Accountant Services 
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nt Internal
Audit
- Costing
- Office Services
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Management
- Credit 
Control
Accounting 
- Financial 
Accounting
Though the Chief Accountant may frequently act in an advisory 
capacity to other functional managers within an organisation 
his role within his own function is very much a managerial one.
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Numerous attempts have been made to identify and describe 
managerial functions. The management theorists considered 
forecasting, planning, commanding and controlling as the main 
activities of managers. More recently managerial functions have 
been analysed in an explicit fashion embracing Planning;
Co-ordination; Evaluation; Supervision; Representation;
Negotiation. The two most important activities were found to 
be Supervision and Planning, in that order (Mahoney et al 1965)*
The entreprenediial type - the manager- - is actively involved 
in the setting of goals and shaping the structure of the 
organisation, whereas the administrator handles routine decisions 
(Litzinger 1963) • Though according to another source most 
managers cannot be classified as entrepreneurs because they are 
not the source of all formal authority in present day organisations, 
something which rests only in the entrepreneur (Hartman 1959)*
Identifying managerial functions in which managers or 
administrators are engaged in activities internal and external to 
the organisation captured the attention of Hemphill (1959) hut rather 
discouragingly, or as one might expect from the discussion a short 
while ago, he claims that numerous jobs with the same title often 
show wide variation in requirements. In this country Horne and 
Lupton (1965) conducted an empirical investigation of the work 
activities of middle managers and conclude that every activity of a 
manager could be recorded by referring to four elements: formulating,
organising, unifying and regulating. Formulating involves a 
definition of objectives on a short and long term basis with the 
added activity of specifying the human and technical resources 
necessary for their attainment. Organising is concerned with 
the development and maintenance of the means and conditions 
necessary for the implementation of plans and policies which 
arise from the explicit statement of objectives. Unifying 
activities embrace the numerous procedures and practices designed 
to facilitate co-ordination and harmonisation of diverse activities 
with the aim of bringing about smooth working, adaptation and 
efficient operation of the enterprise. Regulating is the activity 
connected with the arrangement and shaping of human and material 
resources. This was the activity which managers from all 
functional areas spent the greater proportion of their time.
But in fact managers engaged in finance and administration were 
ahead of the rest in devoting more time to regulating. The 
management process, as one might expect, consisted of considerable 
time devoted to talking and listening; so the adage of management 
getting things done through people was endorsed. By labelling 
the managerial activities described as task orientation we come 
close- to defining the style of leadership) ’Initiating Structure’ 
(Fleishman and Harris 1962). So implicit in the managerial role 
is the exercise of leaderships and the next chapter will be 
devoted to an analysis of leadership or decision-making behaviour. 
This constitutes the dependent variable and being the major 
variable in the research study it warrants examination from a 
number of angles.
CHAPTER 2
. DECISION-MAKING BEHAVIOUR 
AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS
Sometimes a distinction is drawn between supervision and 
leadership1. The role of the supervisor, endowed with formal 
authority to direct and control the activities of his group, 
may be referred to as that, of 'head1 (Weissenberg 1971) .
Leadership is then said to differ from supervision in that the 
person who is a leader, unlike the supervisor who may not be a 
member of the actual group which he supervises, has received 
acceptance and membership in a specific social group. Most 
research concerned with managerial decision-making behaviour would 
have as an underlying assumption the equation of the formally 
appointed supervisor with that of leader. It would appear 
difficult to exercise the responsibilities of supervision in many 
organisations in our culture without some degree of group-centredness. 
However we define the leadership role the base of a leader's power 
lies in all the resources he can exploit in order to affect the 
behaviour of another. These resources according to Dahl (1957) 
include wealth, capability, prestige, skill, information, physical 
strength and personal rewards like recognition or affection.
In addition the motivation to lead is enhanced by large rewards 
promised by accomplishing the group;' s task, reasonable expectancy 
that by working on the task it can be accomplished, a task which 
requires a high rate of group decisions, a situation which leads 
to acceptance by other members of the group for attempting to 
exercise leaderships the possession of superior knowledge or 
competence relevant to the accomplishment of the task, and finally, 
previously acquired status as the group's leader (Hemphill 1961). 
Obviously many organisational situations fail to satisfy all of 
these conditions.
TRAIT APPROACH TO LEADERSHIP
Early attempts to define leadership centred on the tendency 
to stress the possession of a constellation of desirable qualities 
by the leader. This amounted to imputing to the leader special
powers and perceptive abilities unlikely to be found in a person 
who was not born to be a leader (Bavelas i960). The modern 
traitest approach is less ambitious in creating the supremo image, 
but it would seem that popular traits such as quickness of decision, 
the courage to take risks, coolness under stress, intuition and 
even luck could be valuable attributes to possess as a leader. 
Stogdill (1948) drawing on an extensive review of the literature 
at the time, felt that the personal characteristics or qualities 
of the leader could be classified in accordance with the following 
criteria; capacity, achievement, responsibility, participation 
and status. A re-awakening of some interest in the traitest 
approach in the last couple of years appears to have been 
triggered-off by the presence of economic crisis or the prospect 
of an accelerating crisis situation. In popular journalism one 
has noted some reference of late to the absent qualities of 
leadership. In a prominent feature article - In quest of 
Leadership - which appeared in 'Time Magazine* (1974) we are told 
that most definitions of leadership emphasise honesty, candour and 
vision combined with sheer physical stamina and courage, but leaders 
with these qualities are in short supply. It is then concluded 
that social and communication media changes have removed the myth 
of leadership as if to suggest that perhaps the qualities of 
leadership were a rare phenomenon anyway. Younger (1974) writing 
in the capacity of Managing Director of Hay-M§EL* Management 
Consultants, echoes some nostalgic yearings for the characteristics 
found in the immediate post-war management leaders. These 
characteristics are said to be "integrity and moral courage, 
team spirit, loyalty and will-power; persuasiveness by example 
and by physical presence at the scene of action". He maintains 
that technocrats have proliferated with the iioticeable absence of 
the capacity to inspire, to foster co-operation, to develop 
goodwill and secure the following of the men on the shop floor.
It is the trade union officials - 'union leaders' - not the managers 
who appeal to "the admirable emotive qualities of loyalty, 
solidarity, sense of comradeship and common purpose and communicate 
in the language of their members". Younger is not far from the 
truth when he observes the neutralisation of the foreman's role as 
a result of the growth of functional specialisms and the increasing
sophistication of high speed information systems. This leaves a 
gap at first-line supervision level and opens the way to 
intervention by a new generation of managers - often highly 
educated with many whose fathers may be members of a blue-collar 
union - who are not fully conversant with the language, values and 
folklore of the shop^ floor. It is now generally accepted that 
leadership is not a question of passive and undynamic status in an 
organisation or the mere possession of some combination of traits. 
Rather it is a phenomenon in which a leader acquires status through 
active involvement and participation in a task, normally in a group- 
situation, where the leader demonstrates his capacity for carrying 
co-operative tasks through to completion. In order to successfully 
achieve this objective it is likely for him to be intelligent, alert 
to the needs and motives of others, and possess insight, initiative, 
persistence, self-confidence and the ability to assume responsibility 
(Stogdill op cit). In this way we recognise the importance of the 
interaction between personality, task and group factors as influences 
contributing to the determination of leadership styles. One tends 
to be inclined to the view expressed by Yukl (op cit) that -
"there is a great deal of semantic 
confusion regarding the conceptual and 
operational definition of leadership.
Terms defining leadership behaviour have 
proliferated over the years and the same 
term is often used differently from one 
study to the next."
Nevertheless this must not deter us from our endeavours to identify 
the significant strands of thought permeating this area of study.
LEADERSHIP STYLE AND PERSONALITY
The first major study of leadership styles took place in a 
non-industrial setting where aspects of group functioning under 
different types of group atmosphere and different types of leadership 
were investigated (Lippit and White 1939* 1943)* Differentiation
in leadership style - autocratic, democratic, laissez faire - was 
associated with different behavioural reactions among group members. 
The groups appeared to react very favourably to the imposition of 
democratic leadership practice. There appeared to be greater group) 
purpose, harmonious interaction, less aggression and hostility and
group-unity.in the democratic groups than in the autocratic groups. 
The reaction of group members to the laissez faire style was 
marked with a lower degree of efficiency, organisation and 
satisfaction.
More relevant are the observations of Lowin (1968) on leadership 
style,, since they apply to the work organisational setting. He 
postulates the ideal autocratic and democratic leadership style.
In the autocratic model there is a noticeable absence of credit 
for suggestions emanating from subordinates and lack of formal 
recognition of subordinates1 efforts. A learning experience and 
frequent reinforcement is denied the subordinate because he has no 
feedback to rely on due to the lack of institutionalisation of his 
contribution to decision-making. Neither does the subordinate 
develop an insight into the factors which must be considered in 
choosing among alternatives in a decision situation. Should he 
make a contribution he probably gets no credit for it. The 
subordinate, as a result, has little motivation to contribute 
beyond what is minimally expected of him. Under an ideal.democratic 
or participative system, participation by subordinates is more 
frequent and more constructive. Managers are more prepared to 
discuss relevant issues with subordinates and to respect their 
suggestions. When suggestions are received and evaluated the 
reaction is transmitted to the subordinate in the form of feedback. 
This contributes to a desirable level of motivation and promotes 
the quality of future suggestions. It also leads to greater 
involvement and contributes to high performance standards.
This is a theme which will be taken up and expanded later, but 
first we shall analyse the influence of personality as an intervening 
variable in the determination of leadership style.
In any examination of the applicability of a particular style 
of leadership cognizance of factors residing in the personalities 
of both the superior and subordinate is welcome. Drawing on 
empirical observations or insightful perception one shall, in the 
first instance, examine personality from the stance of the sub­
ordinate .
It is suggested that the hostile individual does better under 
the autocratic leader; his latent hostility must be controlled so
as to confine his work to constructive ends. The aggressive 
co-operative type of individual will work better under democracy 
and laissez faire. His self-assertiveness will take constructive 
paths and he will head in the right direction when on his own.
The individualist who is very familiar with his job is better off 
under laissez faire (Uris 1951)• A participative style appears 
to be appropriate if the subordinate’s need for independence is 
high (Tannenbaum and Schmidt 1958)• If leadership practices 
result in a superior monopolising official communication with the 
attendant consequence of denying the subordinate pertinent 
information, this creates certain disadvantages. A cognitive 
structure of the work situation is denied the subordinate and this 
results in emotionalism, lack of direction and alienation. 
"Furthermore, the denial of information by concealing the relation 
between activities and the larger group objectives denies the 
satisfaction of knowing one is part of a larger, important, 
co-operative effort " (Thompson 1961). Likewise the subordinate 
could feel frustrated in situations where the superior can interfere 
with his freedom of action and the realisation of his ambitions.
Any hostility released by the subordinate as a result is not 
compatible with acts of submission to the superior because of the 
likelihood of creating guilt. In psycho-analytical terms, a 
reaction formation sets in when hostilities are repressed and 
replaced by admiration. Autocratic leadership behaviour is also 
said to interfere adversely with spontaneity, creativity and attacks 
co-operativeness (Coch and French 1948).
According to Argyris (1973) authoritarianism appeals to the 
infancy dimensions of the subordinate’s personality and promotes 
dependency and submissiveness. So if the subordinate is fixated 
at the infancy end of the personality continuum then perhaps he is 
more likely to appreciate autocratic behaviour. Tannenbaum (1962) 
cites evidence suggesting that one group of female clerks did not 
wish to avail of the opportunity to participate more in decisions 
affecting their work, instead they preferred to be submissive, 
dependent on others, obeying the rules and following the 
instructions. Apparently, any motivational benefit springing 
from subordinate participation is likely to be offset by anxiety 
(Hickson 1966). But surely this must depend on the proneness to
suffer from anxiety in the first instance. Wispe and Lloyd (1955) 
produce evidence suggesting that low productivity insurance salesmen 
were prone to suffer some anxiety, they indicated a desire for 
interpersonal interaction through the vertical hierarchical structure 
where decisions were made by the District Manager, and they preferred 
people in authority to act aloof but with a certain friendly 
disposition and not to be too intimate. The more successful, less 
threatened, salesmen preferred more permissive authority relations 
with an absence of communication barriers due to status, and the 
emphasis they gave to reporting through the chain of command was 
that much less evident. Those of a personality type which manifests 
itself as authoritarian or having a strong need for independence 
respond less favourably to the opportunity to participate in decisions 
(Vroom i960). This is a view not shared by Tosi (1970) who was 
unable to replicate the results of Vroom*s study, and the assertion 
that a strong need for independence is not compatible with a 
participative style is in direct opposition to the proposition of 
Tannenbaum and Schmidt (op cit). One might also take issue with 
Argyris (1973) on the question of the implied association between 
conformity and authoritarianism. In fact the generality of the 
relationship between conformity and authoritarianism has been 
challenged (Bass 1955) (Steiner and Johnson•1963).
The reaction of group members to different leadership styles 
in the White and Lippit experimental study is quite illuminating in 
terms of subordinate response. Autocracy was found to promote much 
hostility and aggression, and led to the harbouring of latent 
discontent. This was found not to be so in the democratic groups.
But equally the autocratic leader by not disclosing at the outset 
the sequence of steps in the work process, having decided instead 
to reveal them in a piecemeal fashion, had the effect of reducing 
anxiety and promoting dependence because of the presence of a partial 
rather than global picture of the work cycle. Perhaps anxiety prone 
subordinates are those who have become accustomed to expressing 
behaviour closer to the infant end of the personality continuum 
(Argyris 1959) ox have a history of low productivity (Wispe and 
Lloyd op cit).
We have so far discussed the relationship between the 
personality of the subordinate and leadership style. It is now
time to shed some light on the nature of personality of the superior 
in the context of leadership style. However, it is well to remember 
that often the individual who in one capacity acts as a subordinate 
in another acts the role of a superior. The right to exercise 
control - authority - has a number of psychological meanings.
It relates to'superiority, dominance, submission, guidance, help, 
criticism and-: reprimand. It also conjures up images of manliness 
and virility (Tannenbaum op cit). A superior whose feelings of 
insecurity in an uncertain situation does not allow him to release 
control over the decision-making process may be unable to involve 
subordinates to the extent required by participative leadership 
(Tannenbaum and Schmidt op cit). If he has a strong need for 
predictability and stability, he may consider the act of releasing 
control as something that reduces the predictability of the outcome. 
Frequently one hears mentioned the difficult supervisory role 
inherent in the role of the foreman (the man in the middle).
He suffers from a lot of pressure further up the hierarchy and 
this may have the effect of creating dependent, subordinate and 
submissive individuals. According to Argyris (1959) the nature of 
their managerial role does not permit them to voice undue criticism 
or display apathy or indifference.
There appears to be some evidence to associate authoritarian 
behaviour with authoritarianism, and the latter with a lower level 
of intelligence (McGee 1955) "but since this evidence is derived 
from a laboratory experiment one ought to exercise extreme caution 
in any extrapolation to the industrial scene. Sales (1966) seems 
to equate efficiency with high intelligence in a work situation but 
does so rather superficially. He indica-tes that the more 
intelligent supervisor is likely to diagnose production difficulties 
more quickly, takes remedial action more effectively and is more 
proficient at the exercise of skill related to day-to-day production 
problems. For these reasons the highly intelligent supervisor is 
believed to be the most efficient. Support for this viewpoint 
comes from French and Synder (1959) who found that airforce 
officers who exerted the greatest influence over subordinates’ 
judgements were rated the highest on general intelligence by 
subordinates. Apparently an executive new to his job and feeling 
uncertain about situations confronting him is likely to seek
elaborate counsel, but the self-contained manager prefers to 
deliberate alone (Litchfield 1956) obviously involving his 
subordinates to a minimum extent in the decision-making process.
One frequently comes round to asking why someone seeks the role of 
the manager or supervisor in the first instance and then subsequently 
adopts one style rather: than another? This is a rather difficult 
question to answer and the answers that are available are speculative. 
For example, Thompson (1961) feels that people with great dominance 
and status needs evolve within the hierarchy, though some satisfy 
their dominance needs by identifying with their superiors; this in 
turn reinforces the superior's dominance and status drives. A 
superior may impose autocratic rule as an outlet for aggressions 
repressed because of his own exposure to autocratic rule as a 
subordinate (Fromm 1942). Still on the theme of the characteristics 
of the autocrat, McMurry (1958) goes to some length in distinguishing 
between the strong (benevolent) and weak autocrat. His greatest 
admiration is reserved for the strong or benevolent autocrat who he 
believes is aggressive, hard-driving, self-reliant, task-centred 
but apparently is in no way a tyrant or exploiter. As a contrast, 
the weak autocrat is the one that causes a bad image for autocracy. 
Though often intelligent, loyal, conscientious and technically well 
qualified, he places an overwhelming exphasis on security, tends to 
be dependent, fearful and anxious and compensates for his 
insecurities by assuming an arbitrary authoritarian exterior, 
often punctuated by a great emphasis on status and symbols. He 
tends to abide religiously by the rules and regulations and his 
lust for power is only matched by his tyrannical manner which acts 
as a mask for his inner doubts or uncertainties and eliminates the 
likelihood of he having to defend his position. He tends to be 
a strict disciplinarian with subordinates and obsequious to 
superiors. Perhaps Tannenbaum and Massarik (1950) had the weak 
autocrat in mind when they suggested that a leader- may resort to 
discipline of a harsh nature in order to express a deep-seated 
hostility need. ¥e appear now to enter the realm of unconscious 
, motivations in leadership behaviour and this obviously poses acute 
problems from the standpoint of their identification and measurement, 
though Litzinger (op cit)- using the Gordon Survey of Interpersonal 
Values, Questionnaire.- made a brave attempt. Selected personality
variables were found to differ when the roles of centralised and 
decentralised bank managers were examined. It could now be 
argued that the personality disposition of both the superior and 
subordinate is influential in determining the appropriateness of a 
particular style of leadership* just as situational variables, to 
be discussed later, are also likely to have an impact. It is for 
this reason that the research instrument accommodates measures of 
a semi-personality nature.
LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS
It is commonplace to find all-round leadership effectiveness 
associated with a democratic or permissive leadership style. In 
this section it is proposed to examine the claims made by the 
proponents of democratic leadership. In doing so one will attempt 
to pinpoint instances where this style may be inappropriate and a 
more directive style appropriate.
Likert (1961) at the Institute for Social Research, University 
of Michigan, has identified differences in leadership styles that 
appear to influence managerial effectiveness. According to 
Likert the supervisors and managers who are credited with the 
highest productivity, lowest costs, least turnover and absence 
rates, and the highest level of employee motivation and satisfaction 
are employee-centred rather than job-centred. The employee-centred 
manager is perceived by his subordinates as supportive, friendly 
and helpful rather than hostile. "He is kind but firm, never 
threatening, genuinely interested in the well-being of subordinates 
and endeavours to treat people in a sensitive considerate way."
He is also capable at such activities as planning and scheduling, 
training subordinates, supplying them with the necessary methods 
and materials and initiating work activity. Bowers and Seashore 
(1966) have done an excellent job in comparing and integrating a 
number of established schools of thought in leadership and come up) 
with a scheme not far removed from that of Likert. The four 
concepts of leadership - support, interaction facilitation, goal 
emphasis and work facilitation - draw our attention to the leadership 
role as one designed to enhance one's self-esteem, fosters close 
mutually satisfying relationships, stimulating enthusiasm to meet
group goals with the emphasis on high performance, and finally, 
scheduling, planning, co-ordinating and providing the facilities 
and knowledge to enable subordinates to achieve their targets#
These leadership roles need not necessarily be provided by a 
formally designated leader? but by any member of the group-. Bowers 
and Seashore conclude from an analysis of their field study that 
different aspects of performance are associated with different 
leadership characteristics.
The employee-centred manager, as defined by Likert, would 
appear to rank high on Consideration and Initiating Structure.
It was a group) of researchers at the OHIO State University who 
isolated and identified Initiating Structure and Consideration as 
basic dimensions of leadership behaviour. Before finally settling 
on these two dimensions Halpin and Winer (1957) devised the 
'Leader Behaviour Description Questionnaire' (LBDQ) which incorporated 
Consideration, Initiating Structure, Production Emphasis and 
Sensitivity. A consideration orientation indicates friendship, 
mutual trust, respect and warmth. Initiating Structure is the 
type of behaviour that defines and organises organisational 
relationships or roles, establishes well-defined patterns of 
organisation, channels of communication and ways of getting jobs 
done. A production emphasis and sensitivity orientation are ' 
respectively concerned with pointing the finger at goals to 
motivate subordinates, and developing awareness to interrelationship 
and internal and external group pressures. In recent times a new 
scale, 'Tolerance of Member Freedom' was introduced, and this could 
be regarded as a measure of degree of participation.
The job-centred manager would appear to rank high on Initiating 
Structure and low on Consideration. Fleishman et al (1955) when 
examining the leadership scores and the behavioural outcome measures 
conclude that foremen who scored high in Initiating Structure and 
low in Consideration had more accidents, unexcused absences, formal 
grievances and turnover. However, Greenwood and McNamara (1969) 
claim that both Initiating Structure and Consideration are 
uncorrelated with various behavioural measures of supervisory 
performance, attitudes or abilities. Implied in Fleishman's 
(1953) comments on attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of 
Initiating Structure and Consideration are a recognition that these
two factors are mutually exclusive. Weissenberg and Kavanagh 
(1972) maintain that the orthogonality of the dimensions 
Initiating Structure and Consideration is to a large extent 
dependent on the type of leadership behaviour questionnaire used.
The greatest independence is attributable to the Leadership Opinion 
Questionnaire. This means that one can be directive in managing 
subordinates towards achieving organisational goals and at the same 
time establishing highly supportive relations with them. When 
subordinates describe their leader's behaviour under the LBDQ they 
perceive Consideration and Initiating Structure as having lesser 
independence than that prevailing under the Leadership Opinion 
Questionnaire. In addition, Kavanagh (1972) maintains that task 
complexity and subordinate competence - situational variables - 
mediate the independence of Consideration and Initiating Structure, 
with subordinate competence being the more important. In a later 
publication Kavanagh (1975) concludes from his empirical data that 
the role of the leader does, and is expected to integrate the 
approaches of Initiating Structure and Consideration.
In Likert's advocacy of permissive leadership we witness the 
promulgation of a set of ideas which form the foundation base of 
the school of participative leadership. Bennis (1966) conceives 
this type of leadership largely in terms of a 'system of values' 
governing behaviour with a commitment to full and free communication, 
a reliance on consensus rather than on the more customary forms of 
coercion or compromise to tackle and manage conflict, and an 
atmosphere that permits and encourages emotional expression as 
well as being task-oriented. This would be supplemented by the 
suggestion that influence rests on technical competence and 
knowledge rather than the vagaries of personal whims or prerogatives 
of power, and is considered the ideal recipe for knowledge-oriented 
and scientific based industries (Slater and Bennis 19&4)•
Argyris (1973) argues that as the individual moves from the 
infant end of a personality continuum, where he is basically 
dependent and submissive, with few and shallow abilities and a 
short time perspective, to the adult end, where he is endowed with 
relative independence, autonomy, self-control, many abilities and 
a few in depth, a.nd a long-time perspective, then we have to design 
or re-design jobs to permit increased self-regulation, self- 
evaluation, self-adjustment and participation in the setting of
goals. By doing so it is alleged, we bring about a betterment 
of productivity and attitudes. McGregor (i960) views the 
position of man in organisations in a similar vein. He contends 
that, contrary to general misconceptions, man has within himself 
the capacity to exercise self-direction and self-control in the 
achievement of objectives to which he is committed. He is likely 
to assume responsibility rather than to shed it and if he is lazy, 
indolent or passive it is not due to inherent human weaknesses but 
attributable to previous organisational experience. There is also 
a recognition that the full potential of human resources is not 
realised in organisations. This is a theme very much in evidence 
in the 'Human Resources’ model postulated by Miles (1965)*
Heavily influenced by the writings of theorists such as Likert, 
McGregor and Haire, he maintains that there exists in organisations 
reservoirs of untapped resources and that "these resources include 
not only physical skills and energy but also creative ability and 
the capacity for responsible, self-directed, self-controlled 
behaviour." The model has also something to say about the 
improvement of the quality of decisions and company performance 
through effective delegation, and that involvement in decisions 
applies to non-routine as well as to routine matters. Also, the 
opportunity for the exercise of self-direction and self-control 
should be a progressive thing in line with the growth in ability 
and experience of the individual. The dual-factor theory - 
motivator/hygiene - of; Herzberg (1966) would accommodate this 
perspective when it expounds the view that it is the motivator 
factors, centring on the job itself, which bring about job 
satisfaction and increased commitment to the task in hand. On 
the other hand, hygiene factors if improved can alleviate job 
dissatisfaction. In the spirit of participative management the 
practical implementation of the dual-factor theory is a job 
enrichment scheme.
Sales (op cit) rationalises the relationship between high 
performance and democratic supervision by appealing to a basic 
tenet of experimental psychology. This states that high levels 
of performance will prevail in situations in which the reinforcement 
is large. So it follows that the more reinforcement an employee 
receives for production the higher the level of production.
He also invokes the view of the self-actualisation and ego-esteem 
school of thought - based on the work of Maslov (1954) - which 
maintains that democratic supervision provides the means for 
satisfying the higher level human needs. This is achieved by 
allowing subordinates freedom in determining the specific form 
and content of their work, and as a result implicating their 
personalities in the tasks they perform. This can be contrasted 
with the behaviour of the authoritarian supervisor who puts the 
stibordinate in a situation where he carries things out at the will 
of the supervisor, at the same time reducing the opportunity to 
express certain important needs on the job; all this, of course, 
rests on the assumption that workers wish to satisfy higher level 
human needs. Because work is less satisfying under autocracy it 
is concluded that productivity would suffer.
The Survey Research Centre, University of Michigan, relying 
primarily on ratings by self, superior, subordinate or observer 
seems to extoll the virtues of general supervision, as we found 
earlier in connection with the work of Likert. Drawing on their 
studies of a variety of industrial situations - e.g. railway 
maintenance crews, insurance office staff, production lines in 
heavy industry - Katz and Kahn (1953) conclude that general 
supervision together with employee oriented attitudes in the 
supervisor were associated with the highest productivity. Though 
a note of caution should be added. Katz et al (1951) failed to 
replicate findings supporting participative management. In this 
country Argyle et al (qpcit) undertook a replication of these 
investigations and found that foremen of high producing work groups 
tended to use general rather than close supervision and were 
relatively more employee-oriented in their behaviour than were 
foremen of less-productive groups. An employee-orientation is 
present when a leader acknowledges the importance of the human 
relations aspects of his job, he has a healthy respect for human 
beings, takes an interest in them and accepts their individuality 
and personal needs. Argyle et al make the point that certain 
conditions had to be fulfilled before democratic supervision was 
effective. These were abandonment of piece rates and the 
existence of operator-controlled tasks. The beneficial aspects 
of a participative leadership style in terms of managerial
success is reported by Blake and Moutgn (1964)? and Bavelas and 
Strauss (1961) draw our attention to the problems created by 
management arbitrarily revoking, without consultation in face of 
opposition, the productivity bonuses female workers had come to 
expect as a result of been given the opportunity to determine 
their work rate by controlling their own conveyor belt.
Moving on to professional groups, Baumgartel (1957) found 
that participative patterns of behaviour, as opposed to directive 
or laissez faire patterns, were associated with higher task 
motivation and a greater sense of progress among scientists.
Pelz and Andrews (1966) report that scientists were more effective 
when they were able to influence key decision makers. The 
scientists experienced a combination of both autonomy and moderate 
levels of co-ordination by their supervisors; having too much or 
too loose co-ordination was counterproductive. But it would seem 
that a moderate amount of autonomy, where the scientist experiences 
a certain amount of direction, is also necessary, in order to 
achieve an impressive publications output. Having too much or 
too little autonomy was associated with lower productivity (Cotgrove 
and Box 1970).
Other evidence blurs this picture somewhat by either being 
less clearcut or contradictory. Heschler et al (1952) studied 
the relationship between job satisfaction, level of morale and 
productivity to restrictive and permissive supervisory styles in 
two comparable divisions of a naval laboratory. ' ¥hen the 
subordinate scientific personnel rated themselves on the dimensions 
mentioned, job satisfaction, morale in general and productivity 
were higher in the permissive leadership groups. The picture 
changed in one significant respect when superiors, supported by 
specialists, did: the rating. Although the highest level of job 
satisfaction and morale was still attributable to the permissive- 
orient ed groups, productivity was considered to be higher in the 
restrictive-oriented group. The important thing to remember here 
is not necessarily the relationship between satisfaction and morale 
011 the one side and productivity on the other, which in any case 
is not necessarily a positive correlation, but the superiority of 
autocracy on the basis of efficiency as seen through the eyes of 
superior and objective by-standers. The best researcher was found 
working under restrictive supervision. But age may somehow be 
an important variable likely to have influenced the result because
invariably those subjected to restrictive supervision were much
younger, and perhaps more eager. In a study of scientists working
in a Research Centre, Andrews and Farris (1967) felt the quality of 
supervision and a good human relations approach had not much of a
relationship with innovation. It was also found that a lacking in
job related, human relations and supervisory skills could be
compensated by granting freedom to subordinates, consulting them,
with the superior still taking some decisions on his own. This
was found to promote positively the level of innovation.
An interesting view of leadership in a research environment 
has been put forward recently by Barnowe (1975) when he reported 
that leadership tended to assume greater overall importance when 
scientists were in some way disadvantaged, that is when they were 
unable to consult with colleagues in their field and when they had 
relatively less research experience. He concludes with,a view of 
leadership which is essentially non-interventionist. The Research 
and Development Supervisor serves primarily in a helping role, 
providing assistance to subordinate scientists as needed, but he 
is not necessarily relied upon or considered influential when not 
needed.
A general level of support for democratic leadership emerges 
from the findings of survey investigations conducted in organisations. 
In the survey investigation one must be prepared to err on the side 
of caution when drawing causal inferences from the data.
Therefore it would seem worthwhile to establish whether the above 
patterns or trends are sustained by the evidence derived from 
experimental studies conducted in organisations. Coch and French 
(op cit) conducted an experimental study at a plant of the Harwood 
Corporation. It was prompted by the presence of acute employee 
resistance to work methods and job changes which resulted in a 
high grievance and turnover rate, very low efficiency and 
restriction of output. The researchers decided to create an 
experimental and control group, the experimental group participating 
in the evaluation and redesign of their jobs. The latter group 
surpassed their previous performance, unlike the control group, but 
only after experiencing an unsatisfactory contribution for a 
transitional period. During this period 62$ of employees whose 
jobs were modified suffered a chronic substandard performance or
left the job during the retraining stage. An encouraging note to 
these experiments was the impressive performance of control groups 
when exposed to the same conditions as experienced by the 
experimental groups. In a very ambitious and penetrating 
investigation Morse and Reimer (1956) created groups exposed to 
either democratic or autocratic styles of supervision by altering 
the styles used in an ongoing industrial setting. Four divisions 
within a company were subject to investigation. In two divisions 
a participative style was used, decision-making was deliberately 
pushed down the hierarchy, supervisors were trained to use 
supervisory methods of a democratic nature and there was an 
appreciable increase in their freedom of action. In the other 
two divisions greater hierarchical control was introduced by an 
increase in the closeness of supervision and there was a noticeable 
shift upwards in the level at which decisions were made. These 
conditions prevailed for a year and approximately 500 employees 
were involved. It was found that both programmes contributed to 
a significant increase in productivity, surprisingly with a slight 
advantage accruing to the authoritarian system. A similar result 
was reported by French et al (i960) when they replicated the earlier 
study of Coch and French. Both on productivity and attitudinal 
dimensions the results were discouraging for the participation group?, 
though one should point out that members of the experimental 
(participative) group were faster learners. In trying to 
rationalise the failure of the experimental group, Lowin (op cit) 
maintains that the contributory factor responsible was management’s 
failure to include central issues such as production level and 
rate-setting in the participative decision-making process; also 
it is alleged that only minor matters were discussed.
Perhaps a better rationalisation would be in terms of cultural 
variation. The study conducted by French and his colleagues took 
place in a Norwegian factory. Similarly, a study by Whyte (1963) 
challenges the universal applicability of the U.S.A. participative 
management school by showing that in Peru it was the close 
supervisor who exercised definite pressure for production and 
was as a consequence the most highly regarded. Obviously the 
findings from the experimental studies quoted above are somewhat 
discouraging when it comes to the endorsement of participative 
leadership;.
When we turn our attention to the findings from experimental 
studies outside work organisations we are still not convinced of 
the alleged superiority of participative leadership. Shaw (1955) 
created three communication networks to engage in problem-solving 
exercises and nominated the person who received the highest 
independence score in each network to behave in either an autocratic 
or democratic manner. He found that the subjects exposed to 
autocracy, rather than democracy, required less time to solve 
problems and made fewer errors regardless of the communication 
networks in which they were placed. In a similar experimental 
situation McCurdy arid Eber (1953) reached an indecisive result.
They exposed groups, engaged in a task which consisted of the 
proper setting of three switches, to autocratic and democratic 
conditions. In the autocratic climate one person was the absolute 
supervisor with power to order the others. In the democratic 
climate the instructions from the experimenters emphasised 
equalitarianism, stating that each person could offer suggestions 
and that nobody could issue orders to other members of the groups.
It was found that neither the autocratic or democratic style of 
supervision was superior on a productivity criterion. However, 
an unequivocal movement in the direction of democratic leadership 
can be discerned from a finding of Day and Hambliri (1964)* They 
trained a female student to employ close and general supervisory 
styles and to lead groups of female students engaged in an 
assembly line task in a laboratory setting. The most effective 
productivity record was found among subjects who worked with the 
leader practising general supervision. The group method of 
decision-making, in which members are allowed to discuss their 
feelings, raise objections and request information on judgemental 
matters, appears to be very effective indeed (Lewin 1968).
This can be explained in terms of ’owning* a decision in which 
one participated in determining coupled with the influence of 
group pressure, in some cases leading to a reduction in cognitive 
dissonance where a private view is at variance with a publicly 
stated one.
What is surprising, and contrary to one’s expectations, is 
that the nature of the task does not appear to be an important 
consideration, generally speaking, in the laboratory experiments.
Because we find problem-solving exercises lending themselves to 
autocratic supervision or to both types of supervision.
Routine tasks, which one might consider amenable to autocratic 
or restrictive leadership behaviour, are performed better under 
democratic practices. It is then not surprising for Lowin (op cit) 
to voice an opinion that participative decision-making models are 
simplistic ones in a laboratory setting because "they fail to 
reflect just those issues which form the very heart of the 
organisational phenomenon".
The findings of the survey investigations - rather than the 
experimental findings - come down firmly on the side of democracy 
and its benefits. Sales (op cit) offers an explanation to account 
for the failure of the experimental method to replicate the survey 
findings. Generally the brevity of the experimental session would 
rank as a serious explanation if it was not for the fact that the 
experiment lasted for a year in one situation. Perhaps the nature 
of the task is not given enough serious consideration. Sales 
maintains that the exercises in the experimental studies whereby 
the subject suggests possible solutions to simple problems is not 
enough to implicate the unique personalities of the subjects in 
their tasks, and he cites Morse and Reimer (op cit) who report 
that "both groups of clerks indicated that their jobs throughout 
the course of the experiment did not give them a very high degree 
of self-actualisation". Sales also feels that intervening 
variables - e.g. turnover, absenteeism - which mediate the 
relationship between leadership style and performance are crucial 
factors and should receive more of our attention. His solution as 
a starter would be to eliminate the influence of turnover and 
absenteeism from the relationship between leadership style and 
performance in the survey studies and create more opportunities in 
the experimental studies for self-actualisation. Then we would be 
favourably disposed to comparing the effectiveness of each style. 
Lowin (op cit) also stresses the point that we consider the influence 
of the mediating variables he considers important - personality, 
culture, work expectations and environment and leadership patterns 
set at the higher organisational levels. Influenced by Lowin, 
Ritchie and Miles (op cit) empirically established that the degree 
of trust and confidence the immediate superior had in his
subordinate and the frequency with which he consulted him were 
the important mediating variables between leadership style and 
satisfaction with immediate supervision. We have already 
considered personality as a mediating influence, and situational 
factors will receive more emphasis later. But first, a return to 
participative or democratic leadership. A point worthy of note 
is the extent to which it has influenced thought processes and 
prescription as a panacea for corporate ills in the area of 
management education and training but particularly, since we are 
concerned with the behaviour of accountants, in the area of 
behavioural accounting.
We are only too aware of the impact of varying applications 
of control techniques by those occupying leadership positions in 
organisations. The impact is felt in terms of individual satis­
factions, frustration, tension, euphoria and self-actualisation.
One such important control technique operated by accountants 
within organisations is budgetary control. The relationship the 
accountant has with the appropriate functional manager is not 
normally a vertical relationship'but a lateral one. Nevertheless, 
it is maintained that conventional budgeting practice based on 
planning and control relies on pressure, coercion and close 
supervision (Gibson 1970). Commenting on the value of conventional 
cost control systems, such as budgetary control, designed to monitor 
employee performance where information on variances is passed up, 
across and down the organisational hierarchy, Argyris (1953) 
favours a movement towards self-control and self-discipline as a 
motivating force. The individual at the lowest level of the 
organisation is then given the opportunity to draw from the control 
system the information needed to evaluate his own performance and 
communicate upwards at his discretion matters requiring attention 
and action. For this to take root it would require a truly 
participative leadership climate in which mutual acceptance and 
trust between organisational participants exists as to the design 
and use of managerial control systems. Hofstede (1968) in his 
influential study of budgeting practice states the belief that 
supervisors or managers strive for the gratification of higher 
level human needs - self-esteem, esteem from others and 
self-actualisation - in the cycle of events leading to the
achievement of the budget. Also they are likely to seek challenge 
from the setting of budget standards. It is usual when using the 
budget as a motivational device to build on the lower psychological 
needs for these people, which may prove ineffective or possibly 
have a negative effect. Relating formal budget goals to the 
individual’s aspiration level is considered important in terms of 
challenge or withdrawal, leading to feelings of success or failure 
(Stedry and Kay 19*66$ Child and Whiting 1954)*
Implicit in a number of the above remarks is an acknowledgement 
that the system of control is based on an authoritarian model of 
human behaviour (Caplan 1971)• Those who share this view are 
eager and ready to recommend participation as essential in the 
process' of setting budget standards and find it easy to amass 
supporting evidence, for examples the more participation there 
is in the process of setting budgets, the greater the commitment 
of personal motivation towards the achievement of budgets (Coch 
and French op cit); a higher level of participation leads to a 
higher level of motivation (Hofstede op cit); employees 
participating in setting standards performed better than those 
who did not (Bass.& Leavitt 1963)? active participation in the 
budgetary control system aims to get the participants ego-involved 
not just task-involved (Wallace 1966). In addition Dunbar (1971) 
would argue that discussion regarding goals is not enough; it 
must be backed-up with goal getting. Lest the unsuspecting 
accountant is complacent he is admonished to be on his guard in 
case pseudo-participation and biasing creep into the pragmatism 
of participants. Argyris (1953) emphasises the pseudo-participative 
tactics of the controller who at one and the same time encourages an 
exchange of opinions and, believing that the line supervisors have 
not much to contribute anyway, is very keen to get their signatures 
endorsed on the new budget signifying their approval - just in 
case of comeback. On the other hand, budget biasing, which is 
probably easier to perpetrate in a participatory system, amounts 
to managers inflating costs or reducing revenue at the budget stage 
(Schiff and Lewin 1970). According to Lowe and Shaw (1968) 
managers felt it to be in their interest to agree lower rather 
than higher budget standards, striking a balance between present 
job security and increasing future income. They highlight the
subtlety of the individual manager, whose track record may be 
either impressive or wanting, in influencing forecasts to win 
short or long term approval or personal benefits.
Doubts have been cast on the substance of ideas emanating from 
the participative leadership school. Katz and Kahn (1966) 
commenting on the group discussion method refer to two assumptions 
underpinning it which are apparent but not always explicit and 
certainly not always met in practice. First, that the groups 
are peer groups, with each person being equal in terms of formal 
authority? in many reality situations however an authority or 
status figure is present at the discussions. Second, the 
participants come to the group representing their own beliefs 
about cause/effect and preferred outcomes, rather than as formal 
representatives of other groups. Bobbitt et al (1974) argue that 
we need a clearer understanding of what we mean by democratic 
group discussion. Target setting, for example, is considered 
highly influential (Loclce 1968), and perhaps in the total effects 
attributable to interpersonal participation in reaching decisions 
a sizeable proportion is due to target setting. Social interaction, 
a natural concomitant of participation, may have the effects of 
impairing performance in problem solving exercises (Vroom et al 
1969)• Perhaps this is one reason why autocratic supervision 
was found effective in a laboratory experiment on problem solving 
mentioned earlier in the discussion. Is it necessary to consider 
commitment in addition to interaction when we speak of participation? 
It would appear that should the individual identify with a decision 
he helped to make, then he would become motivated to ensure 
successful adoption of that decision, if only to maintain a 
favourable self-concept. Increased commitment to carry out 
decisions is, however, not the same thing conceptually as increased 
task motivation. A subordinate could succumb to group pressure 
and commit himself to a decision which has the effect of restricting 
output or resisting change (Yukl op cit). Does it really matter 
if somebody does not participate in actuality but perceives that 
he does (March and Simon 1958)? Our pseudo-participative 
controller referred to by Argyris would no doubt consider perceived 
but unreal or deceptive participation to have beneficial 
psychological effects, just like real participation. But Heller 
(op cit) believes this discounts the perceptiveness of the highly
intelligent subordinate, so the psychological reaction to 
deceptive participation is unlikely to be the same as it is to 
real participation. Earlier it was considered that subordinate 
participation helps to reduce resistance to change (Coch and 
French op cit) . The subordinate is given the chance to air his 
doubts and fears about the proposed change. If the change is 
to the subordinate’s advantage all is well, but if the proposals 
are clearly detrimental to the subordinate, problems in eliciting 
support are an inevitable consequence. Leavitt (1965) doubts 
whether the ’total participation’ condition was fulfilled in the 
Coch and French experiment. He feels that the objective of the 
discussions appears to have been to gain acceptance of a 
preconceived desired change and asks what would happen if the 
change being urged by management was not attractive to the groups. 
Therefore he concludes that the approach adopted amounted to 
manipulation. A similar accusation is levelled at participative 
management in the same context by Gomberg (1966). He feels that 
participative management at the Harwood Corporation amounted to 
involuntary manipulation. The way the groups subsequently 
embraced the union seemed to confirm this observation. Experimental 
secret groups developed, normally as a precaution against speeding-up 
activities by the organisation. Gomberg asks a number of pertinent 
questions: ’’Was this a cleverly contrived managerial device to
break the solidarity of the group? Were the workers free to decline 
the management invitation to increase production? Was there real 
participation in defining mutual objectives, or did management 
define the objectives and then democratically manipulate the workers 
as a means to achieve them? Did the workers feel threatened by this 
kind of manipulative democracy?”
Challenging the legitimacy of the assertions made by the 
proponents of group decision-making that acceptance, consensus, 
stimulation and growth, improvement in communication and seriousness 
of work contribution have desirable consequences, McMurry (op cit) 
feels they suffer a number of shortcomings. For example, group-- 
decision-making could be very suitable only where groups are small, 
socially well-integrated and homogenous. It also fosters group- 
dependency, breeds conformity, because one dare not oppose, and as 
a result discourages the able non-conformist. There could also 
be a reluctance to disagree on the side of the subordinate because
of status differentiations. It could also be argued that group 
decision-making does not lend itself to quick action, decisions 
may fall on the side of conservatism as opposed to innovation and 
where unanimity is required consensus may be an illusion and amount 
to some members suppressing their views or feelings. Commenting 
on the limitations in the use of group decision-making, Bobbitt 
et al (op cit) maintain that -
”.......all of the studies have primarily
dealt with the employment of group 
decision-making under conditions of 
change. What happens under conditions 
of stability remains problematic at this 
point?”
Questioning the basic philosophy of the participative management 
or leadership school, Strauss (1968) believes there is a tendency to 
place an overwhelming emphasis on personal co-ordination and control 
to the detriment of impersonal control techniques. The neo-human 
relations school or participative management school is also accused 
of overlooking the important role played by bargaining and the use 
of power in interpersonal relationships. Democracy is conceived 
largely in non-structural terms by some writers and the emphasis on 
group harmony, expressing itself in individual/organisational goal 
congruity, is perhaps oversimplified because it is doubtful whether 
this exists in any organisation other than an organisation where 
normative power and moral compliance (e.g. church) exist. In an 
earlier publication Strauss (1963) maintains, contrary to the 
above impression, that engaging in consultation or joint decision­
making (participative management) provides the opportunity for 
bargaining and agreement on a compromise proposal which the 
subordinate can support. It would appear that his 1968 comment 
reflects more accurately the thinking of the participative management 
school.
One can argue that the main theoretical base of the 
participative management school is the ’force for growth’ theory 
of personality. This basically states that man contains within 
himself the urge to grow and he will express the highest qualities 
of thought, creativity, altruism, humanitarianism, of which he is 
capable, if given the opportunity to do so . This view, reflected
in the writings of neo-Freudians - Jung, Adler, Fromm, Hank - 
is perhaps best represented by Rogers (1951) &nd Maslow (1954).
It is well to remember that this theory is but one of at least 
three main theories of personality. Lazarus (1971) makes the 
point that "the force-for-growth concept has been criticised as 
mystical and value laden, since it flirts so continuously with the 
evaluation of man in terms of normative judgements of high and 
low, advanced and primitive, good and bad." Maslow (1965) 
expresses a word of caution about the indiscriminate acceptance 
of his conclusions -
"After all1, if we take the whole thing from 
McGregor’s point of view of a contrast between 
a Theory X view of human nature, a good deal of 
the evidence upon which he bases his conclusions 
comes from my researches and my papers on 
motivations, self-actualisation et cetera. But 
I, of all people, should know just how shaky this 
foundation is as a final foundation. My work on 
motivations came from the clinic, from a study of 
neurotic people. The carry-over of this theory 
to the industrial situation has some support 
from industrial studies, but certainly I would 
like to see more studies of this kind before 
feeling finally convinced that this carry-over 
from the study of neurosis to the study of 
labour in factories is legitimate. The same 
thing is true of my studies of self-actualizing 
people - there is only this one study of mine 
available. There were many things wrong with 
the sampling, so many in fact that it must be 
considered to be, in the classical sense anyway, 
a bad or poor or inadequate experiment. I am 
willing to concede this - as a matter of fact, I 
am eager-to concede it - because I ’m a little 
worried about this stuff which I consider to be 
tentative being swallowed whole by all sorts of 
enthusiastic people, who really should be a 
little more tentative in the way that I am."
■Whether or not we recognise the theoretical base as tentative, 
one has become accustomed to reading accounts of the successful 
implementation of participative management at the macro level.
At one time it was exemplified in the experiences of the Yugoslav 
work councils, a vivid manifestation of the benefits of industrial 
democracy. It is interesting, therefore, to note the comments 
of Mulder (1971) on the reality surrounding the operation of 
these councils. For example, 90fo of the talkers in the council
were experts who had received higher education, the workers were
inadequately motivated, in evidence was the growth of a power 
elite and also the growth of a small circle of competent and 
responsible people. From an empirical study of self-management 
in Yugoslavia, Obradovic (1975) endorses this view but adds that 
the rank and file workers participate more actively when discussion 
shifts from technical issues to human relations problems at the 
individual and group-level? to standard of living and social 
welfare issues; and to hiring and placement problems. Warner 
(1975) reviewing some critical evidence of self-management in 
Yugoslavia feels the "problems of alienation in the workplace 
cannot be magically solved by simply installing workers' councils" 
but is himself inclined to the view that much less might be 
achieved in terms of industrial democracy "if an even weaker system 
of worker participation had been arrived at, or in future is set-up."
Having expressed the view that permissive supervision is 
likely to promote acceptance and quality of decisions and private 
commitment, Bass (1967) then draws our attention to the view that 
permissive supervision may be impossible, unwarranted and less 
likely to succeed or be difficult to introduce in many circumstances. 
It is to an examination of these circumstances that we now turn to
in order to justify the relevance of an alternative to the
democratic style in specified situations.
Where group-norms are not supportive of participation or 
there is a legitimate organisational structure for decision-making, 
group decision-making will most likely have limited effects 
(Bobbitt et al op cit). Democratic management could be functionally
impaired by uniformity of policy and practices designed to ensure
co-ordination, and by a history of bureaucratic traditions 
(McMurry op cit). With the growing importance of technological 
and economic constraints in the use of limited resources someone 
has to assume responsibility for the ultimate decision. Given the 
movement in large sized organisations towards decentralisation of 
functions, democratisation is not a logical development because 
control still resides at the centre or apex of the organisation 
(Gomberg op cit).
A directive style is more appropriate "when the subordinate 
group is large, when communications are poor, when superiors and 
subordinates are physically or socially distant from each other,
or when interaction potential is low among superior and 
subordinates" (Bass i960) . If the subordinate suffers a 
deficiency in knowledge or skill relevant to a particular decision, 
and the superior possesses the appropriate talents, a centralised 
style is justified (Yukl op cit). Participation is also likely 
to be negatively related to group performance when rapid decision­
making is required. The prevailing leadership environment at 
the higher levels of organisation may encourage anything but the 
exercise of a permissive style by the superior (Tannenbaum and 
Massarik op cit). Also because of prevailing or past culture 
subordinates may expect and demand strong directive leadership 
from superiors. McMurry (op cit) believes that management tries 
to push decisions down the hierarchy but this is invariably 
resented from below. To support this point of view he presents 
an observation the embodiment of Theory X: "at least three quarters
of those whom I have encountered in business have shown a pathetically 
small desire or capacity either for genuine self-improvement or for 
self-direction. They don’t really want to improve themselves if 
this requires effort. They do not want responsibility. They 
simply want a safe, secure job and someone to tell them what to do."
In the discussion justifying an alternative to the democratic style 
in certain circumstances it was inevitable to consider the influence 
of situational factors. The next section will pursue a study of 
situational factors in greater depth.
2.4 SITUATIONAL FACTORS
According to Uris (op cit), in considering the applicability 
of a particular leadership style one ha,s to consider the status 
attached to a job, the relevance of the subordinate's experience, 
his qualifications, training and intelligence. A stable group 
that works well together and has the skill and experience to take 
decisions would probably find a democratic style most suitable.
An untrained and undisciplined group or a group operating in a 
novel situation may call for a more autocratic style. The 
motivational disposition of a group may also be of importance.
Groups with a high level of motivation and the highest level of 
productivity were associated with a performance and human relations 
oriented leadership; style. Groups with a low level of motivation
f
and the highest level of productivity were associated with a 
performance oriented supervision. The greatest level of group; 
cohesion seemed to he promoted by performance oriented supervision 
at the cost of a lower degree of satisfaction and a greater degree 
of hostility levelled at the supervisor. The supervisor who 
emphasised the performance and human relations aspects of the job 
had the effect of promoting the highest degree of satisfaction and 
the weakest level of hostility (lisnmi and Seki 1971).
The importance of the decision to the subordinate could be a 
major determinant of preferences for participative leadership 
(Maier 19&5) • ^  therefore a decision is considered very
important by the subordinate, he is likely to prefer to exert as 
much influence as possible. Where decisions are considered not 
to involve matters of importance, subordinates are unlikely to 
object to the imposition of a directive style, particularly a 
benevolent one. In circumstances where subordinates place trust 
in the leader to make a decision favourable to them, the less they 
will feel it necessary to participate in order to protect their 
interests.
Likewise the bureaucratic orientation of subordinates may 
dictate their preferences for leadership style. Kavanagh (1975) 
found that "persons higher in their preferences for an organisational 
climate characteristic of the classical bureaucratic model want an 
ideal supervisor higher in Initiating Structure and Production 
Emphasis behaviours but lower in Consideration and Tolerance of 
Freedom behaviours than those persons lower in bureaucratic 
orientation." Yukl (op cit) would stress, in addition, that the 
subordinate's preferences for Initiating Structure is partially 
dependent on his commitment to efficiency and goal achievement.
Korten (1962) associates degree of goal structuring with different 
patterns of leadership-. The trend towards high goal structure is 
encouraged by an increase in stress derived from internal 
motivational dispositions or external threats. Wispe and Lloyd 
(op cit) found a preference for a less structured or permissive 
situation to emerge in the absence of significant threats in the 
environment. However, the greater the threat perceived the more 
highly structured the preferred situation. Stress and lack of 
clarity as to the best plan of action to pursue in given 
circumstances can give rise to the replacement of one leader
by another who is more able to tackle the problems confronting 
the groups In the process he may acquire greater power than 
previously bestowed on the original leader (Hamblin 1958)•
It would also appear that in a low stress situation it is 
difficult for an authoritarian leadership to sustain itself.
It is for this reason that an autocratic leader, in order to 
maintain power, emphasises threats from within and outside and 
strives towards high goal achievement so as to keep the group 
united. This is a ploy very evident at the macro level in the 
operation of totalitarian social systems. The power of the 
situation is further evidenced by variations in leadership patterns 
as a result of specific circumstances. For example, a crisis may 
call for immediate decisive action without any reference to the 
group. Outside a crisis situation different considerations are 
likely to prevail. A competent leader who has a record of 
success behind him may be able to resist group pressures to conform 
to their demands, (high idiosyncrasy credit), but if present 
non-conformity does not generate more group; success the leader-' s 
idiosyncrasy credit will decline and he will then have to operate 
within more constraining limits set by the group (Hollander and 
Julian 1970). Mulder and Stemerding (1963) maintain that when 
subordinates are committed to the attainment of group goals or 
survival of the group, and the task or environment favours a 
centralised style, then they are likely to expect the leader to 
make most of. the decisions. A person may display qualities of 
leadership and prove effective in a situation requiring diagnosis 
and prediction but prove ineffective in situations where time for 
contemplation and rigorous assessment of alternatives is a very 
rare thing. A condition regulating effective leadership 
performs,nee is the degree of influence a leader has at the 
higher echelons of the organisation (Pels 1952). The stands,rd 
of performance achieved by the subordinate could have a material 
bearing on the choice of style of leadership adopted by the 
superior. Lowin and Craig (1968) believe that the more the 
subordinate contributes to the eventual desired outcomes valued 
by the manager the more positive the manager's attitudes will be 
towards the subordinate. This will be reflected in the degree of 
freedom given to the subordinate and is contrary to the oft quoted 
causal relationship of leadership style determining productivity.
They conclude from the findings of an experimental study that the 
causal relationship of performance influencing style is often 
ignored hut is as important as the opposite one of style influencing 
performance. A similar view was forwarded by Galbraith and 
Cummings (1967) who hypothesised that a leader can improve the 
performance of a subordinate by being highly considerate to him if 
task motivation is impressive. Considerate behaviour is then used 
as a reward and would be withheld from subordinates showing little 
motivation. Finally, Thompson (1961) doubts whether democratic 
practices have yet taken root because of the existence of a 
fundamental superior/subordinate conflict. This conflict is 
alleged to express itself as a result of the demands made on the 
subordinates - i.e. to be loyal, obedient and respect the superior's 
veto - and the subordinate's need for respect, and to be evaluated 
on the basis of merit. Obviously tension would be reduced when the 
subordinate gives way to the superior's demands.
Perhaps the most influential situational theory is that put 
forward by Fiedler (1967) in his Contingency Model of Leadership.
It attempts to predict how style of leadership, leader-member 
relations, the position power vested in the leader and the structure 
of the task harmonise to determine the leader's ability to achieve 
productive output. The measure of the style of leadership is the 
esteem of the leader for his least preferred co-worker (LPC).
The LPC is the person the leader has found most difficult to 
co-operate with. To arrive at an LPC score leaders were asked 
to rate both their most preferred co-worker (MPC) and their least 
preferred co-worker (LPC). Leaders who describe their MPC's and 
LPC's similarly are classified as "high LPC" leaders, whilst those 
who describe their LPC's much more negatively than their MPC's 
are classified as "low LPC" leaders.. The co-worker evaluated- in 
this way need not be someone the leader is actually working with 
at the time. According to Fiedler the LPC score is best interpreted 
as a dynamic trait which results in different behaviour as the 
situation changes. A leader with a high LPC rating would be 
psychologically close to his group members; with a low LPC 
rating he would be psychologically distant. The leader who 
describes his least preferred co-worker in a relatively favourable 
manner (high LPC) tends to be permissive and considerate in his
relationship with group members. He gains satisfaction and 
self-esteem from successful interpersonal relations. The leader: 
who describes his least preferred co-worker in a relatively 
unfavourable manner (low LPC) tends to be autocratic, task centred 
and less concerned with the human relations aspects of the job.
He gains satisfaction and self-esteem from successful task performance. 
Therefore, the high and low LPC leaders seek to satisfy different 
needs in the group situation. Applying this interpretation of 
leadership style to that of the OHIO State School we might conclude 
that a high LPC leader seems to rank relatively high on Consideration 
and the low LPC leader relatively high on Initiating Structure.
Though this conclusion may have intuitive appeal, Heissenberg and 
Gruenfeld (1966) challenge it. Drawing on evidence from a field 
study of civil service supervisors they assert that a low LPC was 
associated with an intermediate point between the extremes of 
Initiating Structure and Consideration. They also challenge the 
view that the LPC measure is a good predictor of leadership 
behavioural characteristics, a point that will be taken up later.
The three major variables in the work situation which can impede 
or facilitate a leader's attempt to influence group members are, 
as stated above, leader-member relations, the structure of tasks 
and the position power of the leader. In the normal course of 
events the organisation provides support for the leader by 
structuring tasks with the help of procedures, rules and regulations. 
The degree of task structure can be measured by establishing the 
extent to which work decisions can be verified, the degree of 
clarity surrounding the stating of the work goal, the number of 
methods available for achieving the goal and the extent to which 
one can be specific about the solution to the work problem.
The leaden finds it easier to force compliance in a structured 
task situation than in an unstructured task situation. In the 
latter situation the leader may find it difficult to exercise 
influence because neither he nor group members can be dogmatic 
about what should be done; in fact, the leader will have to pay 
attention to inspiring and motivating his followers. Position 
power is the authority vested in the leader's position as distinct 
from any power arising from his skill and ability in handling 
matters arising within the group-. It would include the rewards
and punishment at the leader's disposal; his authority to define 
the group;'s rules; and his appointment being immune from: 
termination by the group. The most important of these three 
dimensions is leader-member relations. A liked and respected 
leader, or one working in a smoothly functioning group can do what 
would be difficult for a leader in different circumstances.,
Position power is the least important of the three dimensions 
because a well-liked leader can get results without institutional 
power, and likewise he will not need the power if the task is 
clearly structured. Fiedler arrives at a continuum depicting 
the favourableness of the situation for the leader. Task-oriented 
leaders performed more effectively in situations which are either 
very favourable or very unfavourable for them. This was found to 
be so in basketball teams, surveying teams, military combat crews 
and in complex organisations when executive functions were examined. 
Relationship-oriented leaders perform better in situations which are 
intermediate in favourableness- for them. Policy decision-making 
groups in complex organisations appeared to require a considerate, 
permissive, relationship oriented leadership where a good group 
climate existed.
Fiedler's theory tries to make situational leadership theory 
more convincing by isolating and identifying conditions under which 
different styles of leadership will be more or less effective.
Group performance is therefore dependent upon the match between 
the leader's influence and power and his motivational disposition. 
Recognising Fiedler's work as an ambitious enterprise involving 
quite a few simplifications, Smith (1973) goes on to say -
"For example he assumes that the effectiveness 
of leaders is validly measured by the 
productivity of their subordinates, ignoring 
morale and other indicators. He assumes 
further that the leader's qualities need to 
be classified on only a, single dimension.
Finally he assumes that situations in which 
leaders operate can be classified in terms 
of their favourability to the leader."
Undoubtedly Fiedler's research methodology, along with most, 
suffers deficiencies. One recognises the selection of the 
situational dimensions as arbitrary, but his model has given a 
welcome emphasis to situational determinants of leadership 
effectiveness.
The findings of Fiedler and Likert - advocate;..of 
employee-centred leadership - could converge if one condition 
is met. That is if the immediate environmental factors in 
Likert's studies were intermediate in favourableness. However, 
we have no way of knowing that siich a condition is met because 
Fiedler’s situational measures were not used by Likert.
Fiedler’s model, often in partial form, has been subjected to 
empirical test with rather mixed results in different settings.
In an experimental study in a laboratory setting Sample and Wilson 
(1965) examined certain aspects of the propositions put forward by 
Fiedler. They maintained that their investigation does not 
support Fiedler's notion that the unfavourable low LPC leader is 
generally socially distant and unfriendly. Both favourable and 
unfavourable styles of leadership - expressed in LPC terms - were 
used by superiors friendly to group members but at different times 
during the task. The unfavourable LPC leader quickly and firmly 
structures the group's procedures during the planning stage of an 
assignment and is then free later to play a less dominating and 
even jovial role. On the other hand, the favourable LPC leader 
holds a group discussion during the planning period when the work 
is not clearly organised. It is only with partial success that 
he attempts and achieves organisation of the work during the 
latter phases of task performance. This might be explained in 
terms of a lack of an adequate task orientation. However, it was 
found that the low LPC leaders displayed less positive socio-emotional 
behaviour during the early stages of an assignment when planning 
and organising was needed. The high LPC leader was more concerned 
with establishing warm interpersonal relationships with group 
members during the initial planning stage. But during the 
performance phase of the assignment high LPC leaders became more 
task-oriented and low LPC leaders more human relations-oriented.
Graham (1968) in his study of life insurance agents endorses 
Fiedler's findings in one significant respect. Leaders with a 
high LPC score tend to be primarily human relations oriented 
whereas low LPC leaders tended to be more task-oriented.
Though variability did arise, when for example a low LPC leader 
becomes more considerate in his approach on some occasions,
Graham concurs with Sample and Wilson (op cit) in maintaining
that high LPC leaders were not more favourably evaluated than the 
low LPC leader. Any differentiation can be accounted for not on 
the basis of their primary orientations but instead on how well 
they carry out their particular leadership styles over a period 
of time. In an investigation conducted in three organisations 
Hunt (1967) chose co-acting groups. Unlike the groups chosen 
by Fiedler, co-operation between group members was required to 
perform the task and the leader's role consists of co-ordinating 
activities of members. The leader is also required to provide 
individual motivation and psychological support and encouragement. 
Since position power of the leaders in the organisations sampled 
was high, this variable was not considered in Hunt's study. The 
findings suggest that, to a large extent, variations in leadership 
effectiveness is attributable to the leader-member relations 
variable alone. This result is understandable given the nature 
of the leader's role in co-acting groups. It does appear imperative 
to foster successful leader-member relations within co-acting groups. 
An attack on a proposition of Fiedler that creativity is discouraged 
under task-oriented leadership comes from Andrews and Farris (op cit). 
They found from their study of scientists that creativity flourished 
in such circumstances. In highlighting some desirable behaviour of 
a leader, particularly trust and openness, Rubin and Goldman (1968) 
find it difficult to concede that this kind of climate can be 
established by a low LPC leader who remains psychologically distant 
from his group. They also criticise Fiedler for a lack of explicit 
concern for the needs of individual employees and give us their 
version of the effective leader as someone who is able to 
differentiate between subordinates in performance and cultivates 
open communication. As to task structure, Greenwood and McNamara 
(op cit) dismiss the idea that this variable has any effect on 
leadership effectiveness, though their population sample has serious 
limitations.
More recent evidence is also critical of Fiedler's model.
Graen et al (1970) criticise the research strategy and the limited 
number of statistically significant results and from a review of 
relevant studies suggest that comparability is limited because 
different operational definitions of leader member relations and 
position power have been used in different studies.
Fiedler (1971&) throws doubt on the substance of this allegation. 
Graen et al (1971) return with experimental evidence to discredit 
the LPC and conclude that there was no relationship between the 
leader's LPC score and the perception of group members of leader 
behaviour. The person they designated leader: was chosen at 
random and completed the LPC form. At the conclusion of the 
experiment group members completed a questionnaire describing the 
behaviour of the leader. The force of this finding is however 
tempered by the fact that the researchers relied on undergraduate 
students as subjects and used a non-standard measure of leader 
behaviour. Fiedler (1971L) is quick to point out that the Graen 
experiments were unable to differentiate sufficiently between the 
situations- constructed in the laboratory, and considers the work as 
a result an invalid test of his theory. However, the relationship 
between the LPC score and leader behaviour challenged by Graen et al 
and defended by Fiedler was explored by Stinson and Tracy (1974)• 
Using more realistic subjects - 21 general foremen from a metal 
processing factory - and a standard measure of leader behaviour - 
Leader Behaviour Description Questionnaire - they found, as did 
Graen, that leadership style (LPC) did not correspond to leadership 
behaviour as observed by subordinates.
A suggestion that there is a similarity between the scales 
used to measure LPC and leader member relations, having the effect 
of considerably contaminating these measures by a measurement 
effect, comes from McMahon (1972). But perhaps the greatest 
weakness: of the LPC is "that it implies that a given leader- has 
a fixed, invariant style of leadership which he uses in all 
situations" (Smith op cit). The LPC scores for college students 
were found to have fluctuated over an eight week period, and though 
the LPC scores for industrial supervisors also fluctuated they were 
more stable than in the former case (Stinson and Tracy op cit) .
One discerns an inconsistency in Fielder's position since he 
has modified his view of the relationship between the LPC score 
and leadership behaviour. He now contends that high and low 
LPC's might vary their behaviour in different types of 
circumstances (Fiedler 1972a)• The high LPC leader finding 
himself in an unfavourable situation, where leader member relations
are poor, position power is weak and the outcome uncertain, will 
behave in a, manner to establish good relationships in order to prove 
to himself that he wishes to rela,te to others. In a, favourable 
situation■the high LPC leader will be motivated to seek secondary 
goals - i.e. luxuries such as recognition from superiors and 
admiration - and these goals are realised by "playing the role 
of the responsible, efficient and even officious leader; that is 
by actually or seemingly attending to the task." This is a rather 
interesting point because the behaviour of the high LPC leader in 
a favourable situation manifests itself as distinctly oriented 
towards his superior and expressing a concern for the task. On 
the other hand, the low LPC leader in an unfavourable situation 
will devote his energies to achieving the primary goal of task 
performance or accomplishment. But in a favourable situation he 
will seek, pleasant work relations. His behaviour will then seem 
friendly and considerate toward co-workers. Therefore Fiedler 
concedes that leadership style or motivation as measured by the 
LPC and leadership behaviour are not directly related. Also a 
call, for new methods for assessing situational favourableness 
originates from a group;, one of whom is Fiedler (Mitchell et al 
1970). The Contingency Model is obviously ready for a major 
overhaul but is showing remarkable resilience.
In comparatively recent times Kerr et al (op cit),->representing 
the views of the OHIO State School of Leadership, set about developing 
some situational propositions of leader effectiveness based on the 
leader behaviour dimensions 'Consideration* and 'Initiating Structure' 
and acknowledge their indebtedness to House (1971) whose work on 
path goal theory has influenced the development of their ideas.
In all,twelve propositions are put forward. The situational 
propositions, with supporting evidence, are specifically related 
to the OHIO State Leader Behaviour Dimensions to disprove the 
notion that the OHIO State School is not concerned with situational 
variables. Wofford (1971) has also something to say about the 
impact of situational factors. Using a scheme of leadership which 
incorporates the salient features of both the OHIO State School and 
the Survey Research Centre, Michigan, he found different 
characteristics more effective in one situation rather than 
another. Factors such as task flexibility, group size?managerial 
aspirations, degree of centralisation of operations called for a
particular leadership approach and the dimensions effective for 
production are not the most effective for morale. The impact of 
structtiral factors will he examined later. One thing seems 
certain from the discussion and that is a study of leadership is 
not meaningful without a recognition of the importance of 
situational factors.
A LEADERSHIP CONTINUUM
The tendency in the literature, with minor exceptions, has 
been to emphasise the polar ends of the leadership style spectrum, 
leadership being viewed either as task or autocratic on the one 
hand or permissive or democratic on the other. Heller (op cit) 
argues that power/influence concepts are of more relevance rather 
than vague participation when looking at decision processes.
However, these are rather elusive concepts. Teulings (1971®-) 
neatly defines power: and influence, and also authority -
"Power....... is the capacity to overcome
resistance, to introduce changes' in the face 
of opposition. The exercise of power is also 
visible to those subjected to it.
Influence on the other hand is by definition 
not visible to the subjects; the subjects may 
find their alternatives suddenly restricted 
but are unable to trace the origin of this 
limitation. Hence the exercise of influence 
is not faced by opposition. If there is a 
choice men of position in society prefer the 
use of influence over power.
Authority.......   is legitimate power, that is
power with a socially fixed price for compliance.
Because the exercise of power faces opposition 
the compliance of those subjected to it 
requires a certain price. Power is converted 
into authority by fixing this price for a longer 
time period in terms of scarce commodities 
(pay is the most common example). Authority 
is therefore a more stable form of power."
This definition of Power/Authority and Influence does seem to 
refer to processes moving down vertically or laterally in the 
organisational hierarchy and in leadership terms could be classified 
as directive. Another way of looking at the power relationship is 
to observe the extent to which influence is exerted upwards by 
those lower in the hierarchy. Mechanic (1962) suggests that the
most effective way for lower participants to achieve power is 
to obtain, maintain and control access- to persons, information, 
and instrumentalities. To the extent that this can be 
accomplished, lower participants make high ranking participants 
dependent upon them. Thus dependence together with the 
manipulation of the dependency relationship is the key to the 
power of lower participants. We often tend to underestimate 
the amount of influence subordinates exert in decisions made 
by superiors. Drawing on the observations of Barnard and Simon, 
Walter (1966) makes the point that, though policies may be officially 
announced by superiors, they are often initiated and elaborated by 
employees many levels beneath them in the organisation chart.
Heller (op cit) views the leadership process in organisations as 
the sharing of influence to varying degrees between the superior 
and subordinates. A continuum of leadership would then include 
own decision by superior; own decision with explanation by 
superior; superior consulting subordinate; joint decision making; 
and delegation. The distinctive aspect of this model is the 
introduction of delegation as the position of maximum subordinate 
influence, though the area of choice is usually well specified and 
constrains behaviour. Heller maintains that delegation is 
excluded from discussions of participation because participation 
is invariably associated with group-centred outlook - interaction, 
voting, consultation and consensus - but he believes there is no 
reason why it cannot satisfy self-actualisation needs (the 
justification for participation) as participation is alleged to 
do. There is, of course, the danger that it may be used punitively 
when only unpleasant responsibilities are delegated.
Using a leadership continuum appears to mitigate a problem 
identified by Kerr et al (op cit) as common to both the OHIO State 
and Fiedler studies, that of what befalls predictions when the 
leader's scores are medium rather than high or low. The idea of 
describing decision-making behaviour along a continuum of subordinate 
influence is certainly not new, but is a departure from the well 
explored two dimensional approach discussed earlier. With the 
leadership continuum, however, one could still arrive at centralised 
and decentralised dimensions by aggregating the directive and the 
permissive oriented positions separately.
A number of authorities have presented individual classifications 
of a leadership continuum. Strauss (1963) draws a distinction 
between decisions made by managers on their own, by managers and 
subordinates jointly, and instances where the manager permits his 
subordinate to make his own decision. March and Simon (op cit) 
also acknowledge a continuum of supervisory styles as does Likert 
(1967) when he puts forward his four systems of leadership, showing 
a marked preference for system 4 - the participative style.
In addition Likert (1961) mentions a twelve-point scale for 
describing the amount of subordinate participation that occurs 
when organisational change is introduced. Blake and Mouton (1961) 
proposed a power spectrum which is a system for evaluating the 
amount of contribution a superior and subordinate makes to decisions.
A leadership continuum is proposed by Tannenbaum and Schmidt 
(op cit). Similarly Bass (1967) differentiated leadership patterns 
according to four types. Blankenship and Miles (op cit) have also 
created a five category measure of subordinate influence in superiors' 
decisions. The model of leadership style considered most suitable 
as an operational definition of managerial decision-making behaviour 
in the research study is the power/influence continuum adopted by 
Heller. This model could be equated with the Decision-Centralisation 
(DC) concept cited by Yukl (op cit) which is also concerned.with the 
behaviour of the leader, and with a number of diverse methods of 
decision-making. Some may argue that Initiating Structure is 
similar to the directive end and Consideration is similar to the 
permissive end of the Decision-Centralisation Model, but Yukl 
maintains there are good theoretical arguments for treating DC 
as a separate dimension of leader behaviour. For example, though 
the Consideration dimension incorporates several participative 
decision-making items it must be acknowledged that the desire for 
participation is not always present, it being dictated by 
personality and situational factors. Task oriented behaviour is 
implicit in Initiating Structure, but this is not tantamount to 
denying the subordinate the chance to use his influence in the 
decisions of his superior. Almost certainly there is some form 
of relationship, more likely an indirect one, between Consideration 
and DC and the latter with Tolerance of Member Freedom, but 
Yukl (op cit) considers it more practical to define Consideration
as simply the degree to which a leader’s behaviour expresses a 
positive rather than an indifferent or negative attitude toward 
subordinates. ’In the author’s research instrument the above 
conceptual distinction is apparent. Decision-making behaviour, 
however, does not exist in a vacuum but has to bear some 
relationship to the type of decision considered and structural 
features of organisation likely to impinge on it. If this is 
so, then a close examination of these factors is both desirable 
and appropriate. It is to this question that we now turn in 
Chapter 3«
CHAPTER 3
IMPACT OF DECISION PROCESSES,
AND STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS
It is now patently clear that leadership is something which 
is subject to a number of influences. Two major influences, to 
be discussed in this chapter, are the decision-making process and 
selected structural characteristics of organisation. The 
decision-making process sets the scene for the behaviour involved 
in it, and decision-making behaviour takes place within an 
organisational framework.
DECISION PROCESSES
A brief moment’s reflection on the claims made on behalf of 
parapsychology might dazzle one into a blind acceptance of 
precognitive powers as phenomena related to decision-making ability. 
Ever since Uri Geller’s spectacular feats in precognition, telepathy 
and psychokinesis (Taylor 1975)? apparently it has stirred up 
interest in ways in which telepathy and precognition may be of help 
to the executive. No wonder then that in recent times a report on 
research carried out in the U.S.A. appeared in The Financial Times 
with the heading ’Why hunch may help the right decision’ (Irvine 
1974)• According to Irvine most top flight executives say they 
rely ultimately on their judgement or intuition. However, this 
is understandable since specialised decision-making techniques are 
not yet so advanced or sophisticated as to rule out the intervention 
of intuitive judgement or inspired guesswork. In fact, one can 
never deny the influence of intuitive judgement, what is more 
important is the reduction of the area conventionally reserved for 
intuitive judgement by the development and better use of decision 
analysis techniques.
Litchfield (op cit) has put forward a proposition viewing 
decision-making as either rational, deliberative, discretionary, 
purposive or irrational, obligatory and random. In the former 
instance we proceed through somewhat of an idealised cycle.
We begin by clarifying and describing the issue in question.
A situational analysis then takes place with reference to a variety 
of intelligence data. For the Accountant this obviously means a 
perusal of a variety of cost and revenue data in addition to 
extrapolations. A specification of alternative courses of action 
follows, and where the likely consequences of each alternative are 
known they are explicitly stated. Where they are unknown, estimates 
are required and.could take the form of alternatives. Methods 
available in business to tackle these quantities are, for example, 
economic forecasting, market projections and linear programming.
The next step is to review the issues involved in the decision in 
the light of what is known about the existing situation with 
reference to the alternative courses of action which are now 
available. This is the stage when values are assessed, 
probabilities appraised and strategy is devised in conditions of 
imperfect knowledge. The deliberative process now approaches 
rationality as risk is calculated, normally in mathematical terras, 
and values are explicitly stated. A final choice is then made 
which will be influenced by several considerations resting on the 
rationality, mental faculties and discretionary power of the 
decision-maker. Obviously few decisions in organisations are 
arrived at by means of this full sequence of actions. This can 
be attributable to a number of constraining influences. We are 
all prone to irrationality at one time or another and invariably 
we do not have enough time to methodically subject each decision 
to such rigorous analysis. By implication Caplan (op.cit) recognises 
the accountant’s subscription to the idealised cycle view of 
decision-making when he states that accountants are deluding 
themselves if they consider the activity of gathering, processing, 
and interpreting data as an objective exercise, neither can they 
achieve the degree of certainty and neutrality often attributed to 
them. Whatever course of action is decided it must be executed 
and subsequently verified as to its correctness. At the execution 
stage a decision has to be communicated, the superior taking the 
appropriate action or delegating to others the authority to act.
He also has to provide for possible adjustment to and modification 
of the original decision in the light of changing circumstances 
(Martin 1959)• is sometimes wrongly assumed that the conditions
anticipated in the making of a decision will prevail, particularly 
when the time factor involved is long. We have only to consider 
the proposition of Merton (1936) as to the unanticipated consequences 
of purposive sociological action to realise that the interplay of 
forces and circumstances in a given situation is so complex as to 
render prediction of them quite beyond reach; this is apart from 
the handicap of incomplete knowledge, error and bias of interest 
which is likely to intervene.
When decisions are interpreted in the form of specific 
programmes they become guidelines to future action. We can then 
draw a distinction between programmed and non-programmed decisions. 
According to Simon (1965), a programmed decision is in essence 
repetitive and routine with a definit© procedure - e.g. pricing 
ordinary customers’ orders. On the other hand, a non-programmed 
decision could be considered novel, unstructured and consequential. 
This type of decision cannot be dealt with in a clear-cut manner, 
one finds difficulty in locating a precedent for it and the problem 
tends to be elusive or complex. Simon maintains that non-programmed 
decision-making can be improved by orderly thinking; generalised 
operating procedures could, perhaps, be constructed, and the quality 
of both types of decision can be enhanced by the introduction of 
skilled participants to the organisation together with appropriate 
training and planned experience. There is also a danger that 
programmed activity will drive out that which is non-programmed, 
but the presence of staff activities in organisations ensures the 
survival of activities devoted to non-programmed thought.
Having observed a business decision Cyert et al (1956) make a 
number of relevant points. First, alternatives are not usually 
given but must be sought. An important part of the process is 
therefore the search for alternatives and once a satisfactory 
solution is discovered, even though the field of possibilities is 
not exhausted, the search is discontinued. This is something 
that is neglected by the classical theory of rational choice.
Second, consequences alleged to flow from each alternative are 
seldom given. It follows that a search for consequences is 
another important aspect of decision-making. Third, a comparison 
of alternatives cannot be confined to analysis using a financial or 
quantitative criterion only because of consequences of an intangible
nature which make comparison and evaluation difficult. Finally, 
in reality the problem itself may not be given and an important 
activity is searching for significant problems to tackle. Dufty 
and Taylor (1962), unlike Cyert et al’s observation of the active 
phases of the decision process, studied the implementation stage 
of a non-programmed decision. The decision was connected with the 
transfer of personnel from one location of an organisation to 
another. Though the Chief Executive specified the outcome - the 
transfer of a specified number of staff - it was the Personnel 
Superintendent who had to connect the means to the end. He was 
given wide discretionary powers to use both his standard programmes 
and to develop new programmes or modify old ones through the 
processes of problem-solving and learning. His first line of action 
was to initiate problem-solving activity by calling a conference of 
individuals qualified to contribute to the solution of the problem. 
From this conference resulted, where feasible, the preparation of 
programmes of activity. As the implementation processes neared 
the completion stage lack of optimisation of the operations was 
evident. Standards as to the calibre of staff, previously considered 
of vital importance, were relaxed because of a reluctance to move on 
the part of some staff. This had the effect of creating organisa­
tional slack, which was condoned by the men and union officials 
alike. The unanticipated consequences acted to the disadvantage 
of the company by creating a situation whereby organisational slack 
obtained at the old site and manpower at the new site fell below 
expectations in terms of quality.
Cyert et al (1967) feel that because information on the 
consequences of particular courses of action in business 
organisations is frequently hard to obtain and is likely to be 
unreliable, conscious and unconscious bias in expectations is 
introduced, and if perception is not aimed at realising hopes 
then new developments in reality are rationalised to fit in with 
expectations. As a result, they believe "that research on 
selective perception and recall is of substantial importance to 
an expirical theory of business decision-making."
Programmed and non-programmed decisions also find expression 
in different terms by Drucker (1954)* These are strategic 
decisions, involving risk, and tactical decisions, which are of
a routine problera-solving nature. According to Drucker, strategic 
decisions involve the future, cover many aspects of business which 
are simultaneously affected, involve substantial sums of money or 
great unknown factors and are almost always taken by top management. 
Tactical decisions, on the other hand, are frequently taken every 
day within organisations. A tactical decision is taken by an 
Accountant when he allocates a sum to a particular account.
Hickson (orp cif ) maintains that the growth of programmed 
decisions leads to superiors paying too much attention to this 
type of decision to the neglect of non-programmed decisions, and 
he associates programmed decisions with a lack of power and 
non-programmed decisions with the acquisition of power. Using 
the dimension ftask structure1, a variable not too dissimilar to 
the programmed decision, Fiedler (19721?) tends to share the view 
of Hickson. He believes -
"tasks or assignments that are highly 
structured, explicit or programmed 
give the leader more influence than 
tasks that are vague, nebulous and 
unstructured. It is easier to be a 
leader when the task is described step 
by step in a manual of standard operating 
procedures."
With specific reference to the predicament of subordinates,
Dill (1958) differs in his perspective from that of Hickson and 
Fiedler and argues that the autonomy of subordinates reaches a 
peak when making routine choices in the decision process but 
declines sharply on novel decisions. In the routine decision 
situation the manner in which decisions are made is governed in 
a detailed fashion by established precedent, explicit rules and 
regulations and standard operating procedures, which almost 
certainly obviate the necessity for overt supervision. This is 
a rather interesting point because the routine decision situation 
of the type just described could give rise in some circumstances 
to delegative behaviour on the part of the superior. Dill goes 
on to emphasise that important decisions of an infrequent nature 
that culminate in committing scarce resources, generating risk 
and uncertainty, are the type of decisions that deny the subordinate 
the autonomy he enjoys in making recurrent decisions. In fact 
Walter (op cit) comes closer to Hicksonfs premise - that more 
power is associated with non-programmed decisions - when, relying
on data from empirical observation, he stipulates that subordinate 
influence is very pronounced in non-programmed decision situations.
It is perhaps to be expected for a superior to take advantage where 
possible of a subordinate’s technical competence, previous 
specialised training and detailed information about the immediate 
decision environment. If nothing else, a superior is prone to 
rely on the knowledge of a subordinate in order to save himself a 
lot of time and effort. In such circumstances the superior is 
doing little more than endorsing the subordinate’s field 
interpretations or decisions. As to what happens to subordinate 
influence in a. programmed situation, a prior hypothesis by Walter 
that power would be centralised, creating more superior influence 
and less subordinate influence, fared very poorly. Observations 
had shown that on some occasions the subordinate brought to the 
notice of the superior a situation requiring action and then 
proceeded to tackle the problem, having first received the superior's 
authorisation to do so. In another situation one might find the 
superior bringing to the notice of the subordinate a problem 
requiring attention with a directive to See to it. In other 
circumstances a subordinate's recommendations, requesting attention 
be given to a particular problem or issue, would be allowed to lapse 
because resources are scarce and consequently an emphasis is placed 
on priorities.
This led to a revision of the latter hypothesis which then 
took the form of, "that the influence of superiors in programmed 
decision-making lies chiefly in their ability to specify priorities 
among the alternative actions supported by their subordinates and 
clients." This is a departure from Dill's total autonomy and 
Hickson's opposite presumption that subordinate power or influence 
is absent. However, Heller (op cit) confirms Hickson's viewpoint 
in this respect. In seeking an explanation for the incidence of 
centralised decision styles in the areas of production and finance 
he postulates that tasks in these areas lend themselves to 
programmed decisions and as a consequence this leads to a 
centralisation of power. The refined hypothesis of Walter - 
superior/subordinate influence in programmed decision situations - 
is shared by the author. Equally subordinate influence in 
non-programmed situations, in line with the position of both Hickson 
and Walter, is something which appeals to one's impression of reality.
The distinction made between programmed and non-programmed 
decisions, in terms of subordinate influence, has received minor 
attention, though typical business decisions in relation to a 
continuum of decision-making behaviour have been considered by 
Blankenship and Miles (op cit) and Heller (op cit). In the former 
instance, programmed decisions only were examined and in the latter 
case no such distinction was made, instead the focus was on the 
nature of the decision and the level of organisation at which the 
decision was made. For example, one set of decisions were sub-divided 
into task-related and maintenance (personnel) decisions, the other set 
were categorised according to whether they affected the direct 
subordinate or the subordinate once removed from the superior.
Heller and Yukl (1969) found that first and second line supervisors 
were likely to share more power with subordinates when task decisions, 
rather than maintenance decisions, were under consideration. Senior 
managers were more likely to allow greater subordinate influence in 
decisions affecting indirect rather than direct subordinates. It 
is now clear that decision-making behaviour is influenced by some 
features of the decision process. There are also structural 
features of organisation which are likely to produce a similar effect 
and it is to an examination of these factors that we now turn.
STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS
A natural starting point for any discussion of the structural 
features of organisation is an acknowledgement of the contribution 
of Max Weber. Ever since his ideal type of bureaucracy came on 
the scene it has become a continuous source of fascination and 
theoretical controversy. Bureaucracy of the ideal type, according 
to Weber (1946), is managed by experts who are expected to subscribe 
to a highly impersonal rational perspective with the demands of 
positions requiring job holders to perform their duties as efficiently 
as possible. Rationality in decision-making and obedience in the 
performance of duties are the keystones of the entire system. It 
appears emotion is something to be excluded from the bureaucratic 
process, though the administrator who exercises; charismatic 
authority becomes emotionally important to his followers and must 
establish a right to lead. On the other hand, under the ideal 
type of bureaucracy the rational-legal administrator receives
legitimate power from the system by virtue of his technical 
competence. Somewhat naively it is assumed that individual 
motivation is maintained by the processes of conformity, leading 
to acceptance of the demands of the organisation, and status-seeking, 
the urge to advance by acquiring and exercising technical competence.
Modification to this conceptual scheme has been suggested by 
a number of authorities. Some maintain that a number of dysfunctional 
consequences flow from it. Merton (1949) feels that the emphasis on 
reliability, efficiency and expertise has its limitations, and that 
bureaucracy engenders strong feelings because of the pressure to 
conform. This is further aggravated by mounting pressure, having 
its roots in individual expectation, that the organisation requires 
reliability, consistency, commitment and loyalty from the individual. 
Often in the process^of enforcing compliance a high degree of 
emphasis is placed on discipline. The danger here lies in an 
over-emphasis on discipline, with the strong emotions attached to 
it, leading to a transference of sentiments away from the aims of 
the organisation to its detailed working, eventually resulting in 
the displacement of goals. As a result we expect to see the 
emergence of formalism and ritual as a consequence of a 
preoccupation with specified procedural matters. Excesses in 
this respect leads to diminishing awareness: of organisational 
objectives and the development of 'red tape*. All this is apart 
from 'trained incapacity' whereby previous training and past skills 
elicit inappropriate responses to changed conditions.
The above interpretation opens the way for a systems perspective 
which Gouldner (1959) considers to operate side by side with the 
bureaucratic model. The distinctive features of the natural systems 
approach - also represented by Parsons (1956) and Selznick (1948) - 
is that the organisation as a system has survival and maintenance 
needs with an ability to respond in a spontaneous fashion to a 
changing environment, striving at all times to maintain a dynamic 
equilibrium. This is so irrespective of the fact that each part 
of the organisation has its own goals and needs and that organisational 
goals are but another set of goals. By way of contrast, an action 
perspective (Silverman 1968) departs from a systems emphasis by 
maintaining that it is the individual's interpretation of the 
event that really matters.
In more recent times the preoccupation with rationality and 
formality appears to have suffered relegation in favour of a 
comparative analysis of formal structures. Blau and Scott (1963) 
constructed a typology based on the criterion of 'who benefits'.
The prime beneficiaries, according to this scheme, are members or 
ordinary participants, owners or managers, clients and members of 
society at large; the respective organisations are mutualbenefit 
associations, business? concerns, service organisations and common­
weal organisations. Etzioni (1961) in his comparative analysis of 
complex organisations treats compliance as the central theme. This 
is the power relationship which exists between those who exercise 
power and those subjected to it. Compliance is congruent when 
power is coercive and involvement is alienative (prison), when 
power is remunerative and involvement is calculative (work 
organisation) and, finally, when power is normative and involvement 
is moral (religious organisation). These approaches have raised 
the question of power and involvement as central differences between 
organisations at a general level of analysis. They can be contrasted 
with the more localised and detailed approach of Pugh et al (1968) 
who rely on operational definitions of bureaucracy, with applicability 
across; organisations irrespective of their activity or form of 
ownership, to create organisational profiles. The five primary 
variables or dimensions of organisation structure they used in their 
comparative study were specialisation (number- of specialised 
activities and roles), standardisation of procedures and roles, 
formalisation (the extent to which things are written down), 
centralisation, and configuration or shape of the organisation.
An interesting finding emerged from this study in the form of a 
statement that bureaucracy is not a unitary concept, as conveyed by 
the Weberian model, but organisations may display different degrees 
of bureaucracy over a number of dimensions and that organisations 
may still be bureaucratic with a noticeable lack of centralisation. 
This was deduced from the non-significant correlation between 
centralisation and the variables overall standardisation, 
formalisation and shape of staff organisation.
The province of organisational analysis has also been the 
concern of various management theorists. An influential proponent 
of this school of thought is Urwick (1935)* He and his
contemporaries advocate principles of organisation not far removed 
from classical "bureaucracy# Classical bureaucracy was then 
superseded by the classical theory of organisation, at the operational 
level, in which the following principles were enshrined# A vertical 
hierarchical structure embracing roles, optimally arranged, is 
required. Equal in importance is the precise definition of duties, 
responsibilities and the authority vested in a position. No 
ambiguity should surround the meaning attached to authority and 
channels must exist for effective delegation to take place, always 
remembering that authority and the related responsibility are 
co-equal. The chain of command, which facilitates communication 
and control, necessitates adherence to the principle of one man 
reporting to one superior. The principle of co-ordination ensures 
that individual or sectional effort is directed towards the achievement 
of common goals. On the question of the size of the span of control, 
it is asserted that it should be strictly limited, not to exceed 
five or six in situations where subordinates' tasks are inter­
dependent. Finally, the functional authority (advisory) of the 
specialist is contrasted with the formal authority (executive) of 
the line manager. This is no doubt a very rational perspective 
and does not take seriously the needs of the individual and the 
constraints operating in different organisations.
It was perhaps for this reason that Woodward (19&5) embarked 
on a programme of research examining the characteristics of a number 
of organisations in Essex. The main theme of her findings is the 
influence of technology or production systems in shaping organisational 
characteristics, though the importance of the history of the firm 
and the background of those who built it up is not discounted.
She attributes a variation in structural features, such as span 
of control and number of levels within the hierarchy, to the 
production system (unit, batch, process) used by the organisation.
The production system or technology is likewise held responsible 
for the extent of decentralisation or delegation, the form 
communication assumes, the quality of industrial relations and 
the strain experienced by individuals, the adoption of the staff-line 
concept and the friction or harmony generated, and the nature of the 
control systems used. In a later publication she tentatively 
suggests that management control systems have an influence on
structure and behaviour (Woodward 1970). The main conclusion of 
the Essex study is that the classical theory has high relevance to 
the operation of successful large batch and mass production firms, 
but firms outside this range depend on organic systems of 
organisation for their success^ .
Burns and Stalker (1961) maintain in addition that it is the 
instability of technology and th© low level of market predictability 
that dictate an organic organisation structure. They, like 
Woodward, found that a mechanistic structure serves an organisation 
well if the conditions are appropriate; in this case the prevailing 
conditions need to be stable. An interesting variation on the 
theme of organic and mechanistic structures comes from Lansley et al 
(1974) who extend it to form a four-fold typology of organisation, 
recognising different combinations of integration and control 
mechanisms. Different types of successful and unsuccessful 
organisations fit into the quadrant which expresses their unique 
organisational features.
A theme very much in evidence in the work of Woodward and 
Burns and Stalker is the impact of the' relevant environment on both 
structure and managerial behaviour. Without question the relevant 
environment has a significant impact on decision-making processes 
in business organisations. The disturbed reactive and turbulent 
field environments identified by Emery and Trist (1965) are two of 
the1 four ideal types of organisational environments, and are also 
the two impinging on the decision-making process. As yet we do 
not know to what extent these 'type abstractions' exist in reality; 
what activates a movement from one position to another is still 
■uncertain. The full implication of each environment, type for the 
organisation is also uncertain. The importance of the organisational 
environment is also emphasised by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967)*
They show us how the environment influences differentiation of 
sub-systems and cognitive sets of sub-system members. Since unity 
of effort is required to achieve organisational goals, diverse 
activities must be integrated. It hardly needs stating that future 
research will have to grapple with the distant organisational 
environment in a more sophisticated manner, than has hitherto been 
the case, when analysing interpersonal behaviour.
According to the results of a Canadian survey mentioned in 
an earlier chapter (Levesque op cit), Chief Financial Officers are 
feeling a cold draught from certain regions of the relevant 
environment. Their main concern was the growing involvement of 
governments at all levels of the private enterprise system and 
the incidence of inflation and corporate tax changes. The author 
of the report concludes with the suggestion that in the future- 
Chief Financial Officers will have to take economic trends into 
account when they design and recommend appropriate financing 
decisions; this is apart from advice they may receive from outside 
specialists. The importance of the relevant environment is also 
stressed "by respondents in the present study. One respondent
remarked that "modern industry is very complex and interference
from government through its agencies makes the role of the Financial 
Controller/Chief Accountant much more difficult. Price control, 
for example, has shifted pricing decisions from the Marketing 
Department to Accountants. Developing financial acumen in business 
structures to deal with government policies is another."
It appears that the debate as to which is the critical environmenta 
variable dictating variations in organisation structure still continues. 
Pugh et al (1969) discount the importance given to technology as an
influential factor determining the structure of an organisation and
consider size and dependence - the relationship the organisation has 
with any owning group, with suppliers, customers, etc., - as factors 
truly influencing structural features of organisation. It is size 
rather than technology - though technology will be related to 
structural variables close to the shop floor - which bears the 
strongest relationship to such dependent variables as specialisation, 
standardisation, formalisation and centralisation. In fact 
Woodward (1965) attached no great importance to size as a critical 
variable but, with due respect, her sample did not include many 
large sized organisations. Lansley et al (op cit) also stress the 
importance of size, particularly in the printing industry, by 
suggesting that there is a clear tendency for larger organisations 
to have a steeper than average hierarchical structure, above average 
communication loads for individual managers and superiors, a high 
percentage of communications outside the chain of command and less 
mutual agreement about communication contacts both laterally and
vertically. Small organisations were found to have flatter 
organisational hierarchies and more mutual agreement about 
communication contacts both laterally and vertically. Underlining 
the importance of size of organisation as a structural determinant
f .
Child (1973)? using data from three different empirical studies, 
argues that it is size - rather than technology, magnitude of 
information flow, size of owning group, etc., - which appears to 
be the important predictor of role specialisation, functional 
specialisation and number of specialist staff. All these factors 
contribute to organisational complexity. It is this complexity that 
contributes to the creation of indirect and impersonal managerial 
controls and promotes delegation to qualified employees. They in 
turn are instrumental in setting up more standard operating 
procedures and records to facilitate control and consistency of 
performance,© preoccupation their professionalism encourages them 
to promote. Aiming his discourse at a different audience to that 
exposed to his 1973 interpretation, Child (1972) suggests that 
questions of performance could give rise to organisational 
decision-makers taking decisions through which they influence 
organisational design. This view detracts from the general 
proposition that environmental variables exert the most influence 
on choice of organisational design. The question of strategic 
choice is then examined in which choice of organisation structure 
is to a large extent dependent upon decisions emanating from the 
dominant coalition within the organisation. But to complicate 
matters somewhat we are told that "when incorporating strategic 
choice in a theory of organisation, one is recognising the operation 
of an essentially political process in which constraints and 
opportunities are functions of the power exercised by decision­
makers in the light of ideological values." Hall (1968) offers 
his explanation to account for structural variation. He postulates 
that there appears to be differences in bureaucratic structures 
adopted by professionals inside and outside a professional offioe 
and concludes: "that the nature of occupational groups in an 
organisation affects the organisational structure." A shadow of 
doubt is therefore cast on the existence of any stable relationship 
between the contextual variables and structural variation examined 
earlier.
STRUCTURE AND ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR
Already the dysfunctional school has identified the weaknesses 
of classical bureaucracy in terms of its human repercussions.
Therefore it seems appropriate to examine, in the first instance, 
features of bureaucracy that affect attitudes and behaviour 
generally and then proceed to suggest that bureaucracy is also 
likely to influence patterns of decision-making behaviour that lie 
within its boundaries.
.Argyris (1959) believes that structure is one of the key 
variables - the others are restrictive leadership and management 
controls - which promotes dependence and is anathema to the ’mature' 
individual; though he ascertains from empirical evidence that certain 
personality types, those who had not proceeded beyond the infant end 
of the personality continuum, were congruent with formal structure. 
This is also a theme running through a more recent publication 
(Argyris 1973) with the emphatic acknowledgement that bureaucracy 
generates alienation. Support for this latter proposition comes 
from Aiken and Hage (1966) who report that organisations conforming 
more to the formal bureaucratic arrangements are more likely to have 
a greater incidence of alienation, with the conspicuous presence of 
greater dissatisfaction in those organisations in which jobs were 
fragmented and rigidly structured. The power of bureaucratic 
structures, in terms of the demands imposed on role occupants, has 
been generally recognised. Merton et al (1957) state that 
individuals not initially suited to the demands of a bureaucratic 
position progressively undergo modifications to personality. But 
equally one could validly assert the view that it is both the demands- 
of role and personality which bring about individual adaptation in the 
organisation (Levinson 1959) • One type of structure may be more 
amenable to one type of personality than another. Tannenbaum and 
All’port (1956) related personality types to 'autonomous* and 
'hierarchical* structures of organisation and found that where 
structure was compatible with personality subjects were more 
satisfied, liked the structure better and were keen to remain in it. 
There is, however* one minor qualification to this finding. Although 
the hierarchical structure suited those who were that way inclined, 
on average the 'autonomous' structure produced more satisfaction 
than the 'hierarchical' one. Thompson (1961) believes that
bureaucratic structures tend to pose constraints on group 
effectiveness by interfering with the development of cohesiveness 
and encouraging competition rather than co-operation.
Having explored briefly a global impact of bureaucracy, we 
shall now select certain characteristics of organisation structure 
and relate them individually to attitudes and behaviour. One such 
characteristic is level within the hierarchy. In a way it is not 
surprising to find differentiations in attitudes and behaviour 
associated with status differentials since differentiations are 
so prevalent in society at large. Porter (1961) examined the 
relative importance attached to thirteen different personality 
traits at two levels of management. The higher level managers 
considered aggression, dominance, independence and originality more 
important for managerial success, with a lesser degree of importance 
conferred on conformity, co-operation, flexibility and sociability.
The first group of traits show a strong emphasis on personal and 
individual capabilities, while the second group contain traits which 
show a capability for adapting to the feelings and behaviour of others. 
As the findings of this study were considered to be suggestive only, 
Porter and Henry (1964a) felt it necessary to pose two problems for 
further investigation. These were concerned with whether the 
perception of personality qualities needed for job success: changes 
from lower to higher levels of management, and whether the protestant 
ethic based inner-directed traits - forceful, imaginative, 
independent, self-confident, decisive - rather than the 
other-directed traits - co-operative, adaptable, cautious, 
agreeable, tactful - are regarded more important for success 
at progressively higher levels of management. The results of the 
study show that the inner-directed cluster of traits were regarded 
more important the higher the level of management; the reverse 
was true for the cluster of other-directed traits. Though we may 
conclude from this result that an 'organisation man' is more likely 
to be found at the bottom rather than at the top of the organisation, 
an important qualification is required. That is, the trait 
caution - other-directed - was regarded as slightly more 
important at the higher than at the lower level, but the trait 
self-confidence - inner-directed - varied little between levels.
Relying on the self-perceptions of top and middle managers,
Porter and Ghiselli (1957) report different qualities endorsed 
by the two groups. Members of top management are more likely to 
see themselves as active, self-reliant, and generally willing to 
take action on the basis of their own faith in themselves and in 
their abilities rather than simply being influenced by objective 
evidence. They appear confident in the job and in social inter­
action, display certain cultural refinements and feel it necessary 
to ingratiate themselves. Members of middle management, by way 
of contrast, are more likely to see themselves as careful planners, 
prone to thoughtful actions and well controlled behaviour, inclined 
seldom to take rash decisions, tend to consider proposed actions from 
many angles with a reluctance to take hasty or unfounded decisions, 
tend to conform to the rules of the system and are unwilling to take 
risks in times of uncertainty. They, are also unlikely to display 
the same brand of confidence as displayed by top managers; they do 
not wish to be controversial, neither do they exhibit self-centred 
behaviour and they describe themselves as stable and dependable 
individuals who try to avoid making mistakes. Given the authenticity 
of these profiles, it would be interesting to try and establish 
whether the individuals concerned possessed these orientations to 
begin with or whether the nature of the job and the level of 
organisation were the true catalyst forces in the cultivation of 
these orientations.
Level within organisation is also a variable which appears to 
influence the degree of job satisfaction experienced. Rosen (1961) 
analysed the conditions of work in a single plant and attributed a 
higher level of satisfaction to top and middle managers, almost in 
equal proportions, than to first-line supervisors. Porter (1962) 
considered hierarchical level in relation to the extent to which 
subjects had gratified psychological needs. Using a measure of 
satisfaction which looked at differences between obtained and 
expected fulfillment, he found that for the esteem, autonomy and 
self-actualisation needs satisfaction increased relatively more at 
the higher level management positions; the security and social 
needs were roughly equally satisfied across' all organisational levels. 
Pellegrin and Coates (1957) lend support to this finding when they 
state that top level executives emphasised intrinsic features of
the job, but off-the-job rewards were given more emphasis by 
first-line supervisors. In a cross-cultural survey of management 
attitudes in fourteen countries, Haire et al (1963) associated 
greater degrees of satisfaction with higher, rather than lower, 
levels of management. One critical variable absent from all these 
studies is the difference in formal education which Porter and 
Lawler (1965) believe should be identified. However, the studies 
reviewed serve to impress upon us the importance of hierarchical 
level as a determinant of attitudes and behaviour.
Another important factor is size, which has already been 
considered in the context of structural variation in response to 
an environmental variable. It can be viewed from two angles: 
size of department and size of company. Frequently one hears claims 
extolling the benefits of small size in terms of absenteeism, staff 
turnover, accident rates and productivity. According to Worthy 
(1950), in the smaller organisation there are fewer people, fewer 
levels in the hierarchy and less: minute sub-division of labour.
Employees find it easier to adapt and work is more meaningful 
because of being able to overview the scene. "The organisation 
operates primarily through the face to face relationships of its 
members and only secondarily through impersonal institutionalised 
relationships." This view of Worthy is based on impressions gained 
from observations of organisational functioning. Before analysing 
data from an empirical study in which size of organisation featured 
prominently as a variable, Talacchi (i960) postulates a theoretical 
proposition governing size of organisation and its impact on morale.
As one might expect, large size leads to increases in division of 
labour and the development of status differentiation which leads to 
a falllng-off in employee satisfaction. Division of labour narrows 
jobs and areas of functional responsibility. A deprivation of 
non-material rewards - pride in workmanship, recognition, responsibility 
and so on - ensue, with the almost inevitable result of a deterioration 
in efficiency ^nd morale. Large size also affects interpersonal 
relations. More interaction between people and departments in the 
execution of a single task develops, bringing in its wake an increase 
in complexity which generates conflicting technical interests among 
departments and a reduction in their informal interaction and 
communication. This increases the potential for personal and group)
conflict, leading to a lower level of satisfaction. Size is also 
held responsible for promoting a hierarchy of formal status 
relationships which has little connection with the various networks 
of informal group relationships. It creates an attitude of mind 
in which the organisation and its goals are regarded as impersonal 
entities. There is a greater likelihood of communication becoming 
distorted and a climate of social distance between the upper and 
lower strata is established. The way people feel and react, as a 
result, is not very likely to reduce internal organisational friction. 
Therefore the growth in status differentiation promotes interpersonal 
conflict with undesirable behavioural consequences. Talacchi 
maintains that in the small organisation this type of thing does not 
happen because of the likelihood of overlapping formal and informal 
status, due in part t© the fact that authority relationships are seen 
and accepted in terms of natural requirements to achieve organisational 
goals.
Perhaps the bureaucratising effect of size is something one 
could leave unchallenged, but the dysfunctional aspects of large 
sized bureaucracy appear to be over-exaggerated and the beneficial 
aspects of the smaller organisation are uncritically accepted by 
Talacchi. However, he found that as an organisation increases in 
size, particularly a manufacturing organisation, the general level 
of satisfaction decreases, and as administrative units grow in size 
the level of satisfaction with interaction episodes, both 
laterally and vertically, decrease as does the level of satisfaction 
derived from non-material rewards. From a behavioural, rather than 
an attitudinal, perspective the influence of size is in no way 
clearcut and definitive. Grusky (1961) produces an empirical 
association between rapid turnover in top management positions 
and increasing organisational size. But Gordon and Becker (1964)? 
having reanalysed the data used by Grusky, were unable to establish 
any reasonable relationship between size and the rate of managerial 
succession.
Apparently size of organisation is an important consideration 
whem managers endorse certain personality characteristics (porter 
1963a). He found that managers from larger companies were slightly 
more likely to describe their jobs in terms of challenging, 
interesting and competitive, thereby placing the greatest emphasis
on inner-directed as opposed to other-directed traits. In 
another context Porter (1963h) found hierarchical level as a 
factor which modified the relationship between size and motivation. 
For example, the manager from the small organisation, occupying a 
lower or lower-middle position, is more likely to be more satisfied. 
A high level of satisfaction is likewise experienced by an 
upper-middle manager or vice-president in the larger company.
Porter and Lawler (op cit) feel that the available evidence is 
more convincing in pointing to a better relationship between 
sub-unit, rather than total, size and relevant variables. So it 
appears that size of department is the more influential variable, 
with hierarchical level generally mediating the importance of size.
An organisational relationship which has attracted a fair 
amount of comment and analysis is that of line/staff. The role of 
the line manager has been conventionally viewed as that of a 
generalist concerned with the primary activities of the organisation 
The efforts of the staff specialist are directed at supplementing 
the contribution of the line manager.by providing specialised 
assistance. Dalton (1950) believes that the assumptions governing 
line/staff relationships ought to be highlighted so as to establish 
whether they are realistic. These assumptions suggest that the 
staff specialist is quite content to function without formal 
authority, though it could be argued he wields informal authority 
since he stands; to influence line policy, and that the staff 
specialist’s suggestions as to the improvement of processes and 
techniques to control more efficiently production and people 
would be eagerly embraced by line managers and applied by them.
But we know that conflict situations do arise and interfere with 
the harmonious functioning of this ideal relationship. It is 
therefore interesting to note the impressions gained from an 
observational study conducted by Dalton in three related plants. 
Recognising that it is extremely difficult to withdraw or isolate 
staff/line conflict from general conflict, he ventures to suggest 
that three conditions were basic to staff/line struggles: 
conspicuous and individualistic behaviour among staff specialists; 
complications due to staff people having to justify their existence 
and getting acceptance for their contributions, and as a consequence 
the realisation that to secure a higher level staff position they
were dependent upon the approval of line personnel. It was found 
that line managers disliked receiving what amounted to instructions 
from younger men, and staff specialists were conscious of this.
Staff specialists who were relatively inexperienced were somewhat 
disconcerted when their ideas were treated lightly or frivolously. 
Though often possessing impressive academic "backgrounds it appeared 
they suffered a deficiency in social skills and compensated for this 
disadvantage "by endeavouring to create informal relationships with 
powerful line managers. There was also a noticeable tendency on 
the part of staff specialists to enhance their hierarchical 
structure in order to create greater opportunity for upward mobility. 
Differentiation on the basis of class and formal education manifested 
itself in the way staff: specialists displayed an air of superiority 
in image, dress and speech, which invited anything but: complimentary 
remarks from line managers. Line managers who were suspicious of 
the intentions of staff specialists, because of their eagerness to 
introduce new techniques, considered their actions as something 
designed to usurp their own authority. As a result a power conflict 
inevitably ensued. Without antagonising his colleagues the staff 
specialist had somehow to reach a tacit agreement with line managers 
so as to foster a.workable relationship. Otherwise there is the 
danger of line personnel seeking to jeopardise proposals with which 
they disagree. It is perhaps understandable why line managers should 
resist innovative proposals because, in Dalton’s view, line managers
may look stupid because they themselves were unable to make
1
suggestions for improvements^ the changes in methods may break-up 
cliques and existing informal relationships and dent their authority, 
and changes in techniques may expose forbidden practices and 
departmental inefficiency. Dalton is not alone in highlighting the 
difficult relationship between line and staff; there are other 
authoritative studies which report staff/line conflict and ill-feeling 
(e.g. Woodward 1965)*
In seeking an explanation for the alleged disharmony and friction 
we shall turn to an examination of personality differences between 
line and staff personnel. Thompson (1961) expects to find some 
form of natural selection as responsible for bringing into line 
hierarchies people with great dominance and status needs, whereas 
people whose dominance needs are satisfied by mastery over materials,
rather than people, will probably become specialists of some kind. 
This observation appears to be at variance with that of Dalton 
(op cit) who observed staff specialists as ambitious, restless, 
individualistic and keen to make the right impression with the 
expectation of receiving individual recognition. In fact the drive 
for personal distinction tended to corrode group cohesiveness and 
cause intra-staff tensions. When managerial respondents were asked 
to express preferences for both inner and other-directed personality 
traits in terms of their importance for job success, it was found 
that staff specialists placed relatively more emphasis on the 
other-directed traits and less emphasis on the inner-directed traits 
than did line managers. Managers holding down combined line/staff 
jobs occupied an intermediate position between the other two groups 
(porter and Henry 1964b). These managers place less importance on 
inner-directed traits than do line managers, but consider them more 
important than do staff. For other-directed traits they place 
more reliance on them than line managers, but less reliance than 
staff. As is customary when interpreting data with the aid of 
typologies, certain traits showed reverse trends. The differ­
entiation between line and staff personnel in the form of need 
gratification is reported by Porter (1963c) where higher level 
needs were given the greatest emphasis by line managers. From a 
study conducted in one company Davis (1953) considered staff 
specialists to be better informed than line managers because of 
their greater freedom and mobility within the organisation. In 
the light of the evidence introduced above it is no wonder that 
friction and conflict arise between the two groups.
As organisations become more complex in our society it is 
increasingly hard to identify the functions of a particular 
organisational unit as productive or non-productive or as line 
or staff (Logan 1966)• Teulings (1971a) is of the opinion 
that the implementation of the staff/line concept is no more than 
•front-stage1 behaviour in the service of actual 'back-stage* 
behaviour, covering up basic authority and power conflicts. The 
staff/line principle deludes the line manager that he only has the 
right to exercise power. Teulings offers an explanation of the 
staff/line relationship in terms of coalition theory, adopting 
five different models. From an empirical study in a British 
context he found that effective staff managers tend to form
alliances of the counsellor type with line managers, where the 
staff department head develops a personal contact with the higher 
line manager and the staff subordinate with the middle and lower 
line managers. The staff role in such a coalition is not always 
as ’consultative’ and ’therapeutic' as a 'human relations school* 
interpretation might suggest. To be effective the staff man has 
to be somewhat independent, able to manipulate situations informally 
and generally machiavellian.in approach (Teulings 1971b), a view 
not much at variance with that of Dalton (op cit). Fisch (1961) 
also questions what he calls the wisdom of slavish adherence to the 
staff/line concept and sets about proposing an alternative 
organisational scheme, believing that staff/line has been at the 
root of many of our post-war organisational problems. He 
considers it a useful concept when a company’s product lines are 
simple and subject to infrequent changes over time. But with 
diversification of product lines and growth in complexity of 
operations staff specialisms proliferate. Some of these specialisms 
(e.g. research and development and finance) are so vital to 
organisational success- that it is perhaps unwise to treat them 
as staff functions. Fisch has some flattering remarks in store 
for Accountants. "I am sure you can find in your company many 
instances where, if the controller had more authority to initiate 
action to remedy inefficiency in both manufacturing and sales, 
substantial savings could be achieved faster than under the pure 
line/staff system where the controller may only function as an 
advisor." The alternative system he proposes is the functional- 
teamwork concept which advocates the breakdown of artificial 
barriers between activities and functions, regrouping allied 
functions with the emphasis on organic structures. This scheme 
has a lot to commend itself and could go a long way towards removing 
some of the friction and conflict that beset staff/line relations.
It appears Accountants adopt a directive stance when acting a 
staff role in the area of budgeting. Argyris (1953) feels that the 
way in which Accountants operate budgetary control systems is 
punitive rather than supportive and that budget staff view their 
role as essentially one of criticism. They also view their role 
as one of policing, reporting deviations from target to top 
management and view the budget as a device to pressurise and
challenge line employees. As one might expect, line supervisors 
did not respond in a favourable fashion to these attitudes and 
behaviour. They tended to view the budgeting system as a mechanism 
reporting results without commenting on the reasons for the results, 
that targets were set at an unrealistically high level with a 
tendency to go on increasing them, and that the Accountant's approach 
was generally inflexible. Line supervisors felt that these problems 
could be overcome if the Accountant recognised that budgetary 
standards have no firm factual basis; they are merely calculated 
statements of opinion, and that matters could be improved if the 
Accountant was prepared to see the other man's point of view.
Argyris mentions the remarkable degree of aggression levelled at 
the budget department, a not altogether surprising phenomenon given 
their perceived policing role, and also given the situation that 
success; for the budget supervisor means failure for the factory 
supervisor. Wallace (1966) commenting on some aspects of Argyris*s 
study suggests that budgeting practice not only generates a 
department-centred mentality with parochial views prevailing which 
act to the detriment of organisational based goals, but also that 
the planning and control aspect of budgeting is sometimes over­
emphasised and tends to remove the opportunity for the exercise oif 
personal initiative. A number of dysfunctional consequences - 
defensive behaviour, anxiety, tension and manipulative tactics 
designed to produce a favourable variance - were associated with 
the imposition of rigid budgets, but apparently a profit conscious 
approach to budgeting where supervisors are technically efficient 
and psychologically close to their subordinates produces a different 
effect (Hopwood 1973). Another recent study highlights the reaction 
of middle managers to a budgetary control system. Unlike senior 
managers who tended to view it as an instrument to provide better 
control for middle management, middle managers felt it was a 
policing mechanism based on inaccurate information (Beresford,
Dew and Gee 1973)*
The criticism of the Accountant's staff role is hot confined 
to budgeting practice. It is alleged that accounting as a service 
falls short in adequately assessing the information needs of 
management• This deficiency is exemplified in an observation by 
Tricker (op cit). "The provision of information for management
through the management accounting system tends to he haphazard.
In many concerns such systems study that there has been, has 
concentrated on the paperwork systems without becoming involved 
with the people and the use made of the data." Robson (1965) takes 
on a similar perspective when he maintains that many accountants do 
not see themselves as part of an alliance with managers in the 
processing and dissemination of information. Rather they are 
preoccupied with techniques without paying sufficient attention to 
management's information needs. Still on the same theme, bee (op .cit) 
suggests that the accountant operating in the area of management 
information should broaden his horizon. Elgin (op cit) also admonishes 
the accountant to consider the genuine needs of management for 
information and quotes the example of one British company - Boots 
Limited - who took some positive moves by officially stressing the 
inter-dependent roles of management accountants and managers.
This theme of general criticism still seems to have at least 
some relevance in the light of more recent observations. Firnberg 
(1973) relates the deteriorating position of a Financial Director 
whose position was gradually undermined as a result of the appointment 
of a Planning Director who introduced a comprehensive information 
system which seemed to become the main source of information for all 
significant decisions. The role of the Finance Director appeared 
to be relegated to that of "keeper of the purse". Although 
traditionally the accountant belongs to a discipline frequently 
laying claim to presenting the whole picture of what happsns in the 
organisation, Firnberg expresses grave doubts as to the authenticity 
of this claim in reality in terms of both reflecting the events 
happening and the speed with which the happenings are being reported. 
Support for this position comes from Young (1973) who maintains there 
has been a failure on the part of accountants to furnish the right 
sort of information. This failure is attributable to two main 
causes: first, the accountant's lack of understanding of the
decision-making process and lack of sensitivity to the needs of 
the participants in these processes; and second, that the 
traditional role of the accountant in providing information more 
to describe or highlight a particular manager's responsibility 
does not adequately equip him to directly assist managers in 
decision-making. His solution to counteract this unsatisfactory
state of affairs, now used in his company, takes the form of a 
'decision analysis' technique whereby a series of interviews with 
the managers concerned are arranged - with the blessing of the 
Chief Executive - resulting in a pattern of decision-making devised 
to highlight information requirements of assistance in decision­
making. Recent empirical evidence throws further light on the 
inadequacy of certain information provided by accountants to help 
managers. Beresford Dew and Gee (op cit), investigating the use 
of accounting control data by middle managers, showed that a 
significant amount of information prepared for control purposes 
was not properly used due to the following reasons: it was not
totally relevant, it was too detailed or not detailed enough and 
it arrived too late. It is therefore not surprising to find 
classical staff/line friction, of the type discussed earlier, 
developing between the Accountant and the Manager he serves.
Woodward (1965) accounted for the ill-feeling between accountants 
and line managers in the sphere of production administration by 
asserting that management accountants were reluctant to accept the 
role of management accounting as a servicing or supporting function.
Span of control has been considered traditionally an important 
structural variable. Its size'.featured prominently in the thinking 
of the classical theorists (e.g. Urwick op cit) who viewed it as 
having an optimum size. Later, empiricists (Woodward 1965?
Pugh et al 1969? Child 1973) considered it a function of contextual 
variables - size and technology - and attributed its different. 
magnitudes to changes in these variables. Dale (1952) has shown 
how progression from medium to large sized organisation results in 
an increase in the number of subordinates reporting to one superior. 
Entwisle and Walton (l;96l), drawing on a study of spans of control 
in both bollege and small company organisations, maintain that there 
were small positive correlations between size of organisation and 
span of control, and in any case the span of control does not 
dramatically increase with increasing size.
It is worthwhile exploring the main reasons why the classical 
school show such a strong attachment to the almost constant narrow 
span of control. First, there is the question of span of 
attention. This view subscribes to the contention that a person
is psychologically incapable of attending to more than seven items 
at the one time. Therefore the span of attention dictates the size 
of the span of control. But one can argue that the conditions 
prevailing in the psychological laboratory in which optimum spans . 
of attention are measured do differ, often quite substantially, 
from ongoing organisational conditions. It is highly unlikely 
for an executive to have to attend to his subordinates simultaneously. 
But one must concede that "the span of attention is probably a 
contributing factor toward limiting the span of control, but it 
seems unlikely that it is the only factor" (Entwisle and Walton 
op cit). Second, with a larger span of control there are more 
possibilities for the formation of sub-groups and each sub-group) 
produces its own unique social interaction with the superior.
There is also greater opportunities for the formation of cliques 
with self-advancement as: their primary aim. Entwisle and Walton, 
having invoked evidence from studies of small groups, believe that 
continuing external pressures are required to bind groups larger 
than five into cohesive spans of control. Also it is maintained 
that larger groups- require a longer time to reach consensus with 
less; opportunity for members to participate, and as a result members 
experience less) satisfaction from interactions. Third, the 
possibility of a multiplicity of relationships inevitably acts as 
a constraint on the size of the span of control. However, a 
positive disadvantage of the narrow span of control can be expressed 
as close supervision and a stifling of initiative.
Worthy (op cit) equates wide spans of control with company 
success, posing a direct challenge to the position of the classical 
school. With a wide span of control, he believes close supervision 
becomes impossible and devolution of authority and responsibility 
becomes possible, though he stresses that this requires a,fair 
measure of self-confidence and personal capacity on the part of 
subordinates. His recipe for success- is a flat, less complex 
structure, with a maximum of administrative decentralisation; it 
is only then that one can expect an improvement in attitudes, more 
effective supervision, and a climate in which people are keen to 
assume responsibility and use their initiative. Pisch (1963) 
substitutes span of management for span of control and considers 
it in relation to different hierarchical levels of organisation.
At the general manager level, with the exception of this level 
in medium to small companies and the management of sub-units in 
very large corporations, very wide spans of management are the rule 
rather than the exception. Middle managers on the other hand, tend 
to supervise subordinates with well structured jobs, and in any 
assessment of the optimum size of the span of management at this 
level one has to be cognizant of the functional and geographical 
diversity of company operations; the quality of company planning 
and control; the freedom to delegate; the amount of information 
at the disposal of the decision-maker; the adequacy of the 
remuneration system and the qualities and characteristics of 
superiors and subordinates. Obviously this poses difficulties when 
trying to arrive at a figure for the span of management because of 
the complexity of the constraints, but the figure of fifty is 
suggested by Fisch and is based on his own personal observations.
A much wider span of control is recommended for the supervisory 
level. A recognition of size and product diversification as 
influential agents determining the width of the span of control 
is very much in evidence, with the important proviso that one should 
always remember that companies organise themselves in diverse ways 
depending on the type of business, its history, location, facilities, 
personalities and so on. It appears that a departure from the 
optimum number is now well overdue, and size, hierarchical level 
and technology deserve our attention as mediating influences.
STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP
What remains to be examined is how the structural variables 
mentioned above, together with any relevant organisational phenomena 
not acknowledged so far, are likely to influence leadership or 
managerial decision-making behaviour. The relationship between 
leadership and structure is widely acknowledged. This will be 
explored, to begin with, at a global level of analysis, to be 
followed by specific reference to the impact of selected structural 
variables.
In his analysis of the contribution of the neo-human relations 
school, Strauss (1968) maintains that there is a tendency to consider 
their assertions as having universal applicability irrespective of 
prevailing situational and structural variables. He cites a case
in point, that of Likert's system four style of leadership 
"which calls for high individual identification with the 
organisation as a whole and a great deal of interaction between 
groups." This be believes is appropriate only in certain areas 
of work, especially where technology is complex, change is rapid 
and novel problems are frequently encountered for which there are 
no simple answers. Janowitz (1959) maintains that with the 
development of new weapons military authority has shifted from 
an emphasis on explicit instructions to manipulation with an air 
of paternalism appended to it. He sees a similar trend in 
non-military organisations. The existence of 'structural looseness', 
according to Thompson (1965)* implies the dispersion of power in 
organisations with ramifications for problem-solving. ' Argyris 
(1964) makes the suggestion that it might not be a bad thing if we 
were to accommodate structure to the type of decision faced. In 
a similar vein, Whyte (194S) considers the prospect of organisational 
flexibility ruling during the discussion stage of decisions,but 
greater structuring to be introduced at the implementation stage.
The influence of structure on leadership style is forcefully put 
by Worthy (op cit) who contends -
"that the over-complex, over-functionalised 
organisation structure is likely to require 
the driver type of leader; the over-use of 
pressure as a tool of supervision is thus 
related primarily to the character of the 
structure and only secondarily to the 
character of the individual at the head 
of it."
Already in our discussion of Fiedler's contingency model of leadership 
we have noticed the prominence given to the favourableness of position 
power and job structuring as important variables determining the 
effectiveness: of leadership style. Likewise, Wofford (op cit) found 
different situational factors eliciting different leadership responses.
In a specific reference to functional specialisation Heller 
and Yulcl (op cit) reported that.production and finance managers 
tended to use centralised leadership styles whereas non-specialised 
general managers and personnel managers tended to behave in a more 
permissive way. Purchase and sales managers were found to occupy 
a position between two extremes-. In accounting for the differences 
in leadership style the authors are inclined to the view that the
nature of the task is instrumental in bringing about the above 
result, but the answer may also lie in an analysis of the degrees 
of freedom in the different functions. One would expect to find 
a lesser degree of freedom in the finance and production departments 
because of the incidence of more programmed decisions. In the 
personnel and general management fields, on the other hand, there 
is likely to be relatively more unprogramraed jobs. Leadership 
style was also found to be influenced by job tenure, but here again 
hierarchical level was a mediating force. Heller and Yukl feel 
that the longer the time spent by first and second-line supervisors 
in their job, the greater is the tendency to experience a shift 
from a permissive to a directive leadership style. In contrast, 
senior managers tended to use more 'delegation1 as their stay in the 
job increases. The differences in leadership style is considered 
to be a function of the different perceptions of the qualities and 
skills in the subordinate; it appears that more power-sharing is 
associated with less perceived differences in skill between superior 
and subordinate levels in the organisation. This amounts to a 
question of confidence in the subordinate. It is not altogether 
clear why the more experienced supervisor is less willing to share 
his decisions with his subordinate.
An interesting theoretical question is posed by Hage and Aiken 
(1967) when they ask whether centralisation of power is associated 
with high formalisation and low complexity. The measure devised 
to gauge centralisation or distribution of power was aimed at 
establishing the amount of influence exerted by subordinates in 
decisions concerned with resource allocation and policy determination 
on the one hand, and the extent to which hierarchical-authority was 
relied on for normal work decisions on the other. Formalisation 
embraced the use of rules, their description and whether they were 
adhered to. It would appear that formalisation is firmly 
established in the finance function. Complexity refers to the 
amount of occupational specialisation, amount of professional 
training and involvement in the activities of professional bodies.
In circumstances where centralisation of power exists there is 
every likelihood of adhering to the practice of codifying past 
decisions to form organisational rules so as to avoid overloading 
the centralised decision-making unit. Decentralisation of power
would then he associated with a lower degree of job codification. 
Earlier in this chapter reference was made to attempts at devising 
operational definitions of "bureaucracy using dimensions not too 
dissimilar to those mentioned above (Pugh et al 1968). In a 
study of social welfare and health agencies Hage and Aiken found 
that the relationship between formalisation and centralisation did 
not stand up to empirical test, though the extent to which rules 
were enforced and expected to be observed bore a weak or minor 
relationship to participation in decision-making. Therefore to 
counteract the lack of commitment arising from a low level of 
participation in decisions affecting organisational objectives, 
rule observation is something to be considered.
When we move to a consideration of occupational specialities 
a clearer picture emerges. There is evidence to suggest that as 
the number of occupational specialities increases inevitably there 
is a movement towards decentralisation (Thompson 1961). In the 
study conducted by Hage and Aiken (op cit) they report the greater 
the level of professional activity the greater are the demands for 
participation. This can be explained with reference to the unique 
predicament of the professional in the organisation. He normally 
demands more power and autonomy, and as he becomes more competent 
and expert decision-makers consult him and share decision-making 
with him. Participation in decision-making, rather than reliance 
on hierarchy of authority, is the Centralisation* dimension offering 
the greatest association with the structural properties under 
discussion. It was found also that wide participation in decision­
making appears to go hand in hand with lesser resort to job 
descriptions, less close supervision, more specialisation and 
better trained and committed professionals. The main message 
emanating from this somewhat prolonged deliberation is that 
decentralisation is associated with a reliance on skills and 
expertise and the exercise of self-control; centralisation is 
associated with a reliance on rules and close supervision - 
mechanisms of control which are unsuitable when organisational 
participants are professionally trained. Chandler (1966) lends 
some support to the above findings. He reports that large1 
corporations in the U.S.A. were more likely to become decentralised 
after becoming involved in the manufacture of vastly diversified
products as if to suggest that product diversity leads to an 
increase in occupational specialists, eventually resulting in 
decentralisation of decision making. This was more likely to 
happen when managers were more professional, suggesting that 
professionalism may hasten the process, of decentralisation. In 
a study conducted in the U.K., already referred to, delegation and 
decentralisation were most prominent in industries which had a 
high concentration of skilled personnel (Woodward 1965)-
A finding at variance with those mentioned above - again in 
a British context - whilst acknowledging that the more structured 
of two small-sized organisations had an organisational climate 
where people are more concerned with rules and regulations, 
administrative efficiency and conventionality in dress, manner, etc 
states that participation on the part of group members is slightly 
lower in the less; bureaucratic organisation in spite of the greater 
autonomy (Payne et al 1971)- In defence of the position of 
Hage and Aiken it should be stressed that the work environment 
they studied was likely to be conducive to the particular needs 
of a professional group. The conclusion of Payne et al is not 
substantiated by the findings of a recent study (Bass et al op cit) 
They associate a tight structure with a directive style, and a 
participative style with a non-bureaucratic organisational 
environment•
The remainder of this chapter will1, be devoted to a further 
examination of the impact of the structural variables which were 
the subject of comment earlier, but this time they will be 
specifically related to decision-making behaviour. Level within 
the organisation is one of the variables which affects leadership 
status (Stogdill and Shartle 1948)• Drawing on evidence which 
they classify as expert opinion, training practices and empirical 
data Healey and Fielder (1968) advance the view that different 
levels of organisation place somewhat different demands on leaders. 
The higher the position in the organisation the more one felt it 
necessary to offer work groups more initiating structure and less 
consideration (Fleishman op cit). The independence of both 
consideration and initiating structure is mediated by level 
within the organisation (Weissenberg and Kavanagh op cit) • In 
a different context, Martin (op cit) related hierarchical level
to decision situations in terms of time, continuity, duration 
and tempo. At the lower level the foreman, for example, operates 
in the immediate present with only a slight extension into the past 
and future. The time from the inception to the conclusion of the 
decision is relatively short, hut at the higher level it is likely 
to he considerably greater. The verification of the correctness 
of a decision is almost immediate at the lower level, whilst at the 
higher level wide intervals of time can separate the various 
components of the decision situation, resulting in discontinuity.
The duration is longer as one moves upwards from the lower to the 
higher levels; at the higher level the decision enquiry stage alone 
could last for over a year as opposed to a day or a week at the 
lower level. Also the frequency of decision situations is greater 
at the lower level but there is a greater opportunity to exercise 
flexibility in choice of time to take action at the higher level. 
Obviously immediacy of action is paramount at the lower level; a 
broken pipe or defect in product quality requires immediate 
attention. Variations in decision-making behaviour were found 
to occur at different hierarchical levels by Blankenship and Miles 
(op cit) who report that freedom of action believed to be enjoyed 
by a manager is associated with his position in the hierarchy.
Those occupying positions at the upper echelons of the organisation 
enjoy considerable autonomy in the sense that their superiors did 
not initiate action for them, nor did they consult their superiors. 
But ’’they relied heavily on subordinates to bring problems to their 
attention and to offer ideas and recommendations.11 Managers lower 
in the hierarchy relied less' on suggestions and ideas emanating from 
subordinates and were more inclined to accept guidance from above. 
This result is supported by Heller and Yukl (op cit) who indicate 
that the higher the leader is in the hierarchy of authority, the 
less: centralise® is his decision-making.
As the size of social groupings increases so does the size of 
the leader’s authority, his personal power and the amount of 
delegation permitted in the decision-making process: (Michels 1949)• 
More specifically, as the size of organisational groups increases 
direction of group activities which is leader-centred is 
associated with members expressing attitudes of greater tolerance 
for this type of leadership (Hemphill 1950)- Wofford (op cit)
found the manager whose style is oriented towards personal 
security and group maintenance to he the most effective in the 
large complex organisation. A different type of leadership - 
group achievement and order - was most effective for the smaller 
groups. Blankenship and Miles (op cit) also comment on the 
influence of size hut make the point that any relationship between 
size and decision-making behaviour is modified by hierarchical level. 
Those occupying positions at the bottom of the hierarchy enjoy 
greater freedom in small sized organisations. Managers exercising 
considerable influence on their superiors and endowed with the 
ultimate right of choice in the making of a decision were more 
likely to be found in the upper levels of the hierarchy.
Differences were not so marked between large and medium sized 
firms.
The relationship between line/staff organisation and decision­
making behaviour is not at all clear. Heller and Yukl (op cit) 
found it difficult to classify senior managers as either line or 
staff but eventually were able to choose twenty six managers (line) 
who implemented and controlled policy and sixteen managers (staff) 
who advised and made recommendations on policy. They report that 
there is a small likelihood of line managers being authoritarian or 
less; permissive than staff managers.
Reliance on subordinates - a facet of managerial decision-making 
behaviour - was the dimension related to the span of control 
(Blankenship and Miles op cit). A greater number of managers, 
with thirteen or more subordinates reporting to them, said they 
frequently depended on their subordinates for ideas and the 
initiation of decisions. With a narrower span of control - four 
or less; - managers were less: dependent on subordinates, but yet 
again the influence of hierarchical level was felt. Regardless 
of the size of the span of control, upper rather than middle or 
lower level managers are likely to depend more on their subordinates. 
Areas where subordinate influence could be felt - consultation 
and joint decision-making - were almost dispensed with the larger 
the span of control (Heller and Yukl op cit). From their 
investigation - which reverses- the trend depicted above - they 
found a tendency on the part of senior managers and second-line
supervisors to centralise their decisions when the span of 
control was large. However, the senior managers resorted to 
delegation as their alternative style in such circumstances.
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN
Before undertaking the field work required by the research 
project alternative approaches to the collection of data were given 
consideration. The anthropological approach, resulting in 
qualitative description, and action research, whereby the researcher 
can act as a catalyst to initiate change and observe its consequences, 
are valuable techniques at the disposal of the researcher. The 
natural experiment in a field setting also offers a lot of potentiality 
and is most useful if the researcher gains access to an organisation 
to investigate social phenomena before and after a major change in an 
organisational process- is executed.
Because of the author’s full-time commitment to teaching 
it was felt that the final choice of instrument would rest on either 
the mail questionnaire or the interview and discussion. Each 
approach has its own advantages and limitations, as we shall see 
later, and any one approach could be supplemented by the other.
In choosing the mail questionnaire as the main research instrument 
one was partially influenced by the trend in empirical psychology 
towards quantitative analysis. It is of course possible to use a 
questionnaire as an interview schedule, but such an approach would 
of necessity be costly in terms of reaching the number of respondents 
who might participate in the research study. To reinforce the 
questionnaire as a research tool it was always my intention to use 
a flexible structured interview with a sample of respondents.
RESEARCH METHODS
Though suffering a deficiency as an efficient instrument to 
study social processes, the questionnaire is particularly suitable 
for studies of attitudes, values, beliefs and perceptions of 
informants. As a method it offers great efficiency in gathering 
data and by lending itself to quantification opens the way to 
statistical analysis and data processing. The use of the questionnaire 
for a simple inquiry among people of a certain educational standard - 
a professional group - and concerned with a subject of particular
interest to them is considered valid (Moser and Kalton 1971)•
Without specifying the complexity of the inquiry, Cartwright and 
Ward (1968) would endorse this suggestion when they maintain that 
"postal questionnaires offer an efficient method of collecting 
information. They are cheap and relatively quick and can he 
widely scattered geographically. In approaching professional 
groups there are no problems of illiteracy or inarticulateness to set 
against these advantages." There are other advantages attributable 
to the postal questionnaire, among them being that the greater 
proportion of returns will be returned in a few weeks; problems 
associated with interview errors which affect the reliability and 
validity of survey results are avoided; the likelihood of 
respondents making critical remarks and uttering less socially 
acceptable responses is that much greater than in the interview 
situation; and finally the accuracy of responses is greater if 
questions require the respondent to consult documents or reflect on 
matters for a while (Moser and ICalton op cit) .
There are, however, drawbacks surrounding the questionnaire 
as a research tool. It would appear that all too frequently 
questions are not sufficiently simple and straightforward to be 
understood with the help of printed instructions and definitions.
The danger of ambiguity, vagnenessi and inappropriate use of technical 
expressions creeping in is always present. Speak (1967) has much 
to say about the deficiency of question wording on questionnaires.
Her main concern is that not enough thought and care is given to 
the wording of questions and that we are too ready to accept that 
interpretations of words and phrases depend upon their context.
But research evidence suggests that certain words and phrases may 
have a unique interpretation in their own right - something that 
could be quite independent of context. It is also her contention 
that in order to check distortion we must try to avoid the use 
of emotionally charged questions and those affecting the prestige 
of respondents, just as we should avoid phrases or words which 
elicit varying frames of reference among respondents. Machlup 
(1946) feels that we must be on our guard against the danger of 
artificial responses, misinterpretation or failure to comprehend 
meaning of questions. The questionnaire may not be completed with 
due care; there is no check-up on the validity of the responses,
bias is likely to enter and the end result may be but an 
abstraction of real life situations.
Other criticisms levelled at the questionnaire are that it 
is an unsuitable technique where spontaneous answers, without any 
reference to a colleague, are required and where the respondent 
can see all the questions before answering any of them, particularly 
where a subsequent question gives a clue as to what is required 
previously. In addition one cannot always be sure that the right 
person receives the questionnaire (Moser and ICalton op cit)• 
Commenting on the disadvantages of closed questions so-frequently 
found on a questionnaire, Oppenheim (1972) makes the point that we 
tend to lose the respondent's own thoughts on the matter in question, 
albeit it is only fair to add that the open-ended question can 
somewhat counteract this flaw. Also we introduce bias by forcing 
the respondent to choose among alternatives not of his own making, 
and consequently the prospect of irritation arises because the 
choice of answers do not coincide with his own.
The activity of self-description or self-reporting which occurs 
through the medium of the questionnaire has been the subject of much 
comment. Though recognising some of its limitations in the form 
of distortion and ambiguity, Blankenship and Miles (op cit) believe 
it facilitates the undertaking of a study and enables the researcher 
to contact a large number of organisations. Mahoney et al (op cit) 
commenting on measures of performance used in their studies suggest 
that "the reliability and validity of self-reported performance 
patterns equal that of other commonly accepted measures" and 
justify their use. However, Burns (l954) having compared 
behavioural profiles of managers on self-recorded forms with a 
subsequent verbal description of behaviour on similar dimensions 
found a number of disparities. Apparently the managers concerned 
were astounded by the incongruities. Relying exclusively on a 
respondent’s appraisal of his own behaviour is to accept perceptual 
errors, particularly in a situation where perceived status clashes 
with what appears in reality. Hopwood (op cit) and Heller (op cit) 
report perceptual gaps when a superior and subordinate were asked 
to express; a view on social phenomena common to both. Even 
outside a situation of this nature significant discrepancies between 
reported and actual behaviour are likely to arise (Hhyte 1963)*
Evidence also exists pointing out a discrepancy between reported 
feelings on the questionnaire and what people really felt 
(Cummings et al 1958). Poor response rates are often cited as 
the preserve of the postal questionnaire. This is a point which 
will be discussed later in the context of the survey response.
One must, as a result, offer qualified acceptance to the questionnaire. 
But equally alternative methods, such as the interview, possess flaws.
Follow-up interviews are a means of overcoming some of the 
disadvantages of the questionnaire but the interview is not immune 
from criticism. It is much less structured than the questionnaire, 
but since research requires the securing of comparable data from a 
number of respondents it would be almost pointless if the interview 
was to be non-directive, as found in psycho-therapy. The research 
interview requires the interviewer to maintain some control, but 
the pivot of success is flexibility. One advantage of the interview 
is the intervention of the interviewer when questions appear 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, an interviewee may give a false reply 
because he misunderstands the question or consciously or 
unconsciously he distorts the answer for reasons connected with 
prestige, or he gives the answer expected of him (Moser and Kalton 
op cit)• Likewise the interviewer may unintentionally offer an 
insight into his opinions or expectations by his tone of yoice, the 
way in which he reads the questions, or simply by his appearance, 
dress- or accent (Oppenheim op cit)• Problems common to both the 
interview and questionnaire are: the absence of motivation on the
part of the respondent to co-operate; questions are considered 
irrelevant or inappropriate by the respondent and access! to the 
requisite information is difficult• Whether the questionnaire 
stands on its own as a tool, or is combined with the interview,
Heller (op cit) considers the use of both techniques together or 
the questionnaire on its own to be less- than satisfactory. To 
him the real alternative is Group Feedback Analysis (GFA) because 
it incorporates some aspects of the two major approaches to the 
study of human behaviour, the idiographic and nomothetic.
This is a technique which, to begin with, requires a group to 
be seated around a table. Then members of the group are presented 
with standardised instructions and a definition of the research
objectives by tape recorder. Reinforcement of the research
objectives appear on the short questionnaire they receive.
Some verbal reinforcement can also come from the researcher.
A simple statistical analysis is performed and some time later 
the results are fed back to the group for interpretation. This 
stimulates group discussion with a movement, as the process 
continues, from the unstructured to the structured and quantifiable. 
Heller, in general, seems to be satisfied with the questionnaire he 
use® in management research when he states, "the evaluations of the 
group discussions do not contradict the conclusions from the 
statistical results, rather they provide a second dimension and 
enable us to see some of the findings in a rough perspective."
But in the case of a particular result he expresses reservations 
about the efficacy of the questionnaire when he states, "this 
statistical result is not congruent with the strongly expressed 
views of the feedback discussion, and it seems likely that the 
discrepancy points to a difficulty in using questionnaires for 
complex, subtle and emotionally charged concepts."
Systematic, observation in organisations is put forward by one 
writer as a procedure of greater value than reliance on retrospective 
questionnaires and interviews (Walter op cit). But equally one 
could argue that observers can also misinterpret reality since our 
perceptions can be influenced! and distorted by values, motivation, 
prior expectations, social norms and so on (Hyman 1964)* Also 
the observer who is interested in events in the past will have to 
rely on records or the memory of the respondent, both of which may 
not be entirely dependable. Lowin (op cit) attacks both self- 
reporting and observation as procedures "vulnerable to observer halo 
or rationalisation and need to be replaced by objective measures or 
experimental methods." He quite rightly advocates the adoption of 
longitudinal studies and the use of control groups which are not 
unduly influenced. This is admirable as an ideal proposition, 
but the problem of access to organisations to conduct such studies 
is by no means an easy one.
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
With full cognizance of the observations in the preceding 
discussion the author set about the preparation of a questionnaire 
suitable for collecting the required data. Particular attention
was given to the layout of the questionnaire, to the clarity of 
instructions and to the adequacy of questions in terms of being 
simple, acceptably technical and free from ambiguity. From the 
initial reaction to a pilot questionnaire this objective was not 
wholly realised.
4.2.1 FIRST PRE-TEST’
Ten subjects were chosen in an arbitrary fashion to participate 
in the pilot scheme. They all occupied senior positions in the 
field of industrial.accountancy, invariably occupying positions of 
the rank of Chief Accountant or Financial Controller. Eight 
expressed a willingness- to participate in the study by completing 
the questionnaire they received with an accompanying letter 
soliciting their co-operation. Subsequently, after receiving the 
completed questionnaire, a personal interview was arranged with 
four respondents. Around the same time consultations took place 
with a-few academic and senior accountants in industry when the 
contents of the questionnaire were discussed. These meetings I 
believe had the effect of subjecting the contents of the questionnaire 
to quite an intensive and penetrating analysis, producing a 
crystallisation of scattered ideas to a far greater extent than 
did discussions with two senior industrial accountants prior to the 
pilot scheme. The instrument was tested in order to establish the 
clarity of the instructions and questions, its validity in the light 
of the research objective, its reliability as far as one could tell, 
and finally the ease with which the requisite information could be 
recalled. What immediately Game across was that the questionnaire 
was too long and likely to discourage the most eager and enthusiastic 
respondent. In addition, it was felt necessary to modify its 
layout and contents as a result of a perusal of the completed 
questionnaires and the interview results.
The number of decision types in question 2 of the questionnaire - 
see Appendix 'A1 - was reduced from 23 to 14 and it was felt that 
the decision types- finally chosen more accurately reflected those 
normally taken by, or within the province of, the Financial 
Controller or Chief Accountant. Also in question 2 the columns 
dealing with the frequency with which a decision is taken in the 
course of a year and the approximate time interval between the 
commencement and conclusion of the decision-making process were
deleted.. This was because the completion of these columns posed 
a problem for respondents by taxing their abilities to accurately 
recall the number of times a particular decision was taken and the 
length of time between the initiation and completion of the decision­
making cycle. The distribution of scores from the pilot run, as 
one would expect, seemed rather skewed. A less severe rationalisation 
of question 3 dealing with the extent of specialisation within the 
finance function was also undertaken. Job areas of a unique but 
not widespread 'nature were deleted to allow a portrayal of a more 
representative view. This had the effect of reducing the job areas 
from 19 to 13. In question 4 ‘the section concerned with the 
'importance* of certain qualities: or skills was removed because in 
the circumstances it was considered both confusing and redundant, 
leaving the respondent to grapple with the extent to which the 
qualities or skills are desirable in, or actually possessed' by, 
subordinates in the final survey. Perceived characteristics of 
the respondent's superior in question 6, originally designed to 
reflect certain leadership patterns of behaviour at the highest 
level of the organisation, was considered to be too crude a measure 
and as a consequence was removed. Absent from the pilot 
questionnaire were questions referring to the size of the company 
and size of the finance function. It was felt that size was too 
important a variable to be omitted and was, as a result, incorporated 
in the final version of the questionnaire. There were other 
instances: of very minor adjustments to the layout and content of 
the questionnaire.
SECOND PRE-TEST
Whilst attending a one-week programme on Behavioural 
Accounting at Brunei University in June 1975? "the author distributed 
the modified questionnaire to nine participants whose profile closely 
resembled that of the respondents in the pilot survey. Seven of 
the participants completed it. As a result of the analysis of 
the completed forms a very minor modification to content was 
executed in the form of an improvement to the wording in a few 
instances. The layout of the questionnaire was much improved in 
the final version.
Before the preparation of the final questionnaire a number of 
factors were considered with a view to creating a favourable response
rate. To begin with, the length of the questionnaire is likely 
to be a critical factor. Stanton (1939) reports that a double 
postcard containing a single question which could be answered with 
a tick received a 21.9$ increase over a three page questionnaire.
A similar result is reported by Brown (1965). The difference in 
effort required of the respondent in both cases is quite staggering. 
However, when the nature of the project dictates a somewhat complex 
questionnaire which is also lengthy - e.g. 14 pages - of the kind 
used in the present research study, then we must expect a relatively 
low response rate. This view is to some extent implicit in a comment 
made by Cartwright and Ward (op cit) -
"Meanwhile many researchers will have to face 
the dilemma and choose between a low response 
rate with more information and a high one with 
less data about the individuals who respond."
Sponsorship of the survey is another factor to consider.
The author unsuccessfully approached both the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants and the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants with 
a view to funding the project, in effect sponsoring it. It has 
been suggested that sponsorship of surveys by government is 
instrumental in achieving a high response rate. This is discounted 
by Scott (1961) when he maintains that the use of three different 
letterheads (Central Office of Information; London School of 
Economics; British Market Research Bureau) produced no significant 
variation in response. Kanuk and Berenson (1975) are.of the opinion 
that there is little experimental evidence on the effects of sponsor­
ship, but maintain that when government sponsorship is compared with 
the pooled results of the two non-governmental sponsors, referred to 
above, a significant advantage for government sponsorship is revealed. 
Birmingham Polytechnic provided support for the survey conducted by 
the author, and one is convinced that the appearance of the 
Polytechnic's name and address- on the covering letter was beneficial 
in authenticating the study, which in turn could be reflected in a 
favourable response. The same is likely to be true of an association 
with any charitable or non-profit making institution. The 
introductory instructions and the first question on the questionnaire 
were printed on the back of the covering letter. Scott (op cit) 
found a significant difference in favour of printing the questionnaire
on the hack of the covering letter instead of enclosing it on a 
separate sheet of paper. Using both sides of a separate sheet of 
paper was followed throughout the questionnaire, a measure also 
endorsed by Scott. The covering letter started by acknowledging 
that not enough was known about an influential body of people, 
senior accountants, in industry and continued with a general statement 
of the purpose of the survey; finally, emphasising the 
confidentiality of information provided, anonymity of company, 
that a copy of the synopsis of the findings would be sent on request 
and that the respondent by his co-operation would be helping the 
researcher in this worthwhile venture or endeavour. The author 
felt it essential to emphasise the points mentioned, but in some 
respects Linsky (1965) holds an opposing view. He concludes that 
inserting a piece to convince the respondent that the research is 
worthwhile, and making an appeal to help the researcher had no effect 
on the final response rate.
Anonymity of the respondent, by name and work telephone number, 
was not envisaged simply because one required a means to contact him, 
if necessary, subsequent to the completion of the questionnaire.
On the face of it anonymity of the company was more fictional than 
real if the respondent provided his name and company telephone 
number, and if the identification number on the questionnaire 
remained intact. Anonymity of respondent may ensure a high level 
of voluntary response, and may minimise invalid responses when 
response is mandatory. The benefits of anonymity have, however, 
been challenged. Brayfield and Crockett (1955) feel that anonymity 
as such does have little or no bearing on the willingness to respond, 
albeit respondents may of course be reluctant to provide certain 
information about their department or company. Rosen (i960) 
likewise maintains that anonymity per se has little or no effect, 
and concludes that the identification of respondents in attitude 
questionnaire surveys in circumstances less than threatening is 
unlikely to result in serious statistical or practical distortion. 
However, one must concede that the incidence of social desirability 
responses is likely to be minimised by respecting the anonymity of 
the respondent (Cannel and Fowler 1963). Therefore, in the 
research study this is unlikely to be an important factor.
Since the identity of the Financial Controller or Chief 
Accountant was unknown one had to ensure that either of them would 
receive the questionnaire by specifically stating on the covering 
letter that it was for either of their attention. This in effect 
determined the form of salutation - 'Dear Sir*. Apparently a 
personal salutation has no significant advantage over an impersonal 
one (Kimball 1961). Nevertheless in order to give the communication 
a somewhat personalised flavour the date and signature were hand­
written. Though this may not produce the desired effect.
Kawash and Aleamoni (1971) tested the effect of a hand-written 
signature on the covering letter against a facsimile signature and 
found an insignificant difference. Using designatory letters to 
denote qualifications and official job title of the author was 
considered relevant. Roeher (1963) obtained a significantly larger 
response by using a title after the signature on the covering letter.
The questionnaire was produced on an offset litho process; 
white paper was used and the questionnaire was precoded where this 
was feasible. It seems there is no difference between printed and 
stencilled questionnaires in terms of response rates (Scott op cit) • 
Though Plog (1963) is of the belief that an individually typed letter 
accompanying the questionnaire, explaining the nature of the 
research study and couched in such terms as to secure the 
co-operation of someone hostile to mail surveys can have a tremendous 
impact in promoting a high response rate. Apparently it does not 
really matter if the questionnaire is printed on green rather than 
white paper (Gullahorn and Gullahorn 1963). Perhaps the same 
applies to any other colour. It appears that no disadvantage is 
suffered by using precoded questionnaires (Linsky 1975)• Finally 
the only tangible reward offered the respondent for his efforts was 
the promise of a synopsis of the findings of the survey.
4.2.3 CONTENTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE
The final questionnaire, containing thirteen questions, shall 
now be analysed.
Question 1 Biographical detail, including the experience
variables - Age and Time Spent in Job.
Question 2 Decision-making Behaviour in relation to
different types of Decisions.
This question focuses on the dependent variable - the major 
variable - and requires of the respondent the identification of 
his decision-making approach when confronted with different types 
of decisions. The fourteen decisions, applicable to the role of 
the Chief Accountant, can be classified as either programmed or 
non-programmed; programmed or non-programmed decisions could also 
be classified as task and personnel decisions, the latter consisting 
of non-programmed decisions. Decisions are arranged by category 
in section 4*5? Methods of Analysis. Arriving at the final 
selection of decisions for incorporation into this question was 
a lengthy process. Numerous conversations took place with senior 
industrial accountants and academic accountants before, during and 
subsequent to the pilot survey on the representativeness of the 
decisions. One also solicited observations on the degree to which 
some informants considered each decision as either structured or 
non-structured. The manner in which the later analysis reflects 
the decision categorisation process is the author's responsibility. 
The measure of leadership or decision style is that used by Heller 
(op cit) who successfully tested it for reliability and validity. 
Test - retest reliability of this measure with an interval of 
seven weeks was .82 (n = 32, p«sc.Ol). The measure is ^ illustrated in 
Figure 4*2.3 as the decision style continuum.
Figure 4*2.3
Decision Style Continuum 
(Heller's Influence/Power Continuum)
Style A Style B Style C Style D Style E
Own decision Own decision Prior Joint Delegation
without with consultation decision-
explanation explanation making
It shows the extent to which a superior shares influence with 
subordinates and is very much in the tradition of a power spectrum 
or leadership continuum. Each point on the continuum is said to 
be as effective as any other, and each respondent who has the 
authority to make a particular decision or make a recommendation 
that will lead to one is asked to indicate the approach to 
decision-making he normally adopts. Though encouraged to opt for
one approach entirely in connection with a decision, if more than 
one approach was applicable then 100$ was to be distributed across 
the relevant approaches according to the weight given to each 
approach. There were a number of instances where the 100$ was 
split. If a decision was not relevant to the work role of a 
respondent, he was expected to place 'not applicable' opposite the 
appropriate item. For example, this would apply in the case of 
decisions connected with debtors if the respondent worked in a 
retail food establishment. Another example would be where the 
respondent does not assume responsibility for all finance function 
activities due to split financial responsibilities. Likewise a 
respondent would be unable to respond to a decision item related 
to costing where such an activity, though anticipated, nevertheless 
does not exist in his company.
Question 3 Specialisation and Specialism
This question sets out to measure the extent to which job areas 
within the finance function are established and the level of 
expertise possessed by those responsible for operating, or managing 
each individual area. Key activities or specialised functions 
within the finance function are well documented (Weston op cit; 
Henning and Moseley 1970). Thirteen job areas were finally 
selected to reflect the main operational centres. A high rating 
on this dimension would denote a high level of specialisation.
The specialism factor was a rather crude one, relying on the degree 
of qualification of a section head or sub-system head. Fully 
qualified and senior unqualified could be considered by some to 
run closely parallel to each other. There could also be a slight 
danger of semantic error being introduced. Fully qualified to one 
respondent could mean professionally qualified, and to another it 
could have a different connotation; for example, highly qualified
; i
in the area in question irrespective of professional qualification. 
This is precisely what was intended and by all accounts was 
interpreted as such. Hhere an activity is performed by subordinates 
of equal rank, the respondent was asked to choose the individual 
with whom he had most contact, otherwise unnecessary confusion would 
arise. If one or more job areas are not relevant, the respondent 
was directed to place 'not applicable' opposite the appropriate item.
This answer would be forthcoming in conditions exactly the same as 
those stated in question 2.
Question 4(i) Perceive® Qualities or Skills in Subordinate
Respondents are presented with fifteen personality related 
characteristics and skills and asked to specify the extent to which 
these are desirable in and actually possessed by a subordinate.
¥here the respondent has more than one direct subordinate he is 
asked to focus his attention on the subordinate he meets most 
frequently. A small difference between the aggregate score for 
desired and actual qualities or skills denotes a higher regard for 
the subordinate, and conversely with a large difference. A number 
of qualities or skill items used in previous management research 
programmes were adopted. For example, seven items can be found in 
Heller and Porter1 (1966), four in Porter and Henry (1964a), and one 
in Miles (1964). The remaining three were derived empirically 
from observations at the pilot survey stage.
Question 4(ii) The respondent is given the opportunity to add
any further qualities or skills he considers 
important.
Question 5 Power, Status and Influence
This question was designed with the express- purpose: of gauging in 
rather general terms whether or not the respondent's position is 
endowed with an impressive degree1 of authority, status and influence 
at both superior and subordinate levels. A 'Yes' or 'Ho' answer to
each of the five or six items is required. Power vested in the
leadership position is one of Fiedler's key situational variables.
A biased response to this question cannot be ruled out entirely 
due to its connection with status and influence.
Question 6 Leadership Behavioural Characteristics
Already we have conceptually distinguished leadership behaviour 
expressed in terms of the OHIO State Leadership School from 
Leadership Style manifest in Heller's power/influence continuum.
The four operational definitions of leadership behaviour chosen 
and presented in this question, though condensed, coincide with 
major themes running through the literature (Bowers and Seashore 
op cit), particularly Initiating Structure or Task Orientation on 
one hand and Consideration or Employee Orientation on the other.
In question 6, items (i) and (ii) fit the latter and (iii) (iv) 
fit the former. The respondent is asked to indicate the extent 
to which he considers these characteristics a manifestation of his 
own leadership style.
Question 7 Space was provided for comments on any other
characteristics, not listed in question 6, 
which the respondent feels ought to he emphasised.
Question 8 Psychological Closeness of the Leader
The measure available to the respondent in this question is almost 
identical to the LPC measure used by Fiedler. The only variation 
is that the least preferred co-worker of the leader in Fiedler's 
research need not be a person working with the leader at the present 
time. In question 8 the respondent is asked to give his immediate 
first reaction to sixteen pairs of words opposite in meaning and 
describe the subordinate whom he prefers the least by placing a 
mark in one of the eight spaces on each bi-polar line. This type 
of scaling procedure is known as the semantic differential technique 
and was developed by Osgood et al (1957)• Fiedler uses this 
measure to gauge the motivational disposition or style of the leader. 
Its use in the present study is confined to acting as an indicator 
of the psychological closeness, of the leader to his subordinates.
Question 9 Hierarchical Level in the Organisation
This question aims at establishing the level within the hierarchical 
structure occupied by the respondent. Because of the enormous 
variability of positions, seemingly similar across organisations, 
one recognises the difficulties inherent in a comparison of levels. 
In order to help the respondent locate his particular level the 
following guideline was offered. Top managers of a company or 
division are designated 'Level 1'. Managers one step removed from 
them on the organisation chart are considered to be at 'Level 2*; 
those two steps away constitute 'Level 3', and so on. Though four 
levels are given it is unlikely that many of the respondents would 
be categorised by Level 3 or 4*
Question 10 Span of Control
The respondent is asked to indicate the number of subordinates he 
is responsible for supervising directly, by choosing a number 
opposite the appropriate range.
Question 11 Size of Finance Function
This question asks the respondent to indicate the size of the 
finance function, expressed in terms of number of employees, by 
choosing a number opposite the appropriate range.
Question 12 Size of Company
This question asks the respondent to indicate the size of the 
company, expressed in terms of number of employees, by choosing a 
number opposite the appropriate range.
Question 13 Nature of Role within the Company
This question is akin to a question specifically concerned with the 
outline ingredients of the classical notion of staff/line relation­
ships. It endeavours to establish the nature of the authority 
relationship between the Chief Accountant and the managers he serves 
or for whom he provides essential financial information. The 
respondent is asked to indicate (a) whether his role as representative, 
or acting for the representative, of the Finance Function is purely 
advisory, or (b) whether his role capsulates direct authority to 
implement recommendations of an accounting and finance nature in 
functional areas such as production and marketing, and finally 
(c) whether he is unable to identify his role in accordance with 
the above definitions.
The absence of a measure of the efficiency of the finance 
function on the questionnaire is conspicuous. It would appear 
somewhat unrealistic to invite a respondent to express a view 
pertaining to the efficiency of the department he manages. It is 
commonplace in studies of leadership in the U.S.A. to introduce a 
productivity criterion and relate it to leadership style.
But it is very difficult to evaluate productivity for a service 
function. Evaluation criteria in the form of standards are 
difficult to define, performance is difficult to measure and a
comparison of performance with standards is difficult to make.
When giving consideration to this question some tentative measurement 
criteria, open to elaboration and refinement in the future, came to 
mind.
(i) Cost of the finance function as a proportion of total 
turnover.
(ii) Time-lag between the publication of the statutory 
accounts and the end of the financial year.
(iii) Speed with which monthly comparative figures are 
available and the adequacy of the detail.
(iv) Cash Flow: the adequacy of cash - with or without
debtors - in relation to creditors. A Liquidity 
Ratio (cash + debtors-^ creditors) could be used.
A very fine ratio, 1.1 or 1.2, may be symptomatic 
of good management; alternatively in some 
circumstances it may be construed as a danger 
signal.
(v) If it is the company's policy to take advantage of 
discounts receivable and if the liquidity position 
facilitates it, the speed with which creditors are 
paid. Equal in importance is the effectiveness of 
the function in securing receipts from debtors.
All the above factors would then be considered in the context of the
number of staff employed and the extent of mechanisation. One 
should point out that the absence of an efficiency criteria does 
not detract from the importance and validity of the present research 
study. When we understand to a greater extent the impact of 
situational and structural factors on leadership style or managerial 
decision-making behaviour, then our attention can be diverted to a 
consideration of concrete efficiency criteria.
THE SAMPLE
Considerable difficulty was experienced at the first attempt 
to choose a sample of companies representative of a cross section of 
industry and commerce, excluding banking, insurance and related 
financial services companies. A good example of an index of 
companies, often referred to by researchers, is the Times 1000 
Index. This lists the top 1000 companies trading in the U.K.
Unfortunately, from the author's point of view, some of these
listed companies are either holding or parent companies, proving 
unsuitable for the purpose of the research. It was important
to choose operating companies because it is in these companies 
that one normally finds a fully developed finance function, unlike 
the customary situation in the parent company, particularly the 
large company, where the major preoccupation appears to be 
consolidation accounts work and the monitoring of financial 
operations. Another type of company which was considered unsuitable 
for the purposes of the research was that which employed 100 
employees or less, because of the real likelihood of it having an 
underdeveloped or practically non-existent formal finance function. 
Woodward (1965) deleted from her sample 93 companies employing 
100 employees or less because she felt these companies had few 
hierarchical levels and few organisational problems. Added to 
this were bank, insurance and finance companies because their 
accounting procedures differ from those of an industrial and other 
commercial type. Eventually one managed to secure a relatively 
recent copy of The Guide to Key Industrial Enterprises (Dun and 
Bradstreet) which contains a cross section of industrial and 
commercial enterprises. Putting to one side the very small 
company, the very large groups or parent company and the financial 
services companies, one was left with approximately 7?000 companies 
of varying sizes, located in the U.K., to choose from. The 
intention was to select roughly 1,000 companies evenly distributed 
as to size, and because of this condition a systematic random 
selection was not possible in the circumstances. Instead an 
arbitrary selection within the constraints specified was the only 
feasible course of action. The manual extraction of 9&9 companies 
from the Dun and Bradstreet Guide, on average one company per page, 
was both a burdensome and time-consuming task. The name, address: 
and telephone number, if available, of each company was noted, and 
companies were classified by type of industry and size. The 
size classification was decided on after consultation with two 
senior executives in industry, finally taking the following 
classification: -c500; 500-2000; >-2000 employees. One feels
confident in suggesting that the sampling frame is very 
representative of British industrial and commercial companies, 
bar financial institutions.
The next step was to consider the despatch of the 9&9 
questionnaires. Each questionnaire bore a serial number to 
facilitate the identification of respondents, and obviate the
likelihood of sending a reminder letter to a respondent. One 
was aware that in the eyes of some respondents this could amount 
to an infringement of the notion of company anonymity. A company 
on the sample list was given an identification number which was 
cross-referenced to the number on the questionnaire and the outgoing 
addressed envelope. It was then a matter of matching the appropriate 
questionnaire and envelope. Enclosed with the questionnaire was a 
self-addressed envelope which was unstamped. It would be preferable 
to enclose a stamped addressed envelope but the cost of doing so was 
a discouraging factor. A compromise was reached in the line of 
action taken. Perris (l95l)? however, provides convincing evidence 
for using a stamped return envelope to increase the response rate.
The outgoing envelope bore the addressee's title 'Financial 
Controller' or 'Chief Accountant*; this title order was reversed 
if the company concerned had less than 500 employees since it is 
unlikely to use the title 'Financial Controller'. So that the 
envelope would appear less; stereotyped than correspondence of this 
kind normally reaching a company, it was decided to opt for 
handwriting when addressing the envelope. In addition the word 
'personal' was prominently displayed on the top left hand corner 
of the envelops. It was felt that first-class postage would be 
preferable to second-class in creating a sense of urgency and a 
better impression. Also the threat of a rail strike, likely to 
disrupt the postal service, lingered on the horizon. However, the 
evidence on the superiority of first-class; mail is inconclusive.
Watson (1965) found a small advantage accruing to first-class over 
second-class mail but ICernan (1971) found no advantage either way. 
Finally no deadline date for questionnaires to be returned was 
specified as it was felt unrealistic to do so at a time of the 
year when holidays are taken. It has been suggested that the 
setting of a deadline date for completion and return of a 
questionnaire encourages an early reply (Kanuk and Berenson op cit).
The first batch of questionnaires, numbering roughly 500, 
were despatched on the 19th June 1975 and the remainder on the 
30th June 1975* One felt it might have some beneficial effect, 
in terms of response, if subjects received the questionnaire early 
rather than later in the week; though according to Scott (op cit), 
it makes no difference what day of the week the questionnaire reaches
the prospective respondent. The response rate to the first 
mailing was as follows :-
Table 4*3*1
Response to Despatch of 989 
Questionnaires
Returned Returned
Acceptances Refusals ’Gone Away* Go.Liquidated No Response
144 28 25 4 788
Roughly a month later, on the 18th and 30th July 1975? a 
reminder letter (Appendix !E ’ ) hearing a pre-printed date and 
signature, together with a copy of the questionnaire undated 
also hearing a pre-printed signature, were forwarded to non-respondents. 
This time no self-addressed envelope was used, the addressees 
name and address was typewritten and second-class postage was used.
It was felt that the original copy of the questionnaire would have 
heen mislaid in many cases hy this time, so it was decided to attach 
another copy of the questionnaire to the reminder letter in order to 
encourage the respondent to reply. A reasonable response followed 
the despatch of the reminder letter. This is illustrated in 
Table 4*3*2.
Table 4*3*2
Response to Despatch of 788 Questionnaires 
and a reminder letter
Returned Returned
Acceptances Refusals ’Gone Away' Co.Liquidated No Response
64 37 4 1 682
It would be difficult to differentiate late replies to the 
original request to complete the questionnaire from replies activated 
by the reminder letter. What is interesting, however, is that the 
bulk of acceptances in Table 4*3*2 appears on the original copy 
of the questionnaire. Obviously in most cases, contrary to one’s 
expectations, the original copy of the questionnaire was not mislaid 
by interested subjects. Non-respondents who replied giving their
reasons for not. participating in the study offered some initial 
appreciation of the problem of non-response. The following remarks 
reflect the main reasons given and appear in the original and in 
paraphrased form -
'We would like to help academics bridge the gap 
between theory and practice but the half-psychological 
questionnaire does not ask sensible questions.'
"In view of the nature of some of the questions I am 
afraid that I felt unable to complete it."
'We are inundated with a multitude of forms from 
government departments and trade associations, and 
since your questionnaire requires an appreciable amount 
of time to complete, I am afraid we cannot waste company 
time in this way.'
'We are very busy at the moment with year-end accounts 
and feel at this time we are unable to participate.1
'Current volume of work aggravated by holidays.'
"We are unable to assist you due to a substantial cut-back 
in staff because of the current economic climate".
"I don't wish to participate."
"I am not prepared to provide the information requested."
'The centralisation of the accounting function in the 
group to which my company belongs rules out I completing 
the questionnaire.'
'My job would not fit the pattern of your questionnaire.'
"At the time we received your questionnaire we also 
received two others, and although we are sympathetic 
to your aims we find we are unable to complete it."
'I take exception to having to disclose my identity.1
It was not my intention to remind non-respondents, for the 
second time, to complete the questionnaire as one felt such an 
effort would produce a marginal benefit in terms of extra responses. 
But one recognises it is conceivable that the issue of more than 
one reminder letter is a powerful means to promote an increase in
response (Kemsley 1962), but as/we have already noted there are a 
number of other determining factors as well. To gain some insight 
into the reasons why people did not "bother to respond it was 
decided to contact a random selection of non-respondents, numbering 
thirty five, by telephone. This presented some difficulties when 
endeavouring to locate the person who ought to have received the 
questionnaire. One resorted to asking the telephonist could I 
speak to the Chief Accountant, or Financial Controller. In some 
instances I was unable to establish contact with the appropriate 
person. The non-respondents I contacted offered a number of reasons 
for not responding, ranging from having insufficient time available 
to complete the questionnaire because of normal work pressures and 
mandatory form filling, to lack of interest and pleading not having 
received the questionnaire. In some instances a Financial Director 
received the questionnaire and, perhaps recognising that it was not 
totally relevant to his job area, retained it instead of passing it 
on to the appropriate subordinate to complete. By seeking an 
explanation for non-response on the telephone one could easily have 
forced the non-respondent into a situation whereby he offers a 
plausible rationalisation for his failure to co-operate. This 
rationalisation may be at variance with his true intentions. 
Non-respondents were contacted in early September 1975 an& during 
the course of the conversation I availed of the opportunity to 
remind them that it was still not too late to complete the 
questionnaire. About ten respondents requested a further copy 
of the questionnaire. Shortly afterwards thirteen completed 
questionnaires were received. The final response, expressed by 
company size, is shown in Table 4*3*3*
Table 4*3*3
Number of Respondents classified by 
Company Size
n = 955
SIZE OF COMPANY
Small Medium . . Large Total
f  ■ 1° $
64(29) 86(38.9) 71(32.1) 221(23)
On comparing the stratification in Tahle 4*3*3? with that which 
constitutes the original sample, illustrated in Tahle 4*3*4? no 
great divergence is evident.
Tahle 4*3*4
Sample of Companies classified 
by Company Size
n = 989
SIZE OF COMP AFT
Small Medium • Large Total
d?7° $ $
336(34) 322(32.6) 331(33.4) 989
After deducting the number of questionnaires (34) representing 
those returned as ’Gone Away’ and ’Company Liquidated' from the total 
sample number, a response rate of 23$ was achieved. Having 
discarded nine incomplete questionnaires, the final distribution of 
responses appears as depicted in Table 4.3*5*
Table 4*3*5
Final distribution of Responses 
by Company Size
n = 955
SIZE OF COMPANY
Small Medium Large Total
59 86 67
f
212(22)
The questionnaire, as earlier stated, was designed with a view 
to it being completed by a respondent who possessed operational 
responsibility for a reasonably developed finance function. Those 
who were unable to complete the questionnaire to an acceptable 
standard, but tried to do so, did not normally satisfy this 
requirement. For example a respondent - a Financial Controller 
of a large group of companies - recognised the limitation of his 
position in this respecct when he maintained that each operating 
company within the group had its own qualified Financial Controller 
or Financial Director which precluded his involvement in the sort
of decisions, of an operating nature, envisaged "by the questionnaire. 
At the other end of the scale three Financial Accountants obviously 
had very restricted authority attached to their positions, so much 
so that the questionnaires were grossly incomplete. Another 
respondent, a Managing Director and Financial Controller, submitted 
only two pages of the questionnaire with a note to the effect that 
the company was a small private one, and nI do not think my answers 
to your questions would be very representative.” A number of 
unanswered questions was a prominent feature of a questionnaire 
coming also from a respondent in a small company. The fragmentation 
of the finance function, a concomitant of which was the allocation of 
responsibility between two accounting managers, led the respondent 
to submit an incomplete questionnaire. These then were the type 
of questionaire not processed.
Poor response rates are often cited as the preserve of the 
postal questionnaire.
"Response rates reported for mail surveys 
have been very much lower than those for
interview surveys  Mail surveys with
a response of as low as 10$ are not unknown 
while rates of over 90$ have been reported 
on a number of occasions" (Moser and Kalton 
op cit).
Gray (1957) contends that with specialised populations it seems 
possible to obtain an 80$ response rate without the issue of a 
reminder letter. He attributed the good result, however, to the 
simplicity of the questionnaire. As far as one can see, a good 
result in the context of a relatively complex, lengthy questionnaire 
is possible given the presence of favourable influencing factors. 
Hopwood (op cit) reports that each questionnaire in his study 
conducted in one company was accompanied by a letter from the 
General Manager confirming that the study had been approved by the 
senior managers of the company. In addition two reminder letters 
with accompanying copies of the questionnaire were sent to 
non-respondents. A response rate of over 87$ was obtained. A 
similar response rate was achieved by Bass et al (op cit). They 
attributed the high return rate to the fact "that respondents were 
informed that the data would be summarised for each individual 
manager sc that he would be fed back a 'profile* of the situation 
in which he and his subordinates worked." A group of forty two
managers, attending a short course at the Ashridge Management 
College in 1971? were addressed by the author with a view to seeking 
their co-operation by participating in a research study. Having 
spent ten minutes explaining the purpose of the study and its value, 
stressing the anonymity of the respondent and the confidential nature 
of the inquiry, a fairly long, cognitively taxing questionnaire was 
distributed to each person present with the specific request that it 
should be completed while I waited. On average it took thirty 
minutes to complete the questionnaire. The response rate was very 
impressive at 98$* There is no doubt that one confronted a 
receptive audience, coupled with the fact that the Course Director 
had approved the survey as a legitimate educational pursuit. A 
similar questionnaire was distributed in the same year to a group 
of accountants attending a short course at Cambridge University.
This time I instructed the Course Director to distribute the 
questionnaires, which he received from me, to the course 
participants, which he did towards the end of the course. He 
spent little time introducing the questionnaire to the audience, 
and suggested that those interested could collect a copy of the 
questionnaire as they left the lecture room. After the despatch 
of one reminder letter to non-respondents, the response rate was 46$.
These generally favourable response rates can be contrasted 
with the rate of 23$ obtained in the present survey. But one must 
be fully aware of the favourable conditions prevailing in the above 
circumstances which, in my opinion, facilitated an impressive 
response rate. However, when one compares the response rate of 
23$ with that of 22$ achieved by Santocki (1975) who conducted an 
I.C.M.A. sponsored research study, using the postal questionnaire, 
into various aspects of the management audit, one begins to 
appreciate some of the difficulties in securing a high response 
to a technical questionnaire from a remote sample population, 
widely dispersed geographically, but representative of the population 
as a whole.
The problem faced with a low response rate is that non­
respondents may differ in some material respect from respondents, 
so that any judgements based on the views of respondents are biased. 
From a brief conversation with thirty five non-respondents, 
undoubtedly a small proportion of the non-response population,
the author failed, from a superficial assessment of them, to 
subscribe to the view that they were a unique or special breed of 
Chief Accountant or Financial Controller. Already reasons have 
been put forward for refusing to respond and outright non-response. 
When thirteen of the thirty five non-respondents returned the 
completed questionnaire subsequent to the telephone conversation, 
their profile and distribution of responses on the questionnaire 
showed a similarity to the pattern of the initial, respondents.
In connection with bias due to non-response, Ferber (194$) maintains 
that it does not follow that questions on the questionnaire will be 
similarly affected. In fact some questions may be totally 
unaffected.
McDonagh and Rosenblum (1965) maintain that the mail 
questionnaire may reveal representative responses in spite of a 
partial return from a sample of the selected population, and that 
researchers should have greater confidence in the questionnaire 
method as an initial tool of research. They conclude from the 
results of a study that there were no significant differences 
between the responses on a mailed questionnaire and those given by 
interviewed respondents who had not answered the questionnaire. 
Identical questions were asked of both groups. There is a 
contention that respondents and non-respondents can be differentiated 
on the basis of socio-economic and personality characteristics, but 
the evidence available to support it is not very convincing.
Wallace (1954) reported that respondents and non-respondents were 
virtually the same on a number of socio-economic characteristics. 
Ognibene (1970) found respondents to be high on gregariousness and 
leadership traits, but Vincent’s (1964) typical respondent did not 
fit this profile; instead he showed a tendency towards conformity 
and co-operation. Finally, the representative nature of the 
sample can be gleaned from the sample characteristics set out in 
Appendix ’B ’ .
THE RESEARCH INTERVIEW
The questionnaire was primarily designed as an instrument 
to collect data lending itself to quantifiable analysis. There 
were of course open-ended questions to offer the respondent the
J L IO  -
opportunity to expand, add:; to or qualify a given observation. 
However, it was felt necessary to conduct follow-up interviews 
with a sample of respondents in order to allow qualitative 
judgements or comments to he made on issues covered by the 
questionnaire. The sample list was compiled from respondents 
whose companies were located in the South East of England, 
particularly the Greater London Area, and the West Midlands. 
Respondents chosen for interview were selected from the list in 
a random fashion. Only three respondents refused to participate 
and this was justified on the grounds of pressure of work. In 
all thirty two respondents participated and their distribution 
over company size is shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4
Humber of Respondents Interviewed, 
by Company Size
n = 221*
SIZE OP COMPANY
n = 32
Small Medium Large Total
f i 7°
10(31.2) 10(31-3) 12(37.5) 32(15)*
Sub-sample - interview sample - characteristics appear in 
Appendix IB I where they are contrasted with total sample 
characteristics.
The number of respondents interviewed as a percentage of the 
total number of respondents is 15$. The interview programme 
started in September 1975 and was concluded by the end of 
February 1976.
In order to facilitate the smooth operation of the interview 
and collect a wide range of pertinent data an interview schedule 
was prepared and used. This had the effect of structuring the 
interview but it offered also a lot of flexibility. The questions 
on the Interview Schedule (see Appendix 'F* ) covered most of the 
points raised by the questionnaire and acted as a catalyst by 
promoting a very useful empirical enlargement of responses on the
questionnaire. At the outset of the interview the author 
stressed the strict confidentiality of the inquiry, which was educa­
tional in nature, and the anonymity of respondents and that if 
one’s curiosity led to asking delicate or sensitive questions the 
motives of the researcher were purely educational. One tried to 
explain to interviewees how their company came to he chosen as 
part of a sample of companies in the first place and the reasons 
for the follow-up interview.
At the time of arranging the interview a large number of the 
selected respondents expressed the view that the most time.they 
could devote to the interview was thirty minutes, preferably less.
In actuality the time allocated to the interview was considerably 
greater. Everybody interviewed was co-operative and helpful and 
the interviews varied in length from 1-J- to 2 hours, averaging 
lj hours. One felt that as-the interview progressed it assumed 
a therapeutic value for many interviewees. A number of interviewees 
also welcomed the opportunity to give serious consideration or 
reflection to aspects of their jobs normally taken for granted but 
present at the level of dim awareness. Wax (1952) would view 
this situation as a form of exchange in which the researcher and 
informant consciously or unconsciously give each other what they 
both desire or need. She quite rightly states that most 
informants will resent manipulative and patronising behaviour on 
the part of the researcher. It is important to listen attentively 
with respect to suggestions or advice; and the rewards received 
by the informant are many, ranging from relief from a boring work 
episode to allowing a bitter informant to obtain relief from 
divulging his frustrations.
METHODS OP ANALYSIS
Hypothesised and other relationships in the data were subjected 
to statistical analysis. A computer programme was specifically 
compiled in order to examine simple correlative associations.
Later a statistical computer package - SPSS - was extensively used. 
The statistical tests used were :-
Tests of Hypothesis - comparison of proportions
using the Normal Statistic Test
Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient
Kendall’s Tan. Rank Order Correlation Coefficient
Coefficient of Multiple Correlation 
Partial Correlation 
Chi-Square (xa)
The relationships examined with the aid of these tests are 
discussed below. In addition, in order to obtain an overview 
of patterns of questions, on a tabular and cross-tabular basis, 
percentage or index tables were produced. All statistical work 
was carried out on the computer.
Each question on the questionnaire (see Appendix1 A*) will be 
examined with a view to identifying the statistical treatment it 
received. The variables which were subjected to statistical test 
will be examined first. The decision-making behaviour variable 
in question 2 (hereafter referred to as decision style) is the 
major dependent variable and has a relationship with all other 
variables on the questionnaire. The latter comprise the 
independent variables.
Decision Style in relation to different 
types of decisions (Question 2)
Programmed decisions are identified by the numbers 3? 6, 10,
12, 14? non-programmed decisions are comprised of the remaining 
numbers - 1, 2, 4, 5, 7> 8, 9? 11> 13* Task decisions are 
identified1 by the numbers 1, 3? 4? 5> 6, 7? 9> 10, 11, 12, 14; 
personnel decisions are comprised of the remaining numbers - 
2, 8, 13* This probably reflects reality, with a preponderance 
of emphasis given to task decisions. Por each decision style 
the mean of the stated percentages was extracted over all 
applicable decisions. An identical calculation was made when 
all applicable decisions were sub-divided into the categories 
enumerated above. A comparison of the percentage time usage of 
the decision style for the different categories of decision was 
made. Por each decision style the number of respondents 
actually using a given style more for non-programmed than 
programmed decisions was calculated. This was achieved by 
comparing the mean percentage time allocated to a decision for 
non-programmed decisions with the mean percentage time allocated to 
a decision for programmed decisions. The proportion of all 
respondents using a decision style more for non-programmed than
for programmed decisions was then compared with 0.5 using the 
normal test statistic. An identical calculation was made when 
comparing the usage of the various decision styles for task as 
opposed to personnel decisions.
Decision Style in relation to the 
independent variables
The experience variables - time spent in job and age - 
(Question l) were related individually and combined to decision 
style using the Pearsonian Product Moment Correlation, Kendall’s 
Tau Sank Order Correlation and the Coefficient of Multiple 
Correlation. The individual relationships were then mediated 
by level in the organisational hierarchy (Question 9) and size of 
both finance function and company (Questions 11, 12) using the 
Partial Correlation Coefficient.
The variable Specialisation - extent to which a job area is 
established - (Question 3) was derived from a Likert five-point 
scale by summating the ratings for the thirteen areas. It was 
then related to decision style by category of decision using the 
Pearsonian Product Moment Correlation and Kendall's Tau Sank 
Correlation. Specialisation and Specialism - degree of 
qualification of person operating or managing a job area - 
(Question 3) were together related to decision style using the 
Coefficient of Multiple Correlation. Specialism was also related, 
011 an individual basis, with decision style using the Pearsonian r 
and Kendall’s. Tau. The scale used to arrive at a score for the 
variable Specialism was identical to that used for Specialisation.
Perceptions of desirable and actual qualities or skills 
(Question 4) were recorded on ordinal type scales. Integers 
ranging from 1 to 7> denoting minimum and maximum scores 
respectively at the extreme points, were assigned to the scales 
to indicate relative positions. The difference between the actual 
and desirable score for each of the fifteen types of quality or 
skill was calculated and the differences were aggregated. The 
aggregate difference was then related to decision style over all 
decisions and by category of decision using the Pearsonian r 
and Kendall's Tau. The individual types of quality or skill
discrepancy were also related to decision style using the 
Pearsonian r. The mediating effect of level within the 
organisational hierarchy (Question 9) was measured by using the 
Partial Correlation.
The Status, Power and Influence variable (Question 5) was 
obtained by aggregating the affirmative responses in columns 57 
to 62. This variable was related to decision style, using the 
Pearsonian r and Kendall's Tau, over all decisions and by 
programmed decisions only.
The managerial behaviour characteristics variable (Question 6) 
was sub-divided into two categories - Employee Orientation (i) (ii) 
and Task Orientation (iii) (iv). It was obtained from a 
five-point Likert scale by summating the ratings for the four 
characteristics, and was related to decision style using the 
Pearsonian r and Kendall’s Tau. Using identical tests the ratings 
for the dimensions Employee Orientation and Task Orientation were 
summated and each dimension was related to decision style.
Combined with L.P.S. - opinion of least preferred subordinate - 
(Question 8) both dimensions were related to decision style using 
the Coefficient of Multiple Correlation.
The Semantic Differential scale (Question 8) was adopted in 
order to measure the attitude of the superior towards his least 
preferred subordinate (L.P.S). It was used by Fiedler in a 
similar capacity and can be viewed, like a Likert scale, as a 
summated rating scale. The total attitude scale is derived from 
sixteen bi-polar rating scales, each being an eight point scale, 
with 8 representing the most favourable response. A respondent's 
total score is the measure of his attitude. :• To counteract a 
biasing effect the position of the poles was varied between scales. 
The L.P.S. variable was related to decision style over all decisions 
using the Pearsonian r and Kendall’s Tau. When relating L.P.S. 
and Employee Orientation and L.P.S. and Task Orientation to 
decision style the Coefficient of Multiple Correlation was used. 
Ignoring decision style, L.P.S. was related to both Employee 
Orientation and Task Orientation individually using the 
Pearsonian r and Kendall’s Tau.
The Level variable (Question 9) was related to decision style 
using the Pearsonian r and Kendall's Tau. The mediating effects 
of size of company and size of finance function (Questions 12, 11) 
individually and collectively on the relationship between decision 
style and hierarchical level were measured using the Partial 
Correlation. The same statistic was used to establish the 
mediating effects of level in the following relationships: 
the individual relationship between age and decision style and 
time spent in job (job experience) and decision style; age and 
job experience together in relation to decision style; the 
relationship between the aggregate quality or skill discrepancy 
and decision style; the relationship between span of control and 
decision style. In addition hierarchical level was combined with 
size of company to mediate the relationship between span of control 
and decision style.
The number of subordinates reporting directly (span of control) 
variable - Question 10 - was related to decision style over all 
decisions and by category of decision using the Pearsonian r and 
Kendall's Tau. The relationship between decision style and span 
of control was then mediated by hierarchical level (Question 9) 
and by both size of finance function (Question 11.) and size of 
company (Question 12) individually, and by hierarchical level and 
size of company together using the Partial Correlation.
The Size of Finance Function variable (Question 11) was 
related to decision style using the Pearsonian r and Kendall's Tau. 
It is used as a mediating variable in the relationship between 
hierarchical level (Question 9) and decision style. It was also 
merged with size of company (Question 12) to mediate the latter 
relationship. To measure its mediating effect the partial 
Correlation was used. Similarly this variable mediated the 
relationship between job experience and age (Question l) and 
decision style, and the relationship between span of control 
(Question 10) and decision style.
The Size of Company variable (Question 12) was related to 
decision style using the Pearsonian r and Kendall's Tau. It acted 
as a mediating variable in the relationship between hierarchical
level (Question 9) and decision style, fusing with size of finance 
function (Question 11) to mediate the latter relationship. The 
Partial Correlation was used to measure its mediating effects.
It also mediated the relationship between span of control 
(Question 10) and decision style and together with hierarchical 
level (Question 9) mediated this relationship. The relationship 
between age and job experience (Question l) and decision style 
individually was also mediated by size of company. Nearly all 
relationships between the dependent and other independent variables 
were classified by size of company in an endeavour to assess the 
influence of company size.
The role of the Chief Accountant variable (Question 13) was 
related to decision style using the Chi-square test (JC*)•
Index and Percentage tables were compiled in order to high­
light the pattern of data distribution on a tabular and cross-tabular 
basis. In three instances graphs were prepared from the 
Percentage tables.
Percentage Cross-Tabular Tables
- Size of Company related to Job Experience
- Size of Company related to Hierarchical Level
- Size of Company related to Span of Control
Graphs
- Decision Style Profile by Company Size
- Size of Company related to Size of Finance 
Function
Percentage Tabular Tables
- Functional Hole of Chief Accountant
- Status, power and Influence
Graph
- Decision Style over all Decisions 
Index Tabular Tables
- Specialisation and Specialism
- Employee and Task Orientation
Table of Differences;
- Discrepancy between desirable and actual 
qualities or skills related to size of 
company
Comment on the Statistical Tests
Confronted relatively frequently with a skewed distribution 
of data and the use of ordinal scales the logical course of action 
would appear to be the choice of non-parametric tests. Siegel 
(1956) has championed these tests in psychological research when 
conditions surrounding the use of parametric tests are not fully 
satisfied. Constrained by the confines of the statistical 
package used - the SPSS - all multivariate analysis had to be 
conducted through the medium of parametric tests which are 
underpinned by the assumptions of normality of distribution and 
interval scaling. This being so, in order to achieve uniformity 
of testing methods a parametric bivariate correlation coefficient 
- Pearson’s Product Moment - was considered an appropriate test to 
use. However, as a precautionary measure Kendall’s Tau Rank 
Correlation Coefficient was used in nearly all the cases where the 
Pearsonian r was considered relevant as an exercise in verification. 
Ho substantial differentiations are discernible when we compare the 
results of both tests (see Appendix ’D ’). Though Spearman’s Rank 
Order Correlation Coefficient is generally considered preferable 
to Kendall's Tau, the incidence of a number of ties in the data 
makes the latter the more suitable.
Parametric tests are frequently used in psychological research 
in circumstances when the conditions attached to them are not 
fully met. In highlighting the limitations of his research 
method, Heller (op cit) goes on to say: "It is known that rating
scales such as those used in nearly all research on participation, 
including the present one, do not meet all the assumptions of the 
Pearsonian r". A widely held view explaining the attachment to 
the parametric test (even when its conditions are not satisfiedt'.) 
is that it is better at detecting significant differences between 
two sets of scores, making use of all information in the data, 
whereas the equivalent non-parametric test simply takes into 
account the rank order of the scores. Miller (1975) states that 
"statisticians have recently examined what happens to the accuracy 
of certain parametric tests (i.e. the t-tests) when the basic 
assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance are system­
atically violated. Happily these studies show that the results
of the t-tests are not seriously distorted even when quite marked 
departures from the basic assumptions are introduced.11 There 
appears to be no reason to suspect the robustness of other 
parametric tests unless there are glaring departures from normality 
and homogeneity. This is unlikely to be the case with the present 
research data.
Though the dependent variable, depicting the time spent on 
each decision style, may satisfy the interval level measurement 
criteria, since it possesses the characteristics of a ratio scale, 
the same cannot be said of the independent variables measured on 
a Likert scale. Since the Likert scale does not offer a zero 
point for subjects who feel neutral about an item, it facilitates 
statistical analysis at the cost of reducing validity by forcing 
some subjects to express a view they do not hold. It is argued 
that the Likert scale is not tantamount to an interval scale because 
of its ordinal status and therefore no conclusions can be drawn 
about the meaning of distances between scale positions (Moser and 
Kalton op cit). Nevertheless’, many psychological variables are 
measured on scales which cannot be classified as interval scales 
of measurement. However, under certain circumstances a seemingly 
ordinal attitude scale may satisfy the requirements of interval 
scaling. Stone and James (1965) offer as a major finding the 
view that "education students perceive the prestige of teacher 
specialities reliably enough so that their judgements can be 
measured on an interval scale."
It is evident that when interpreting the significance of a 
correlative association between variables there are no imputations 
of cause and effect. A 5$ level of significance will be used 
(i.e. one-tailed test) when a hypothesis postulates a direction 
in the differences between two variables. The size of the 
sample for any statistical table will depend on the completeness’ 
of the information on the questionnaires.
CHAPTER 5
HYPOTHESES
The hypotheses were formulated subsequent to an exhaustive review 
of the relevant literature, and reinforced by empirical observations 
obtained during the pilot stage of the research study. The dependent 
variable - decision style - is featured in every hypothesis along with 
the relevant independent variable(s). One should emphasise that the 
hypotheses centred on the mediating effects of size and level are 
somewhat speculative.
Hypothesis I The Chief Accountant displays a tendency to 
manage in a directive fashion.
Hypothesis II Programmed decision situations lend themselves 
to both directive and delegative styles of 
decision-making behaviour.
Hypothesis III Hon-programmed decision situations lend themselves 
to consultative or participative styles of 
decision-making behaviour.
Hypothesis IV Task decision situations are more likely to be 
associated with a directive and a delegative style 
of decision-making behaviour.
Hypothesis V Personnel decision situations are more likely to 
be associated with a consultative or a 
participative style of decision-making behaviour,
Hypothesis VI The more experienced - age and time spent in job - 
the Chief Accountant the greater the likelihood of 
he using a moderately directive style of decision­
making behaviour.
Hypothesis VII A high level of specialisation is likely to he
associated with a directive style of decision-making 
behaviour.
Hypothesis VIII A high level of specialism is likely to lead to the 
use of a less centralised style of decision-making 
behaviour.
Hypothesis IX When the Chief Accountant perceives a smaller 
discrepancy between actual and desirable skills or 
qualities in the subordinate he is more likely to 
use a directive decision style. The opposite is 
true when he perceives a larger discrepancy.
Hypothesis X Chief Accountants enjoy a high level of organisational 
status, power, and influence and this is likely to be 
so irrespective of the style of decision-making 
behaviour.
Hypothesis XI Employee oriented behaviour, rather than task 
oriented behaviour, is associated with decision style
Hypothesis XII A directive style is likely to be associated with a 
low L.P.S. and a permissive style with a high L.P.S.
Hypothesis XIII When the span of control of the Chief Accountant is 
wider a directive decision style is more likely to 
be used, whereas a permissive decision style is more 
applicable when the span of control is narrower.
Hypothesis XIV The Chief Accountant whose functional role embraces 
the use of direct authority to implement his 
recommendations is likely to have a penchant for 
a directive decision style.
Hypothesis XV The larger the size of the company and finance function
the greater is the likelihood of a permissive oriented 
decision style prevailing.
Hypothesis XVI Size of company and finance function mediates the
relationship between decision style and the 
experience variables.
Hypothesis XVII Size of company and finance function mediates the
relationship between decision style and span of 
control.
Hypothesis XVIII Size of company and finance function individually and
combined mediate the relationship between decision 
style and hierarchical level.
Hypothesis XIX Overall the Chief Accountant's decision style is
likely to be influenced by the size of the company.
Hypothesis XX The higher the organisational level the greater is 
the likelihood of the Chief Accountant exercising a 
permissive oriented style.
Hypothesis XXI Hierarchical level mediates the relationship between
decision style and the experience variables.
Hypothesis XXII Hierarchical level mediates the relationship between
skill discrepancy and decision style.
Hypothesis XXIII Hierarchical level mediates the relationship between
decision style and company size.
Hypothesis XXIV Hierarchical level mediates the relationship between
decision style and span of control. It produces a 
similar effect when combined with company size.
CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
Having specified the Hypotheses in Chapter 5? the stage has 
now been reached where data and observations derived from the 
questionnaires and interviews are subjected to analysis, and 
inferences are drawn from the trends and patterns that develop.
In the next chapter, under the heading of Discussion, the empirical 
evidence will be discussed further with specific reference to the 
Hypotheses and the relevant literature.
Before examining the impact of category of decision on 
decision style, the distribution of the Chief Accountant's decision 
style over all types of decisions ought to be acknowledged. The 
decision style profile is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6
Decision Style Profile of Chief Accountants 
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We find that almost equal emphasis is given to restrictive and 
permissive decision styles with a marginal advantage in favour 
of a directive style whose closest rival is a consultative style. 
Styles D and E - joint decision-making and delegation - appear 
to he used sparingly.
DECISION-MAKING BEHAVIOUR ( DECISION STYLE) IN 
RELATION TO DIFFERE1JT TYPES OF DECISIONS
The main consideration to hear in mind is whether the type of
decision faced hy the Chief Accountant has any hearing on his
decision style. The manner in which decision styles are used
more for non-programmed and task decisions than for programmed and 
personnel decisions is depicted in Tahle 6.1.
Tahle 6.1
A comparison of the percentage time 
usage of Decision Styles for the 
different categories of decision f
Decision Type 
Comparison
Decision Style
A B c D E
Non-Programmed - 
Programmed
Task - Personnel
4-
-3.39
4-
6.7 8
-0.07
8.04^
-
6.40
-4.12
7*43*
-4-43*
-5.01*
5-76*
4 = p <  *>001 Source: Q 2 in
Questionnaire
* Normal Statistic Test
The finding in the upper part of the tahle suggests quite 
emphatically that decision styles C and D - prior consultation and 
joint decision making - are used more frequently for non-programmed 
than programmed decisions. Alternatively, it can he expressed in 
a slightly different form. Decision styles A, B and E - own 
decision without detailed explanation, own decision with detailed 
explanation and delegation - are used more frequently for programmed, 
decisions than for non-programmed decisions. Though the statistic 
for B was not significant, nevertheless the pattern of positive and 
negative values was maintained.
The finding in the lower part of the tahle suggests equally 
emphatically that decision styles C and D are used more frequently 
for personnel than for task decisions and that decision styles A,
B and E are more frequently used for task as opposed to personnel 
decisions.
In the relationship between programmed decision situations 
and decision styles A, B, E the strongest statistical association 
is reserved for the delegative style ’E', and the weakest association 
(non-significant) for the semi directive style ’B ’. This then 
might suggest that the two most appropriate styles for programmed 
decisions are delegation and own decision without explanation.
¥e shall now turn to the field observational data to see to what 
extent it endorses the statistical prediction.
’For programmed decisions delegation is prevalent.
There is extensive delegation with a cut off point 
beyond which variances have to he reported by the 
subordinate.’
In the larger company control data (e.g. sales and profit analysis)
and the audit function tend to he relied on as monitoring devices
in addition to placing trust in the subordinate. One respondent 
in a large company said:
’’Because of the size of the company extensive delegation 
is applied. I rely on my fortnightly meetings with 
subordinates to keep me informed. In addition there 
is the internal audit to keep me in touch with any
irregularities and defects in the content of records
and systems. And of course there are the impersonal 
control techniques - budgets and profit statements to 
keep me in the picture.”
In the smaller company there appeared to he more direction emanating 
from the Chief Accountant. Generally, the calibre of his 
subordinates was relatively lower and the size of operations lent 
itself to a higher degree- of informality. Every effort was made 
however to delegate when the circumstances justified it. The 
following remarks are attributable to Chief Accountants in the 
smaller company.
‘Subordinates operate under guidelines, subject
to periodic checks - browsing through the control 
data and a reliance on informal contacts.*
'In a programmed decision situation you would 
delegate where possible, but exceptional matters - 
e.g. when to take a discount on a payment to a 
supplier in certain circumstances - would require 
my attention. In other situations you would 
take action on your own if, for example, the accounts 
did not look right. But you must always rely on 
your subordinates, your success depends on them.1
'Delega/be with clear terms of reference. Where a 
formal control device does not exist, then control 
is likely to be exercised surreptitiously. It is 
essential to be informed, particularly when you have 
to face the external Auditors, so periodic checks 
are essential, though the number bears a relation­
ship to the calibre of staff. The need for 
periodic checks is also important in another sense 
because sometimes subordinates fail to understand 
instructions.1
Irrespective of size certain similarities were discernible 
in the comments made by respondents. Confidence in subordinate's 
ability is an important determinant of decision style, particularly 
of delegation in this context. Conversely, matters of an 
exceptional nature arising from a programmed decision situation - 
e.g. where payment to a foreign supplier in his currency exceeds 
£50,000, though individual sums in excess of this figure on 
aggregation are exempt, - were likely to call forth a directive 
style. In practically all situations where authority to take 
programmed decisions was delegated the use of monitoring devices, 
be they personal or impersonal, were considered justifiable. 
Cross-functional contacts and hearsay also had their uses as 
sources of information. In addition subordinates were encouraged 
to bring to the notice of the Chief Accountant matters of a unique 
kind both within and outside their level of competence. They 
were also allowed to conduct a dialogue on a cross-functional basis, 
e.g. discussions with marketing personnel on matters connected with
credit control,provided in the event of a disagreement or anything
of significance arising from such contacts the Chief Accountant 
was fully aware of developments. The Chief Accountant would 
also he likely to interfere more in so called sensitive areas - 
e.g. debtors - with a moderating influence in case an over- 
enthusiastic credit controller pressurises unduly a valued customer.
Though some form of checking book entries was an organisational 
reality universally, checking reached almost obsessional proportions 
in two construction companies. Both companies evolved from humble 
beginnings and their overall management still resided in the 
entrepreneurs responsible for their development. In a sense the 
Chief Accountants concerned were perpetuating a practice initiated 
by the owner manager in the early formative days and still actively 
pursued. One respondent said he was perfectly satisfied with the 
competency of his immediate subordinate and tended to delegate but 
felt it necessary to retain control by a random selection of 
entries in the books of account, so as to verify their accuracy. 
Another checked the cash book once a month and performed a periodic 
check of the Plant Register. In other situations pressure of 
time tended to elicit a directive response from the Chief Accountant.
Non-Programmed decisions elicit different decision styles.
The decision styles C and D - consultation and joint decision-making 
- are significantly associated with non-programmed decisions in 
Table 6.1. The observational’ data certainly confirms this finding. 
Various forms of consultative and joint decision-making behaviour 
were, for example, attributable to situations in which a major 
overhaul or modification to an accounting system was contemplated. 
Often in addition to the vertical contact with the subordinate 
the Chief Accountant would involve interested parties, from other 
functional areas, likely to be affected by any changes. This was 
exemplified in a number of comments made by respondents.
'In a decision connected with the re-design of the 
accounting system consultation took place between 
the computer man, my deputy and myself. My deputy, 
who favoured the retention of the manual system, 
exerted great influence in the final decision.'
1 The involvement of subordinates was conspicuous 
throughout the discussions related to the 
centralisation of accounting.'
'With reference to the centralisation of the 
accounting function subordinates were asked to 
examine their areas; time targets were set and 
a programme of action, decided jointly, was 
initiated. Subordinates exercised a fair degree 
of influence, e.g. in the matter of staff 
redundancies.*
'I was presented with the idea of developing a 
computerisation programme. Having considered 
the problem and broken it down into manageable 
parts, a steering committee was formed and my 
deputy along with a systems analyst were seconded 
full-time to conduct a feasibility study. A 
number of managers from other departments were 
involved in the deliberations at the committee 
meetings, but unfortunately this gave strong members 
the chance to influence events. Only my deputy was 
involved in the discussions before the report to the 
board was finally produced.'
'Because of a need for a new accounting system due to 
a significant increase in capital expenditure I 
conveyed to my subordinate what I thought it might 
look like. He listened, went away, thought about 
it, sorting out any snags as necessary. Hopefully 
he will come back to me having clarified the situation 
and then we shall discuss the scheme together.'
Numerous instances could be quoted of subordinate involvement 
in non-programmed decisions other than those relating to a 
modification of accounting systems. At the same time one can 
identify situations in which the Chief Accountant is reluctant to 
involve a subordinate, or if he does he appears not to treat the 
subordinate's contribution as such all. that seriously when arriving
at a decision. The confidential nature of a decision and whether 
the subordinate can make a worthwhile contribution appear to be 
important constraining influences. Here are some comments which 
reflect certain reservations.
'As far as modification to procedures is concerned 
subordinates can exercise tremendous influence; 
for example, they make suggestions, we engage in 
joint facts analysis exercises, and it is not 
difficult to reach agreement with them or endorse 
their views. However, there are times when I make 
the modification proposals and present them to 
subordinates as decisions, giving reasons for the 
line of action suggested.'
'Because of the secretive nature of disposals and 
acquisitions, the subordinate's role is merely that 
of collector of relevant information.'
'Faced with a complex situation - profit projection - 
I seek information from a number of quarters, e.g. 
production and sales. I would also seek the 
suggestions of subordinates in certain circumstances 
but at the same time I would refer to the documen­
tation they prepare in the normal course of events.'
'I discuss matters connected with the finalisation 
of cost statements when the person in charge is 
competent.'
'In many complex or uncertain situations I tend to
* make decisions on my own because of the limitations 
of subordinates. Subordinates usually have realistic 
expectations of the quantity and quality of their 
contributions and are aware of their limitations.'
'A subordinate's influence in a decision to change 
the accounting system is only felt, if having 
consulted him his contribution appeals to sound 
principles of logic.1
'If the problem concerned is within the orbit of 
the subordinate's experience, by all means involve 
him in the decision. Otherwise, the inclination 
is to tackle it oneself. Where decisions are 
based on information of a secretive or confidential 
nature, this rules out the involvement of the 
subordinate.'
'In a problem or special situation the subordinate 
may be involved in the decision process-as the 
provider and interpreter, exercising a strong 
influence on the final decision. But this is 
subject to the competence of the subordinate.'
'Circumstances in which I decide on my own are those 
in which I feel my knowledge or skill'is superior 
to that of my colleagues or subordinates.'
There appeared to be a greater tendency for respondents in the 
smaller organisation to express a reluctance to involve subordinates 
in non-programmed decisions apparently due to their lack of an 
acceptable level of competence. Generally speaking the subordinate 
of the Chief Accountant in the larger organisation is more able, 
perhaps because of better job prospects and remuneration. Some 
Chief Accountants felt participation by subordinates in a 
problem decision area was beneficial in circumstances where their 
influence was negligible.
*1 involve the subordinate in a problem situation 
so as to give him the opportunity to assimilate 
it and I would suggest certain courses of action 
for his consideration, but from the beginning I 
knew what the answer would be. It's an educational 
experience for the subordinate.'
'Where I am very knowledgeable about something 
(e.g. setting guidelines for the investigation of 
variances) I initiate action with predetermined 
notions about the likely outcome, and though I have 
made up> my mind I involve my subordinate out of 
courtesy.'
A number of other factors received a minor emphasis as 
phenomena likely to influence the adoption of a permissive 
decision style.
•Consensus decision-making is a striking feature 
of this organisation.’
'I would like to be able to engage in the style I 
like (lots of consultation) but the company 
environment seems to discourage it.1
•Group guidelines forced a decision on subordinates 
which they felt to be unsuitable for the company.’
’It’s likely one is more friendly and considerate
towards subordinates when their contribution to 
a decision is valued.’
’Avoid the danger of being manipulated by having 
decisions imposed on you. To guard against this, 
it is necessary to build up confidences.’
A similar statistical pattern presents itself when types of 
decisions are dissected into personnel and task decisions. All
the personnel decisions have already been classified under the label
of non-programmed decisions. On the other hand, five of the eleven 
task decisions are programmed decisions. The evidence in Table 6.1 
suggests that decision styles A, B and E are significantly 
associated with task decisions, and C and D are significantly 
associated with personnel decisions. This is not a surprising 
result if we lend credence to the observational data as to the 
appropriate style to use for personnel decisions when the subjects 
concerned are indirect subordinates.
’In connection with personnel decisions related 
to indirect subordinates I enter into discussion 
with my immediate subordinate before taking the 
final decision.’
’Joint decision-making is a normal occurrence when 
it comes to the upgrading of indirect subordinates.’
There appears to he an expectation on the part of the Chief 
Accountant that his subordinate would initiate the consultation.
’I like to receive early notice of significant 
personnel decisions, which is required in a medium 
sized company. I like to play the devil's advocate, 
e.g. in contemplated dismissals, when I try to extract 
from my immediate subordinate the consequences of 
dismissing an indirect subordinate.'
'Nith personnel decisions I would like to know what is 
being done and why.1
'As to staff1decisions, I feel I must be consulted by 
my subordinates.'
Of course there will be times when consultation and joint decision­
making will be forfeited in favour of a more directive style, and 
if consultation is used it is not altogether genuine.
'The promotion of an indirect subordinate is a 
decision I am likely to take on my own. There is 
an able accountant working in the Management 
Accountant's section and he could benefit from 
broadening his experience and assuming new 
responsibilities. I know the Management Accountant 
is likely to resist such a move because he does not 
want to lose his services. My mind is made up and 
any 'consultation' I use in such circumstances amounts 
to no more than a diplomatic ploy.'
Finally, the impact of programmed decisions in the relationship 
between task decisions and decision style is likely to be critical.
6.2 DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO EXPERIENCE 
VARIABLES (TIME SPENT IN JOB AND AGE)
The relationship between decision-making behaviour (decision 
style) and both age and job experience individually and combined 
is shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2
Correlation between Decision Style 
and Experience Variables
Experience Variables
Decision Style
n=212 
Job Experience
n=209
Age
n=209 
Age and 
Job Experience
A .15 * .07 .15
B -.07 -.10 .10
C -.12* 1 • 0 .12
D -.01 .04 .09
E -.01 .02 .03
1 = p <  .05 Source: Q 1, 2 in
2 = p <  .025 Questionnaire
Table 6.2 illustrates a significant statistical association 
between decision styles A and C and job experience. This suggests 
that the more time spent in the job the more directive the Chief 
Accountant becomes, whereas when he is relatively new to the job 
he is essentially consultative in his approach! though in the 
small company there is a likelihood of a shift from consultation 
to joint decision-making materialising (see Table 1, Appendix'C*)• 
Age does not seem to be an important factor in this respecf •
No significant statistical relationship emerges when the experience 
variables are combined and related to decision style. In an 
attempt to rationalise the two significant relationships between 
job experience and decision style we shall refer to the 
observational data.
Respondents showed a certain unease when trying to recall 
and articulate style differentiation due to job tenure. A number 
of those interviewed had spent a relatively short period of time 
in their present job, though obviously they were able to draw on 
experience of similar jobs which preceded the present one to help 
them distinguish between behavioural dispositions on assuming a 
new job and subsequently on having behind them the benefit of a
reasonable amount of job experience. Resorting to 
delegation as a style with growing job tenure was something 
which received some emphasis in the interviews with respondents 
but is not borne out by the statistical evidence. However, we 
must acknowledge that delegation in many circumstances within 
the finance function does not carry with it the autonomy often 
alleged to encompass it. The issue of guidance and monitoring 
of events can be quite prevalent in conditions of delegated 
authority. The consultative nature of decision-making behaviour 
when job experience is shallow was forcefully endorsed by the 
observational data.
'Newness to the job promotes a consultative style.
As one acquires knowledge of the critical operations 
in the department and absorbs the expertise of 
subordinates, one could easily become less consultative 
and take more decisions on ones own.'
'It took some time to get to grips with the job and 
during the first six months I tended to consult peers 
and subordinates quite a bit. I was many times 
disposed to condemning a particular practice or 
procedure but always felt it necessary to consult 
the appropriate person to discover the reasons behind 
it. You are likely to take more decisions on your 
own as familiarity with both subordinates and the 
technical nature of the work grows.'
'While maturing in the job you listen a lot but I 
must admit you feel vulnerable in situations where 
knowledge or information is lacking. At the early 
stages- you go through the phase of getting to know 
your subordinates better, and they you, and it is 
critical to gain their respect. In developing good­
will with subordinates you take longer to explain 
things.'
'You are inclined to consult subordinates more in the 
early days in a job as a means to remove uncertainty 
and introduce a clearer perspective of the situation.
With the passing of time however you are more 
likely to take decisions on your otto.’
'At the beginning I was rather anxious in the job, 
faced with the difficulty of learning the company's 
practices and procedures as well as having to size- 
up my subordinates. Having now spent ten years in 
my present job I feel that maturity, greater 
knowledge of the requirements of the job and the 
right people as subordinates give me greater scope 
to delegate. Increasing time spent in the job also 
gives; you the opportunity to recruit 'your type' of 
subordinate and train those you inherited.'
'On taking over a new job you would almost as a matter 
of course consult, up and down, if only as a means to 
spread the blame if need be.'
Respondents who experienced procedural deficiencies in the 
past felt that improvements in systems would relieve them of a 
detailed preoccupation with day-to-day administrative matters, and 
foster delegative behaviour.
'At one time panic situations were frequent due to 
grave defects in various procedures. Wow procedures 
have been tightened and perfected to the extent that 
so much of the processing of the work load is a matter 
of routine and can be safely delegated.'
With such a highly procreduralised environment and a young team of 
subordinates, this respondent has tried to sustain interest and 
motivation of staff by initiating group discussions and target setting, 
where the meeting of targets is viewed competitively across companies 
within the group. Also in an endeavour to create an 'exciting' 
environment, his office walls carry different diagramatical 
representations of performance.
Assimilating the style of the boss was considered by some 
respondents to be the end result of the passing of time in the job.
'The chief influence is the boss's style. If he 
likes to work in a directing way then you should 
do likewise.'
’The main influence on one’s own style over time 
is the management style of one's superior.’
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECISION STYLE AND EXTENT TO 
WHICH JOB AREAS ARE ESTABLISHED (SPECIALISATION)
AND DEGREE OF QUALIFICATION (SPECIALISM)
The impact of "both specialisation and specialism individually 
and combined on decision style is depicted in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3
Correlation between Decision Style 
and Specialisation and Specialism
n=211
Decision
Style Specialisation Specialism
Specialisation 
and Specialism
A .151 .04 • H  ‘
B
O
J
0•l 1 • i—1 0 .11
C
1
-.11 .06 • ro 0
D
mO•1 .01 .04
E 1 ' • O
0
 •1 .07
1 = p < .05 Source: Q 2, 3 in
2 = p ^  .025 Questionnaire
Before commenting on the results in Table 6.3 one should emphasise 
the fact that specialisation was found to be fairly high and 
specialism comparatively low in the finance function (see Index 
of Specialisation and Specialism Table 5, Appendix ’C).
Table 6.3 illustrates significant statistical relationships 
between decision styles‘A 1 and'C! and specialisation, suggesting 
that in conditions of high specialisation a directive style may 
prevail; whilst a consultative style may be more relevant in 
circumstances where specialisation is relatively lower. No 
statistically significant relationship emerges when decision style 
is related to specialism. However, when this relationship is 
expressed by size of company - see Table 1, Appendix ’C1- a very 
significant statistical association exists between the directive 
style 'A1and specialism for the small company, implying that the
Chief Accountant resorts to this style when those in charge of the 
many job areas are well qualified. A very plausible explanation 
to account for this result is that in many instances the Chief 
Accountant himself takes over responsibility for and direction of 
a number of these areas in the small company. In the medium 
sized company high specialism invites consultation (see Table 1, 
Appendix ' C '). When the variables Specialisation and Specialism 
are combined and related to decision style the pattern of the 
relationship subsisting between style and specialisation is 
repeated; conveying to us the impression that the Chief Accountant 
may consider it necessary to be directive in his approach when 
jobs are highly structured and specialised and managed or operated 
by well qualified personnel. By way of contrast, the Chief 
Accountant may feel a greater need to involve himself, through 
consultation, when he is confronted with a lesser degree of 
specialisation and where the person in charge is not so highly 
qualified. The authenticity of this proposition can now be 
examined with reference to the observational data.
There appeared to be a general belief that once areas of work 
activity are well specified and prescribed, constant interference 
is necessary and justified, be it as a result of what was said at 
progress meetings, hearsay, perusal of formal control data; or in 
the absence of the latter, matters coming to light as a result of 
frequent informal contact. Interference was not confined to areas 
of activity where the Chief Accountant suffered a lack of adequate 
knowledge of operations or technicalities, but it extended to 
situations where he was very conversant with the technical nature 
of the activity.
’Even in highly specialised areas, keep your eyes 
open and do dip checks.'
’You’ve got to know whats going on. Credit Control 
is a great responsibility for one man; pick his 
brains and spend at least two hours' a week with him.
Constant liaison is a wise course of action.’
'I must be convinced of the justification for the 
action suggested by subordinates on major issues.'
'Because of the size of the company I possess 
comprehensive knowledge of all accounting 
activities. In selected areas, e.g. credit control,
I am fully aware of what's going on hut still I sit 
down with the person in charge of it to discuss 
problems and offer guidance monthly.'
'The budget officer is given strict guidelines to 
adhere to in the preparation of the budget. I 
will critically review the end result. I make it 
my business to be familiar with the main stream of 
each activity I am responsible for, even where the 
detail of an activity is not fully comprehended.
'You tend to formalise things, e.g. meetings and 
reports, when you are not too sure of the core of 
an area you are responsible for.'
'Computer programming is an activity in which I 
plead a certain ignorance, and difficulties in 
understanding arise even at progress meetings. As 
a form of self-protection I enlarge the responsibilities 
of the Computer Manager into areas with which he is 
not totally familiar. You must not give him the 
chance to act in a cocky manner.'
There are times when the subordinate with specialised skills 
'takes exception to the fact that he has to submit a summary of 
his price commission submission' to the Chief Accountant. The 
respondent to which this remark is ascribed disapproves of his own 
boss.'s 'style of remote supervision or complete delegation without 
checks.' He maintains 'people don't mind providing information 
on their performance because it shows their boss the progress they 
are making so he can, where necessary, compliment them on their 
performance.'
The interdependence of job areas was in itself a good 
reason to maintain control.
'Activities within organisations are inter­
dependent, so deadlines must be met and pressure
applied, if necessary, because falling behind 
would disrupt the sequence of events.1
The benevolent nature of the organisational environment may 
sustain the expectation that procedural change can be legitimately 
initiated and implemented by the person in the position of authority.
'The old budgeting system had well defined rules, and 
all variances were brought to my notice. The 
budgeting system is now creative and flexible. When 
it was first introduced it encouraged a lot of contacts, 
exchange of views and positive participation. Because 
of the attitudes of most people to the atmosphere 
created by benevolent management in the company, they 
are a pretty docile lot. They neither resist change, 
nor are they inclined to use initiative. They expect 
any changes to come from my position.'
Probably because of a lesser degree of specialisation and a 
lower level of specialism a less clear picture of the organisational 
situation is visible. This forces the Chief Accountant to consult 
his section head to establish his depth of understanding of a 
particular issue, more so because procedures are not efficient at 
registering and analysing developments. Some of the comments made 
by respondents who experienced such conditions are as follows:
'From recent experience I can recall a section head 
who performed adequately but lacked foresight in the 
identification of problems. In these circumstances 
it is necessary to spend more time finding out what is 
going on and then offer leadership.'
'One is inclined, so to speak, to hold their hands a 
lot more, at all times trying to encourage them with 
a considerate form of supervision which amounts to 
guidance. One tries to strike a balance between 
involvement and non-involvement.'
'In conjunction with the subordinate in charge we 
review and try to improve the procedures.'
It appears from the evidence presented in Table 6.3.1 below 
that the weight of a high degree of specialisation could be 
instrumental in forcing the Chief Accountant to use a directive 
style in non-programmed decision situations. This can be gleaned 
from the statistically significant relationship under style ’A 1.
Table 6.3.1
Correlation between Decision Style, 
with regard to decision type, 
and Specialisation
n=211
Type of
Specialisation
Decision Style
Decision
A B C D E
Non-programmed .15"
i
-.11 -.07 .01 -.01
Programmed .05 .02
00o•1 -.02 -.01
1 = p -c .05
2 = p < .025
Sources Q 2, 3 in 
Questionnaire
One might conclude from this result that a high level of special­
isation may elicit attempts to structure decision processes, with 
the Chief Accountant resorting to a directive style. Without the 
mediating effect of specialisation we could expect a consultative 
and joint decision making style to be more applicable to non­
programmed decision situations. This is shown clearly in Table 6.1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECISION STYLE AND PERCEIVED 
QUALITIES OR SKILLS POSSESSED BY SUBORDINATE
A pertinent question to ask is whether the size or magnitude 
of the discrepancy between desirable and actual qualities or skills 
appertaining to the subordinate, as perceived by the Chief 
Accountant, bears any relationship to decision style? It should 
be noted that the greater the discrepancy over the selected items 
on the questionnaire the less favourable the impression of the 
subordinate's qualities or skills. The converse is true of a 
smaller discrepancy. Table 6.4 shows the relationship between
decision style, over all types of decisions and fay category of 
decision, and the aggregate skill discrepancy score.
Table 6.4
Correlation "between Decision Style, analysed 
fay decision type and aggregate decisions, 
and perceived Qualities or Skills in subordinate
n=212
Decision Type
Perceived Skill Discrepancy
Decision Style
A B G D E
Programmed 1 • 0
t
.11 .02 -.02 -.11 '
Non-Programmed
I
.11 .07 -.01 -.193 -.01
X 2
Personnel .13 .03 -.00 -.14 .01
Task • 01:.
1
.12 .00
X
-.13
000•I
Aggregate -05
1
.12 .00
001—1 •1
t—0•I
1 = p < .05
2 = p C .025
3 = p <  .01
Sourc-e: Q 2, 4 in
Questionnaire
Where the Chief Accountant perceives a large difference between 
what he considers desirable and what his subordinates actually 
possess in terms of qualities or skills related to job performance 
he is inclined to use a semi-directive style ’B 1 . On the other 
hand, where he perceives a small difference he is likely to involve 
his subordinates by sharing influence with them through the medium 
of joint decision-making. This finding, shown in the bottom row 
of Table 6.4? appeals to commonsense by suggesting that one is 
more likely to involve a subordinate in the decision-making process 
if he has the requisite qualities or skills likely to permit him 
to make a valid and effective contribution. Turning to the category 
of decision one row removed from the bottom of the table, we find 
that the statistical associations for task decisions is almost 
identical to that for aggregate decisions. However, when the 
relationship is viewed from the position of other categories of 
decision differentiations do emerge but the underlying pattern of
influence sharing remains unperturbed. For example, in the 
context of programmed decisions a large skill discrepancy will 
again call forth a semi-directive style 'B'. But where the 
discrepancy is small, delegation is the style considered most 
appropriate. This is understandable given the nature of this 
type of decision. Where a skill deficiency is experienced it seems 
logical for the superior to take the decision and provide the 
subordinate with some form of learning experience by explaining 
to him the reasons for the course of action taken. In the event 
of the subordinate possessing the requisite skill, there is no 
reason why the subordinate should not execute the requirements of 
a programmed decision on his own. As we have seen earlier in the 
discussion, he is in any case likely to operate within an elaborate 
framework of performance monitoring. The emphasis changes when 
the scene of action shifts to a non-programmed venue. Where the 
superior has a low estimation of the subordinate in an ill-structured 
decision situation he opts for a directive style probably in the 
belief that it is the more practicable because the subordinate may 
be out of his depth in the event of the superior trying to explain 
to him the intricacies of the decision. Should the superior hold 
the subordinate in high esteem then circumstances change. He is 
now prepared to share non-programmed decision-making with the 
subordinate by engaging in joint decision-making - style ’D 1 -
no doubt convinced that the subordinate has a positive contribution 
to make to the final outcome. The statistical pattern applicable 
to non-programmed decisions and perceived skill discrepancy 
practically repeats itself when we glance at the result for 
personnel type decisions in Table 6.4* It is well to bear in mind 
that all the personnel decisions listed in the research instrument 
are classified also as non-programmed, though the majority of 
non-programmed decisions are task rather than personnel decisions.
The presumption that the Chief Accountant faced with a delicate 
personnel issue, in circumstances where he has a low opinion of 
his subordinate's skills, will take decisions affecting indirect 
subordinates on his own has a lot of intuitive appeal. Conversely, 
the Chief Accountant who holds his subordinate in high esteem is 
likely to endeavour to create a relationship in which the 
subordinate has a significant part to play in reaching a final 
decision.
So far we have viewed the perceived qualities or skills in 
the subordinate variable as an aggregate score9 sub-divided by- 
type of decision and decision style. We shall now relate each 
individual skill item to decision styles in order to establish 
the items which have the greatest effect on the decision style 
of the Chief Accountant. A matrix of correlation of perceived 
skill discrepancy over the individual items by decision style 
appears in Table 6.4*1*
Table 6.4*1
Correlation between individual Skill Discrepancy 
and Decision Style
n=212
Type of Quality 
or Skill
Decision Style
A B c D E
1. Rapid Decision Ability .09 *05 -.10 -.07 -.02
2. Verbal Ability -.06 .08 .13* -.08 -.10
3. Technical Ability .193 .05 -.10
M-
-.24 -.04
4* Forcefulness .00 *09 -.03 -*07 .00
5 * Ferseverence .06 .01 -.02 -.08 -.02
6. Sensitive -.03 .08 *05 -.08 -.04
7* Intelligent .01 .06 -.02 -.06 .01
8. Imaginative -.02 .04 .06 -.06 -.03
9* Responsible .06 *05 -.04 -.08 -.05
10. Self-confident -.04 .15* .06 -.13* -.09
11. Calm under pressure *07 *09 -.04 -.13" -.05
12. Tactful
7.
*13 .01 .02 -*193 -.06
13* Considerate of the 
views of others .02 -.01 *03 -.05 -.01
14- Willingness to pass on 
information -.04 .193 -.07 -.05 -.01
15 * Ready to accept new 
ideas *05 .10 .04 1 • 00 -.11
1 = p ^ *05 - Source: Q 2, 4 in
2 = p .025 Questionnaire
3 = p <  *01
4 - p <. .001
In accordance with the earlier aggregate finding the pattern of 
signs in Table 6.4*1 suggests that positive values are more likely
to be associated with restrictive styles and negative values 
with permissive styles. Out of 75 correlations only 11 are 
statistically significant. The strongest statistical association 
(-.24 ) is reserved for the relationship between technical ability 
and decision style ’D ’. This tells us that when the Chief 
Accountant perceives a small discrepancy between what is desirable 
and what the subordinate possesses of this attribute (knowledge, 
skill and current information related to industrial accountancy) he 
is likely to enter into joint decision-making with him. Conversely, 
if the discrepancy is large, a directive style 'A* is employed.
Other skills which can be singled out for comment are self-confidence; 
calmness under pressure; tactful; willingness to pass 011 information 
acceptance of new ideas. Where the subordinate is seen as lacking 
in self-confidence the superior adopts a semi-directive style ’B ’, 
but where the subordinate suffers no deficiency in this respect and 
possesses enough self-confidence he is likely to be considered a 
partner in the decision-making process. Being endowed with an 
acceptable level of calmness under pressure of work is certainly 
to the subordinate’s advantage if he wishes to be involved in joint 
decision-making with his superior, because of the relationship 
between style ’D ’ and this attribute. Should the subordinate be 
lacking in adroitness- in his dealings with others, particularly 
when the issue is a sensitive one, it would appear the superior is 
unlikely to hesitate in using a directive style. But where the 
subordinate is capable of being tactful in a delicate situation to 
the satisfaction of his boss he is allowed to share influence with 
him in the decision-making process. The less the willingness to 
pass 011 information to others on the part of the subordinate, the 
greater the likelihood of he being subjected to a semi-directive 
style ’B ’. Finally, the Chief Accountant shows a willingness to 
engage both in joint decision-making and delegation where he is 
assured of the subordinate’s readiness to accept new ideas.
We shall now focus attention on the material derived from 
4(ii) on the questionnaire, which afforded the respondent the 
opportunity to present qualities or skills additional to those 
listed, and to the observational data derived from the interviews.
Technical ability - manifest predominantly as professional skill, 
coupled with knowledge of the relevant problem or issue under 
review - was overwhelmingly endorsed as the skill in the subordinate 
most valued when considering his true involvement in the decision­
making process. This item along with five other items already 
listed in Table 6.4*1 are excluded from Figure 6.4? which only 
depicts additional qualities or skills influencing subordinate 
involvement in the decision-making process. They are listed in 
order of importance, 1 being the most important.
Figure 6.4 
Additional Qualities or Skills
1. Able to communicate clearly in writing
2. Able to liaise effectively with non-financial
personnel
3. Able to think analytically and logically
4* Able to motivate staff
5. Commitment 
Loyalty
Pleasant Personality
6. Balanced Judgement 
Able to Delegate 
Honest and Trustworthy
7. Able to meet deadlines
8. Commercial Insight 
Ambitious
9. Respects Confidentiality 
Able to Control Staff 
Sense of Humour 
Objectivity
10. Initiative 
Persuasiveness 
Determination 
Punctuality
11. Numerically Exact 
Reliable
In many organisational settings the existing distribution of 
responsibility among subordinates is obviously a key factor ini 
determining the choice of subordinate to perform a. particular task. 
It would appear, however, that the degree of involvement of the 
subordinate in the decisions of his boss must be strongly influenced 
by his suitability as perceived by the boss.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO STATUS,
POWER, AND INFLUENCE
One might expect to find the role of the Chief Accountant to 
he endowed with high position power, authority and status because 
of the importance attached to financial control, particularly in 
times of economic difficulties. If he is reasonably competent 
there is no reason why his influence is not felt in the higher 
echelons of the organisation. Equally, because of his training 
and career progression he should possess a high degree of technical 
influence with his subordinates. These presumptions are 
substantiated by the data in Table 2, Appendix 1C1,where a high 
score for this variable is established. When Status, Power and 
Influence is correlated with decision style no significant statistical 
association emerges between the two. This is demonstrated in 
Table 6.5.
Table 6.5
Correlation between Decision Style 
and Status, Power and Influence
n=212
Decision Style Status, Power, Influence
A
OJ0•
B .04
C
0•1
D
CMO•
E
CO0•I
Source: Q 2, 5 in
Questionnaire
Though an important variable it is difficult to fathom how it 
affects decision style directly. Generally respondents scored 
high on this dimension. They tend to view vertical respect as 
emanating from it when it is of sufficient magnitude. A falling 
off in respect is attributable to lower doses of it. In either 
case a number of behavioural ramifications are said to flow from 
it, some directly filtering through to leadership behaviour, but
all affecting the general personality disposition of the Chief 
Accountant. The following comments extracted from the observa­
tional data emphasise this point.
1. High Incidence of Respect
’It has the effect of making life easy and relaxed, 
encourages openness and allows one to intercede on 
behalf of subordinates rather than trying to protect 
oneself.’
’It enables you to be more definite in comments or 
views about situations as well as about figures, 
generally feeling more self-assured.’
'It would promote self-confidence which would show 
itself in a keenness to assign jobs to subordinates.
A person would feel freer to act and feel less 
threatened.’
'It allows you to be creative and outspoken and 
permits you to experiment and take risks.’
’It provides the atmosphere in which you explain to 
subordinates the reasons for doing things, keeping 
them informed of developments and the consequences 
of not pursuing a particular line of inquiry. This 
encourages subordinates to bring problems to you, 
and shows them that you care about their difficulties.’
2. Low Incidence of Respect
'Without it you are inclined to be ratty, blowing your 
top and keeping things close to your chest.'
’We have a manager in the organisation whose influence 
has deserted him and his respect is at a low ebb.
He is really twisted inside desperately trying to woo 
popularity. As a result his style is nondescript and 
in exercising it he loses the respect of all concerned.'
'Particularly in relation to the boss, one could become 
more protective, less open, a tendency to double check, 
feeling inhibited and trying to cover-up. In relation 
to subordinates there could be a tendency towards a 
dictatorial approach, directing people to do jobs rather 
than asking them to contribute.’
There was a general view that influence and the concomitant respect 
were a function of the technical and social skills of the job 
occupant. Where they were lacking every effort should he made 
to redeem the situation, if, of course, the person is aware of the 
deficiency. Where position power is weak this predicament may he 
eased or reversed. As one respondent remarked, 'I involved myself 
in a significant area - corporate planning - where once I had no 
influence at all. Wow they consult me on matters connected with 
it.*
DECISION STYLE IN BELATION TO 
MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOUR CHARACTERISTICS
One recognises that a measure of leadership behavioural 
characteristics should ideally he more comprehensive, in terms of 
the quantity of items, than that used in the questionnaire. 
Nevertheless, one is confident that question 6 does emphasise, 
alheit in a condensed fashion, the salient features of the 
leadership behavioural dimensions - employee and task orientations. 
These characteristics are possessed by respondents overall to a 
fair degree (see Table 3? Appendix'C1 ). In Table 6.6 these 
dimensions are related individually and together to decision style.
Table 6.6
Correlation between Decision Style 
and Managerial Behaviour Characteristics
n=212
Managerial Behaviour Characteristics
Decision Style i and ii 
Employee 
Orientation
iii and iv 
Task 
Orientation
i, ii 
iii, iv
A -.10 -.01 -.07
: b .08 .04 .07
c -.06 -.03 — .06
D .06 -.01 .03
E
i
.12 .05 .09
1 = p < .05 Source: 2, 6 in
Que s t i onnai r e
The relationship between the combined characteristics and task 
orientation and decision style fares poorly. However, the 
statistically significant relationship between decision style fE ! 
and employee orientation tends to suggest a linkage between a 
permissive style and employee centred behaviour. It appears to 
be necessary to distinguish between delegation as a style 
contributing to high subordinate autonomy with the minimum level 
of performance monitoring, and a delegative style offering some 
autonomy but with the subordinate primarily operating within well 
prescribed procedural boundaries and subject to a fair amount of 
control. When asked how they would behave in relation to a 
subordinate, deserving their confidence, at the inception of a 
delegated assignment which was not procedurally circumscribed, 
respondents invariably remarked on the necessity to be considerate 
in behaviour in such circumstances. Where confidence is lacking, 
one respondent was convinced that his behaviour *was likely to become 
somewhat formal, punctuated with social unease or distance, always 
operating in the knowledge that one day in the future one may have 
to reprimand him for something.1 This may offer an explanation 
for the statistically significant result. The next best 
statistical association (-.10) between decision style ’A ’ and 
employee orientation is also an interesting result, though it 
fractionally falls short of significance. It assumes a position 
of statistical significance on the Kendall Tau non-parametric 
test (see Table 6, Appendix !D !). This might offer some form of 
endorsement of the oft quoted association between a directive style 
and less considerate managerial behaviour. By way of contrast 
task oriented behaviour, manifest in a preoccupation with achieving 
impressive performance standards and ensuring that expertise and 
resources are mobilised to attain work targets, is not the preserve 
of any one style. Question 7 asked the respondents to specify any 
other managerial characteristics not listed in question 6 which 
they felt ought to be emphasised. This elicited a number of 
responses, the majority emphasising the characteristics contained 
in the previous question in a different or more explicit form.
The greater number of remarks hovered on the employee centred 
aspect of the leadership role concerned with individual development 
and fostering group harmony and integration. Typical comments were 
as follows:
"I believe everybody desires to be good in his or 
her eyes at the job they are doing. Our management 
by objectives scheme requires staff to do their own 
appraisal at the end of the year and submit it to 
their superior for comment."
"I am responsible for encouraging my subordinates to 
develop ideas and carry them through on their own 
initiative. I allow them to work without close 
constant supervision and to expose them to outside 
influences, i.e. other companies and technical courses."
"I believe I am responsible for the broadening and 
development of my subordinates and in influencing 
them to similar action vis a vis their staff."
"I believe I am responsible to a fair degree in 
encouraging my subordinates to work as a team rather 
than as individuals."
"I believe I should be responsible for ensuring that 
all staff are tolerant and work together on a proper 
working relationship basis."
One respondent mentioned a less acceptable behavioural view of 
management as the "art of being a good ’nag1 - of demanding, 
expecting, and getting a certain standard or objective." Another 
felt that different accounting functions demanded different 
managerial qualities. "Routine accounting functions require 
administrative, technical, innovative and men management abilities. 
Commercial activities need different abilities, viz. commercial 
flair, imagination, persuasiveness and the power to influence 
(hopefully for the goodi)." The projection of charismatic 
leadership qualities, enhancing the status of the finance function, 
removing obstacles likely to induce frustration, and relieving 
subordinates of some of their work load in times of pressure were 
qualities which received minor emphasis.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO OPINION OP 
LEAST PREFERRED SUBORDINATE (L.P.S.), AND 
THE LATTER IN RELATION TO MANAGERIAL 
BEHAVIOUR CHARACTERISTICS
The L.P.S. measure touched a raw nerve in some respondents - 
"I cannot see that it can he of significant interest to you"s 
"I do not psycho-analyse my subordinates. Ne work as a team and 
objectives appear to be satisfactorily achieved.” If this 
reaction was widespread it may cast doubts on the authenticity 
of the profile. It was therefore very reassuring when, in one 
instance during the interview stage, I played back the profile of 
the least preferred subordinate to the respondent and he was 
remarkably impressed by its accurate reflection of what he 
considered to be key aspects of the personality of the subordinate 
in question. The relationship between decision style and L.P.S., 
and decision style and (a) L.P.S. and Employee Orientation 
(b) L.P.S. and Task Orientation appears in Table 6.7*
Table 6.7
Correlation between Decision Style and L.P.S., the 
latter combined with both Employee Orientation and 
Ts.sk Orientation and correlated with Decision Style
n=212
Decision
Style L.P.S.
L.P.S. and Employee 
Orientation
L.P.S. and Task 
Orientation
A -.12 ' .15 .12
B -.01
CO0• .04
e .06 .09 .08
D .03 .07 .04
E .131 .1 7 1 .14
1 = p^< .05 Source: Q 2, 6, 8 in
2 = p .025 Questionnaire
It is particularly apparent from a scanning of Table 6.7 that the 
high L.P.S. Chief Accountant, who we claim establishes a friendly 
and warm relationship with his subordinates, resorts to a 
delegative style. Conversely, the Chief Accountant with a
Ilower L.P.S. score becomes directive in his approach. When 
L.P.S. is combined with employee orientation and related to 
decision style a significant statistical association emerges 
between style ’E* and this combined variable, reinforcing the 
earlier result of a high L.P.S. leader embracing or clasping a 
delegative style. The association with style 'A1 is marginally 
short of significance. So we might expect the employee-centred 
leader who happens to be warm and friendly to choose the permissive 
style ’E ’. As is demonstrated in the right hand column of 
Table 6.7 the strength of the relationship between L.P.S. and 
Decision Style can not compensate for the lack of a significant 
association between decision style and task orientation in 
Table 6.6 when the independent variables are combined and related 
to decision style. As a result, no significant relationship is 
found. Though this may be so when L.P.S. and Task Orientation are 
integrated and related to decision style, something quite different 
arises when L.P.S. is related to managerial behaviour characteristics 
without the intervention of decision style. This relationship is 
depicted in Table 6.7*1•
Table 6.7*1
Correlation between L.P.S. and Managerial 
Behaviour Characteristics
n=212
Opinion of Least 
Preferred Subordinate
Managerial Behaviour Characteristics
Task Orientation Employee Orientation
L.P.S. .19
CO0•
3 = p .01 Source; Q 6, 8 in
Questionnaire
The significant statistical relationship between L.P.S. and Task 
Orientation may appear on the face of it to be a rather surprising 
result, particularly in the light of a non-significant relationship 
between L.P.S. and Employee Orientation. A feasible explanation 
to account for it at this point may be that the leader who enjoys 
a warm and friendly relationship with his subordinates feels it
now necessary to place priority on the task related ingredients of
his role.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO THE 
SPAN OP CONTROL
The pattern of relationships between the span of control 
and decision style over all decisions and by category of decision 
is shown in Table 6.8.
Table 6.8
Correlation between Decision Style, with regard 
to decision type, and Span of Control
n=212
Span of Control
Decision Decisions
Style
Aggregate Programmed
Non-
Programmed Personnel Task
A .163 .04 .21 ^ .35 "■ .07
B 1 • 0 -.06 -.01 -.03 -.03
C -.08 -.01
O
NO•1 1-.11 1 • 0 VJ1
D -.ll‘ .05 -.14 * -.173 -.02
E -.02 -.01 -.01 1 • 0 VJ1 .01
1 = p .05 Source: Q 2, 10 in
2 = p <  .025 Questionnaire
3 = p < .01
4 = p <  .001
In the second column from the left under the heading 'Aggregate1 
are listed the statistical associations between decision style and 
span of control over all decisions. We may conclude that, as a 
result of the statistically significant associations between 
decision styles 'A' and 'D' and span of control,the Chief Accountant 
is less likely to use a permissive style, instead preferring a 
directive style, when a large number of subordinates report to him 
directly. On the other hand, he is more likely to resort to a 
permissive style where a small number are directly responsible to 
him. When we explore the other significant trends highlighted in 
Table 6.8 we begin to realise that the best predictors of the 
relationships just specified can be located in the non-programmed 
and personnel categories of decision. We find also that when
confronted with personnel decisions the Chief Accountant adopts 
a consultative style in addition to joint decision-making as an 
approach when his span of control is narrow. No significant 
statistical relationships emerge between decision style and span 
of control when programmed and task decisions are considered.
The above finding would appear to suggest that in decision 
situations of an ill-structured or personnel nature, where one 
might expect to find a high level of interaction between the 
superior and subordinates, a permissive style - deeply consultative 
or participative - would be too cumbersome, and a directive style 
would be more appropriate when the number; of direct subordinates is 
large. In these decision situations, however, a permissive style 
would be suitable when the span of control is narrow. As to the 
non-significant relationship between decision style over programmed 
decisions and span of control, one could subscribe to the view 
that the superior's span of attention is not heavily taxed, 
irrespective of the size of the span of control, (within reasonable 
limits), in decision situations which are procedurally well 
prescribed. One is forced to rely on conjecture to explain the 
non-significant relationship between decision style over task 
decisions and span of control. Perhaps the instrumentality of 
programmed decisions, which along with non-programmed decisions are 
responsible for the creation of this category of decision, was 
most strongly felt.
The observational data lends support to the central theme 
manifest in the statistical results. The general consensus 
appeared to be that a small span of control - in the region of 
2 to 4 -  offered the superior the opportunity to become more 
involved in his subordinates' work problems, more aware of 
developments conducive to a problem-centred approach, more able 
to concentrate on matters of policy freed from numerous co-ordinating 
functions and generally able to act in a more informal fashion.
There was a feeling however that the danger of interfering too 
much in the subordinate's work province was omnipresent.
The above emphasis was reversed when respondents commented on 
the consequences of a large span of control (e.g. 6). There was 
a general belief that the wide span of control was instrumental in 
encouraging remoteness, detachment, less time spent with
subordinates, formalised access to the superior and structuring 
of contacts, and generally provided a sympathetic climate for the 
exercise of a directive style. Swimming against the tide, two 
respondents expressed a marked preference for a flat organisational 
structure. One of them equated good working relationships with 
a large span of control, maintaining "that nobody is then the 
teacher's pet." Others rightly pointed out that both the calibre 
of subordinate and task similarity were influential determinants of 
the optimum size in given circumstances. One might also add that 
supervisory capability is equally a determining influence.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE 
OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT
Respondents had to choose from three role categories (executive, 
advisory and neither) on a nominal scale in the questionnaire. * 
Establishing exactly the true nature of their authority in cross 
functional contacts which results in action or inaction is evidently 
fraught with difficulty for respondents. This may be reflected in 
the distribution of their perceptions in Table 6.9*
Table 6.9
Perceptions of Functional 
Role Occupancy
n=212
Functional Role Percentage Distribution,
(a) Advisory
jb
30.7
(b) Executive 42.9
(c) Neither (a) or (b) 26.4
Source: Q 13 in
Questionnaire
Though 42$ of respondents see themselves as possessing direct 
authority to implement recommendations of an accounting and finance 
nature in other functions (e.g. Production, Marketing), the majority
* The data lended itself to Chi-Square test after 
creating categories based on the time spent on a 
decision style - 19*9$$ 20-49-95 > 5 0  -
and relating them to each functional role.
consider themselves to act in a purely advisory role, or are 
unable to perceive their role definitively as either advisory or 
executive. This tends to conform to the weight of observational 
data indicating that pragmatism in the presence of formidable 
constraints is the only sensible course of action. ¥e shall delve 
into these observations shortly, but first an examination of the 
relationship between decision style and functional role is called 
for. It is illustrated in Table 6.9-1*
Table 6.9*1
Relationship between Decision 
Style and Functional Role
n = 212
Decision Style
Chi-Square 
Observed Values
A 2.83
B 2.88
C 1.63
D 1.36
E 4*41
Source: Q 2, 13 in
Questionnaire
.05 tail of X ~ 9*49* As the observed values 
are less than 9*49 we cannot claim a significant 
relationship.
There is no reason to suspect a differentiation in the decision­
making behavioural patterns exhibited by the Chief Accountant due 
to the nature of the functional role he performs. The functional 
role, embracing cross functional contacts, is politically a delicate 
one in the eyes of a number of respondents.
It would appear that the Chief Accountant most frequently 
resorts to formal recommendations on financial: matters in his 
dealings with non-financial managers but he is always prepared to 
institute persuasive powers when considered necessary.
’I have probably a 90$ success rate in getting my 
recommendations accepted, but I still have to make 
a conscious effort to sell my ideas.1
'The status of the Finance Function is high in this 
company but nevertheless^I have to rely on political 
processes to get things accepted. It's not 
infrequent for me to take managers in other 
departments to lunch and explain to them the 
desirability of accepting a certain line of action.'
'Advice is challenged as a normal occurrence. You 
have to use persuasion because figures alone cannot 
do the talking, e.g. price increase. Managers are 
anything but weak and humble as far as financial 
matters are concerned - they challenge you and 
question you and it's up to you to prove your 
position.'
'I recommended that stock be reduced by £100,000 in 
three months time. I explained to the production 
manager the beneficial effect this would have on the 
cash flow position. Mo progress on this issue was 
reached within a reasonable length of time, so I was 
forced to repeat the recommendation. It was at this 
stage that a meaningful exchange of views happened 
where we explored the reasons behind the production 
manager's objections, e.g. the consequences in 
redundancies due to a cut-back in production; the 
impairment of service to marketing. This proved 
very useful indeed.'
Persuasive skills may prove ineffective in the face of 
hardened resistance by non-financial managers to courses of action 
suggested by the Chief Accountant. Often in such circumstances 
the referral of the matter or issue in question upwards, inviting 
the intervention of a higher authority, usually a financial director 
or managing director, was not uncommon. Even the likely threat of 
intervention may be sufficient in certain circumstances.
'I had no difficulty in getting the Production 
Manager to call a halt to the production of tinned 
sausage rolls. The shadow of my boss, the Financial 
Director, in the background had something to do with 
it.'
’In 20 to 30$ of the time my recommendations are not 
enthusiastically received. I would then refer the 
problem to the Managing Director who, if convinced 
by.the soundness of my arguments, would exercise 
his influence.'
The bulk of solid resistance was likely to come from marketing 
or sales personnel.
’Sales and Marketing people show a reluctance to accept 
financial discipline. A good example is the over­
optimism with which they put forward proposals for a 
large capital investment project (selling outlets).
We had to deter them. We have a finance oriented 
parent company who would endorse recommendations which 
are financially sound.'
'The Sales Manager did not take kindly to the suggestion 
that cash should accompany an order where a customer 
resides overseas. This was brought about by cash flow 
considerations. He felt this was a harsh imposition 
and would adversely affect volume of sales, so he was 
not prepared to go along with it. The only alternative 
open to me then was to place my recommendation in the 
hands of my boss', the Financial Director. He won't 
find it easy either and it will become a real bargaining 
session.’
There can be no denying that this relationship, akin to the 
classical staff-line relationship, is studded with innumerable 
behavioural intricacies. In addition to the observations cited 
above, further variations in the strength of the Chief Accountant’s 
influence were found to be relevant, though occupying a position of 
lesser importance. They do tend to indicate the pragmatism brought
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to bear on issues by the Chief Accountant in his liaisons 
with non-financial managers in other functions. From 
bargaining sessions acceptable compromises surface. Some 
felt that real influence rested on the quality of the reports 
or. memoranda produced, and in turn were dependent on the 
quantity and substance of one’s ’homework’. An abortive 
attempt at getting a recommendation accepted could produce 
benefits by giving rise to the revision and improvement of 
the original recommendation. In another situation flexibility 
of approach was heightened by the sudden realisation that the 
original recommendation lacked cognizance of key commercial 
considerations. However, when the respondent feels especially 
knowledgeable in the area in which he is giving advice, e.g. 
price commission work, he would take a. firm stand, on his 
interpretation of the 'grey areas', allegedly 'with the 
company's interest at heart'. The respondent's influence 
can be considerably enhanced where he has a ’special' relation­
ship with the general manager. Finally, his authority to act 
and secure the implementation of his recommendations is more 
likely to be influential in issues connected with accounting 
procedures rather than strategic questions affecting other 
functional areas.
6.10 DECISION STILE IN RELATION TO SIZE
Size constitutes two variables in the research instrument, 
that is size of company and size of finance function. As 
illustrated in Figure 6.10, size of finance function moves in 
sympathy with size of company.
Figure 6.10
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When decision style is related to both the size of the company 
and finance function the statistical pattern that emerges appears 
in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10
Correlation between Decision Style 
and both Company and-Finance Function Size
n=212
Size
Decision Style Company Finance Function
A
2.
-.13 -•15 2
B -.10 -.05
C .08 .06
D .12 ' 1.12
E . .17 3 • 15 2
1 = p < .05 Source:
2 = p <  .025 Questionnaire
3 = p < .01
The overall pattern conveys in each case that restrictive styles 
tend to be associated with the smaller company., and permissive 
styles tend to be associated with the larger company. More 
specifically, the statistically significant results suggest that 
the Chief Accountant in the smaller company and finance function 
tends to use the restrictive style ’A 1 whilst his counterpart in 
the larger company and finance function adopts a different 
perspective by subscribing more to the use of permissive styles 
’D ’ and ’E*. The strongest statistical association subsists 
between a delegative style and size of company. When discussing 
the impact of size on decision style most of the respondents 
considered it more meaningful to attribute the major determining 
influence to size of company rather than size of finance function. 
Apparently it is inevitable for an accounting manager to be more 
preoccupied with detail and to direct operations with a generally 
lower calibre subordinate staff in the smaller company.
On the other hand, the larger company had the distinction of 
possessing more easily identifiable standardised accounting 
activities invariably controlled by higher calibre section heads. 
This appeared to have the effect of fostering close working 
relationships between section heads and the Chief Accountant where 
delegative behaviour was also evident. Representative comments 
extracted from the observational data are as follows:
’In the small company you are immersed in detailed 
technicalities, worrying about the pennies and very 
pedantic. In-the large company, though he may be 
out of touch with many aspects of general company 
policy, the Chief Accountant has the benefit of more 
specialised sections where delegation is possible.
As a result he is generally distant from the areas 
of operation.'
'In the smaller organisation one would take more 
decisions on one's own, primarily because of the 
calibre of subordinates, and one would also be very 
much involved in the day-to-day decision-making.
The larger organisation offers a greater challenge 
to qualified people % as a result one has a different 
breed of subordinate, and this must influence your 
management style.'
'You don't have the protection of the 'middle management 
belt' in the small company so you are likely to be 
more directing in your style and use less consultation 
than you would do in the large company where the 
implementation of decisions is a longer process due 
to technical complexity.'
Respondents tended to distinguish between an increase in size 
organically induced and that brought about by acquisition strategy. 
In the former’case it would require a very large increase in 
company size to activate a variation in management style. In 
the latter case structural variation could be a natural consequence, 
arising fairly quickly, with the effect of modifying management 
style.
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'Wait until the new divisional manager 
(subordinate) proves himself before granting 
him autonomy.'
'Though a certain degree of independence would 
be granted to the head of the finance function 
in the new subsidiary company, formal systems 
of control to measure performance would be 
set up.'
'An iron fist and velvet glove approach is 
necessary in one's dealings with the Financial 
Director of a newly acquired small subsidiary 
company. I have let it be known quite firmly 
what is expected in terms of reporting, and one 
will continue to take a close interest as long 
as is necessary to assess acceptable standards of 
efficiency. So far I am appalled by his pathetic 
attempt at preparing a budget. His working 
papers numbered only a few sheets. This man 
must be re-educated.'
A result forcefully reinforced by the observational data 
is that subordinate involvement and delegative behaviour on 
the part of the superior occur to a marked extent in the large 
company. In order to illuminate a possible reason for such 
a phenomenon reference to an analysis of perceived skill 
discrepancy by company size is called for. This appears 
in Table 6.10.1.
Table 6.10.1
Discrepancy between Desirable and Actual 
Qualities or Skills related to Company Size
n=212
Discrepancy Index
Type of Quality or Skill Size of Company
Small Medium Large
1. Rapid Decision Ability 40 67 36
2. Verbal Ability 95 102 65*
3. Technical Ability 81 73 62*
4. Forcefulness 60 92 59
5* Perseverence 54 53 49
6. Sensitive 50 89 48
7. Intelligent 34 40 23*
8. Imaginative 78 83 61*
9. Responsible 64 60 37*
10. Self-confident 63 74 54*
11. Calm under pressure 62 61 40*
12. Tactful 80 99 61*
13. Considerate of other's 
views 48 66 33*
14« Willingness- to pass on 
information 44 68 36
15. Ready to accept new 
ideas 65 71 45*
Source: Q 4(i)> 12 in
Questionnaire
Note:
The Kruskal-Wallis One-Way Analysis of Variance statistic 
was calculated with a view to testing the H0 that the 
mean index scores for the three company sizes were equal. 
The value obtained for this statistic was 15.14* The 
Chi-Square value at p< .001, 2 df, is 13.82. Since 
15*14 is greater than 13.82 we can reject the H0 and 
conclude there is a difference between index scores 
for the different company sizes. From this result and 
the inspection of Table 6.10.1, we find it easy to accept 
that the index scores for the large company are smaller 
overall. The differentiation is very pronounced in the 
types marked with an asterisk. A low index number 
denotes a favourable impression of the subordinate.
The Chief Accountant in the large company tends to view his 
subordinate more favourably, over all items listed, than his 
counterpart in the medium or small company. Our attention is 
drawn to those items marked with an asterisk in Table 6.10.1 
because they appear to emphasise the skills perhaps most responsible 
for the favourable impression. This finding is likely to support 
the view, expressed earlier, that the large company offers an 
environment conducive to the needs of relatively high calibre staff 
and manages to attract this type of staff. As a consequence, 
subordinate involvement in decisions through joint decision-making 
or delegation is therefore not surprising.
Size of company is then an influential variable, having an 
appreciable impact on decision style. However, when the other 
independent variables, with the exception of Age and Functional 
Role, were related to decision style using size classification in 
the analysis only a few results of interest were noted. Two of 
them have already been commented on in the discussion on job tenure 
and specialism. The remaining variable will be discussed in the 
next section under the heading of level. Therefore the mediating 
effects of size are present but somewhat limited (see Table 1. 
Appendix10* ). Further analysis was conducted, removing the influ­
ence of size from the bivariate correlative relationships between 
the independent and dependent variables specified below. The 
partialling out of both size of company and finance function in the 
relationship between decision style and experience variables is 
shown in Table 6.10.2.
Table 6.10.2
Influence of Size on the individual 
relationships between Decision Style 
and Age and Job Experience
Decision
Experience Variables 
n=209 n=212
Size of Finance 
Function 
Partialled out
Size of Company 
Partialled out
Style Age JobExperience Age
Job
Experience Age
Job
Experience
A .07 .15 x .07 .14 z .08 -15 *
B -.10 -.07 -.10 -.07 l • O -.07
C 1 • 0 -.12 1 -.04 -.ll' -.04 -.111
D .04 -.01 .04 1 • 0 .03 -.01
E .02 -.01 .02 .00 .02 -.01
1 = p .05
2 = p^ -c .025
Source: Q 2, 1, 11, 12
in Questionnaire
Due to the similarity of the correlations following the removal 
of size it is particularly apparent that the influence of size 011 
the above relationship is minimal. The very slight tendency for 
respondents in large companies to stay in the job for a shorter 
time, which cun be gleaned from Table 6.10.3, does not appear to 
have much influence on the result.
Table 6.10.3
Relationship between Company Size and 
length of time in present position
n=212
Size of 
Company
Number of Years
^ 1 1-3 4-6 >  6
€p PP f . i
Small 20.3 30.5 22.0 27.2
Medium 14.0 33-7 19.8 32.5
Large 15.6 36.3 21.7 26.4
Source: Q 1, 12 in
Questionnaire
Conducting an identical operation, size of company and finance 
function was partialled out of the relationship between decision 
style and span of control. This appears in Table 6.10.4-
Table 6.IO.4
Influence of Size on the relationship between 
Decision Style and Span of Control
n=212
Decision
Style
Size of Finance 
Function 
Partialled Out
Size of Company 
Partialled Out
Span of 
Control
Span of 
Control
Span of 
Control
A .16 3 .16 3 .16 3
B
O•1 ■'=3-
0•1 'vt-
0•1
C
COO•1 1 • 0 CO -.08
D -.ll'
l
-.11
1
-.11
E
CMO•1 -.02 -.02
1 = p <  .05
3 = p <  .01
Source: Q 2, 10, 11, 12
in Questionnaire
The identical set of results achieved after using the Partial 
Correlation test tends to suggest that size has little or no impact 
on the relationship between decision style and span of control.
As one respondent remarked, ’no more than a given number will 
report to you whatever the company size.’ One might also add 
that the size of the company, or for that matter the finance function, 
is unlikely to upset the conception of a manageable span of control 
in relation to the requirements of a particular decision. We shall 
return to size in its association with hierarchical level in the 
next section, but first it may be worthwhile to depict graphically 
by size category the decision style, over all decisions, of the 
Chief Accountant. This can be seen in Figure 6.10.1.
Figure 6.10.1
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On an overall "basis -this result suggests that Chief Accountants 
tend to vary their style between different company sizes, as has 
been already disclosed in Table 6.10. Styles which are restrictive 
and consultative are the more popular, leaving joint decision-making 
and delegation as the styles lacking in popularity. Unlike the 
small company, where the directive style is very pronounced, the 
consultative style receives the greatest emphasis in the medium 
sized company and almost ties with a directive style in the large 
sized company.
6.11 DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO LEVEL 
WITHIN THE ORGANISATIONAL HIERARCHY,
AND THE INFLUENCE OF SIZE
The relationship between decision style and organisational level 
is shown in Table 6.11. In order to establish the importance of 
size as a determinant of this relationship it was decided to partial 
out both size of finance function and company separately and 
together. From a perusal of Table 6.11 we find that size cannot 
be considered an influential agent, as the statistical magnitude 
and pattern which emerges: shows an infinitesimal difference.
Table 6.11.
Correlation between Decision Style and 
Organisational Level together with the
removal of the influence of size
f n=212
Decision
Style
. (a)
Size of Finance 
Function 
Partialled Out
(*)
Size of 
Company 
Partialled Out
(a) and (b) 
Partialled 
Out
Level Level Level Level
A -.12 1 -.12 ' -.11 ' -.11 1
B .05 .05 .06 .06
C .01 .01 .00 .00
D .10 .11 .09 .10
E .03 .03 .01 .02
1 = p <  .05 Source: Q 2, 9> 11» 12
in Questionnaire
The main conclusion to be drawn from the data in Table 6.11 is 
that there is a likelihood of a directive style prevailing at the 
lower organisational level. When we turn to the arrangement of 
the data by size of company in Table 1, Appendix 'O’ , a fuller 
picture of the relationship between decision style and level comes 
into focus. On reading it we discover that in the small firm 
at the lower level the Chief Accountant is likely to be directive 
and at the higher level semi-directive in style. By way of 
contrast, in the medium and large sized company at the higher level 
the Chief Accountant is more likely to use delegation and joint 
decision-making styles respectively. In reality the true 
comparison is between levels 1 and 2. This is shown clearly in 
Table 6.11.1.
Table 6.11.1
Level within the organisation as a 
function of Company Size
Company Size
(n=124)
Hierarchical Level 
(n=79) (n=8) (n=l)
1 2 3 4
$ f * fo
Small (n=59) 66.1 28.8 3.4 1.7
Medium II CO ON 59.3 36.0 4-7 0.0
Large (n=67) 50.7 46.3 3.0 0.0
Aggregate (n=212) 58.5 37-3 3.8 0.5
Source: Q 9? 12 in
Questionnaire
Though the greater proportion of respondents in each size category 
perceive themselves as occupying a position at level 1, it appears 
a larger number of Chief Accountants in small companies operate at 
this level.
The question we wish to pose now is to what extent, if at all, 
does level in the organisation mediate relationships specified 
below. To begin with, it is proposed to partial out ’level’ in
the relationship between decision style and the experience 
variables. This is illustrated in Table 6.11.2.
Table 6.11.2
Influence of Hierarchical Level on the 
individual relationships "between 
Decision Style and Age and Job 
Experience
n=209 n=212 Par*
Level
;ialled Out
Decision
Style
Age
Job
Experience Age
Job
Experience
A .07 .15 2 •06. .14 %
B -.10 -.07 -.10 -.06
C -.04
1
-.12 i • o -.12 '
D .04 -.01 .05 -.01
E .02 -.01 .02 -.01
1 = p •
2 = p •
05
025
Source: Q 1, 
Questionnaire
It is clear that the position occupied in the organisational . 
hierarchy does not appear to assume any importance so far as the 
relationship between decision style and the experience variables 
is concerned. The same appears to be true when the relationship 
between decision style and perceived skill discrepancy is 
considered. The elimination of level leaves the original statistical 
pattern almost intact in Table 6.11.3.
Table 6.11.3
Influence of Hierarchical Level on the 
relationship between Decision Style 
and the Discrepancy between Actual and 
Desirable Qualities or Skills
n=212
Decision
Style
Level Partialled 
Out
Skill Discrepancy Skill Discrepancy
A .05 .05
B .12 ‘
CM 
1—1 •
C
oo•I oo•1
D -.18s -.17S
E
t—o•i i • O
l = p < .05
3 = p < .01
Sources Q 2, 4? 9
in Questionnaire
Next the effects of level, and level and size of company combined, 
on the relationship between decision style and span of control 
were examined. Yet again no appreciable transformation of the 
data, of any real significance, can be observed in Table 6.11.4*
Table 6.11*4
Influence of Hierarchical Level and Company 
Size on the relationship between Decision 
Style and Span of Control
n=212
Decision
Style
Level 
Partialled Out
Level and 
Company Size 
Partialled Out
Span of Control Span of Control Span of Control
A .16 3 .17 3 • 17 J
B
0•1 O•1 -.04
C -.08 1 • O 00
CO0•1
D -.11 1 -.12'
CMi—1 •1
E
CMO•1 C\J0•1 -.02
1 = p #05 Source: Q 2, 9? 12
2 = p < .025 in Questionnaire
3 = p <  .01
Finally, the removal of hierarchical level from the relationship 
between decision style and company size produced consequences 
similar to those recorded above. The identical statistical pattern 
remaining after partialling out hierarchical level is visible in 
Table 6.11.5*
Table 6.11.5
Influence of Hierarchical' Level on the 
relationship between Decision Style and Company Size
n=212
Decision Style
Level 
Partialled Out
Company Size Company Size
A -.13 % -.13 *
B 1 • O -.10
C .08
CO0•
D .12 ' .12 ‘
E • 173 *17 3
1 = p .05
2 = p < .025
3 = p <  .01
Source: Q 2, 9? 12
in Questionnaire
The absence of a mediating role for hierarchical level may 
be attributable, in part at least, to the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of respondents occupied positions 011 
two high organisational levels - 1 and 2 - which are perhaps 
closely related. The situation might be quite different if, 
for example, first-line supervision were accommodated in the 
analysis.
CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION
The hypotheses have been formulated and are specified in 
Chapter 5* They will now be subjected to empirical test by 
invoking the relevant data derived from the research study. In 
addition ancillary data, frequently extending a perspective on a 
particular issue, will be acknowledged. The relationship between 
the individual findings and the pertinent literature will also be 
explored.
THE DECISION STYLE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT
In an earlier study the author concluded that financial and 
management accountants, unlike non-financial managers, experienced 
more of a restrictive leadership style (McKenna op cit). It is 
highly likely that many of those exercising the restrictive style were 
of the rank of Chief Accountant. Hastings (op cit) conducted an 
exhaustive study of the chartered accountant in industry, and when 
discussing the accountant’s attachment to the value ’caution* he 
maintained that the accountant who supervises the processes involved 
in the operation of accounting systems "shows a particular tendency 
to check the work of subordinates and in particular to limit the 
discretion of subordinates who are not qualified accountants." 
Commenting on the ingredients of the accountant’s personality 
profile, Barden (op cit) had this to says "accountants as a groups 
are likely to be practical, realistic, resolute and are inclined to 
make decisions and take action on their own." We shall now 
introduce the first hypothesis which is rather general in nature.
Hypothesis I The Chief Accountant displays
a tendency to manage in a 
directive fashion.
If we examine Figure 6 (p.128) where the Chief Accountant’s 
decision style profile is depicted we find that the directive 
style is narrowly endorsed as the most frequently used style, but
we must also recognise that a consultative style assumes almost 
equal prominence. In fact the overall picture in Figure 6 
projects the view that restrictive and permissive styles receive 
equal endorsement. Therefore we have to admit that Hypothesis I 
is only partially .true and needs revision before it can be accepted. 
As we shall see later the decision style profile is influenced by 
the size of the company. The type of decision is also influential 
in the determination of style.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO DIFFERENT 
TYPES OF DECISIONS
The hypotheses dealing with programmed and non-programmed 
decisions will be examined first. They appear in the following 
form:
Hypothesis II Programmed decision situations
lend themselves to both directive 
and delegative styles of decision­
making behaviour.
Hypothesis III Non-programmed decision situations
lend themselves to consultative or 
participative styles of decision—
■ making behaviour.
¥e can confidently accept both hypotheses as the relevant findings, 
illustrated in Table 6.1 (p.129 )? suggest that directive and 
delegative decision styles are commonly used for programmed 
decisions, but consultation and joint decision-making are evidently 
considered more appropriate when the Chief Accountant is confronted 
by non-programmed decisions. ¥e have already reported the 
tremendous emphasis placed on the Chief Accountant’s need to be 
aware of happenings in programmed decision situations. Elaborate 
systems of control and periodic personal checks were not uncommon. 
These mechanisms of control could be fostered by the process of 
professionalisation, and by cultural forces in the organisation 
supporting a restrictive approach. Participation in these 
circumstances is likely to be dysfunctional, failing to promote 
the proper motivational disposition (Leavitt 1962). In the 
smaller company a directive style was more pronounced, allegedly 
because of the relatively low calibre of staff, but it assumed a
flavour of informality. Whatever the size of the company, 
delegation as a style does not appear to bestow the high level 
of autonomy generally believed to be enjoyed by the subordinate.
The omnipresence of performance monitoring devices and the referral 
of exceptional items for the attention of his boss tends to under­
mine autonomity and promote a state of subordinate dependency.
This may explain why this style is a natural ally of a directive 
style in programmed decision conditions. In different conditions, 
and perhaps in other functions, delegation may revert to its more 
conventional form and recover the lost autonomy. Even in the 
finance function delegated authority connected with very simple 
tasks, and consequently straightforward decisions, would obviously 
confer on the subordinate a high degree of autonomy. This type 
of decision was not accommodated in the research instrument.
The scene changes considerably when we examine the impact of 
non-programmed decisions. Here we find the Chief Accountant is 
prepared to permit a high level of subordinate influence in his 
decisions, periodically inviting lateral influence from other 
functional personnel as well. As Strauss (1968) points out, a 
participative style is only suitable where novel problems are 
frequently encountered for which there are no simple answers.
However, we have seen how constraining influences may disturb this 
balance of influence. These are manifest in a variety of ways: 
in the secretive nature of the work; the superior believes he is 
vested with greater knowledge relevant to the decision; the calibre 
of subordinates is suspected; the company environment militates 
against it; and the superior uses participation where he recognises 
the subordinate’s influence is minimal but believes the exercise is 
worthwhile as a developmental experience for the subordinate.
There is a dearth of empirical evidence relating to the above 
relationships in the literature and much comment appears at a 
general level of analysis. For example, Hickson (op cit) 
maintains that subordinate influence is negligible in programmed 
decisions but is marked in non-programmed decisions. Fiedler (1972) 
tends to share this view when commenting on the influence of the 
leader. He maintains that tasks which are explicit or programmed 
give the leader more influence than he acquires in nebulous or
unstructured tasks. These observations are generally in line 
with the main theme running through the findings. However,
Dill (op cit) takes an opposite view to that of Hickson and Fiedler, 
but by implication acknowledges that programmed decisions could 
lead to the superior adopting a delegative style. This view adds 
credibility to the finding that delegation as a decision style is 
appropriate in programmed decision situations. Relying on data 
from empirical observation, Walter (op cit) is convinced that 
subordinate influence is very pronounced in non-programmed decisions, 
because he believes a superior would, where possible, use the 
specialised skill and knowledge of the immediate decision environment 
possessed by the subordinate. He arrived at a less clear-cut 
position when he subjected to empirical test the hypothesis that 
superior influence would be greatest in programmed decision 
situations, a conclusion which challenges the views of Hickson and 
Fiedler. What Walter did find bears a close resemblance to the 
result obtained by the author, whereby a directive and delegative 
decision style prevailed in programmed decision situations. In 
the case of delegation, the referral of exceptional items for the 
attention of the superior came through strongly in Walter1s 
observations. When the centralisation hypothesis fared.very 
poorly, he concluded that sometimes subordinates brought to the 
notice of the superior an issue requiring action and then proceeded 
to tackle the problem, having first received the superior’s 
authorisation to do so. Conversely, the superior brings to the 
notice of the subordinate a problem requiring attention with a 
directive to deal with the matter. In other circumstances a 
recommendation emanating from the subordinate suggesting a particular 
course of action may not be heeded because of the emphasis placed 
by the superior on priorities regarding the use of resources at 
that particular time.
We shall now examine the hypothesised relationships between 
task and personnel decisions and decision style.
Hypothesis IV Task decision situations are
more likely to be associated 
with a directive and delegative 
style of decision-making behaviour.
Hypothesis V Personnel decision situations are
more likely to he associated with 
a consultative or participative 
style of decision-making behaviour.
Faced with the data in Table 6.1 (p. 129 ) and. the supporting 
evidence we can safely accept hypotheses IV and V. The weight 
of programmed decisions must be felt in the task decision category, 
but it is interesting to observe that, whereas programmed decisions 
invited a directive and a delegative style, task decisions, in 
addition, called forth a semi directive style - incidentally this 
produced the strongest statistical relationship. No doubt the 
influence of non-programmed task decisions was felt here in 
counterbalancing the effects of programmed activity. As one 
would expect personnel decisions, being non-programmed and affecting 
indirect subordinates, generated much interaction and discussion 
with direct subordinates, often culminating in joint decision­
making. Heller and Yukl (op cit) contend that at the lower levels 
of management superiors are likely to share more power with 
subordinates when task decisions, rather than maintenance 
(personnel) decisions, are under consideration. But a finding of 
theirs, more relevant to the present study, is that senior managers 
were more likely to allow greater subordinate influence in decisions 
affecting indirect rather than direct subordinates. We can only 
assume that this view is also applicable to decision situations of 
a personnel nature impinging on the work life of the indirect 
subordinate.
. DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO 
EXPERIENCE VARIABLES
Litchfield (op cit) maintains that an executive new to his 
job and feeling uncertain about situations confronting him is 
likely to seek elaborate counsel, but the self-contained manager 
prefers to deliberate alone, with the implication that he involves 
his subordinates to a minimum extent in the decision-making process. 
Perhaps self-containment in this sense is a function of time spent 
in the job. This seems an appropriate moment to introduce 
hypothesis VI.
Hypothesis VI The more experienced - age and
time spent in job - the Chief 
Accountant the greater the likelihood 
of he using a moderately directive 
style of decision-making behaviour.
A glance at Table 6.2 (p.138 ) immediately conveys to us that the 
hypothesis in its present form must be rejected because of the 
absence of a significant statistical association between decision 
style and the experience variables - age and job experience 
combined. On a closer examination of Table 6.2 we find, in 
accordance with Litchfield's assertion, that job experience is the 
independent variable that really matters. The finding suggests 
that the Chief Accountant is more likely to be directive with the 
passing of time in the job, whilst when he occupies the job for a 
relatively short time he tends to be consultative. Apparently 
in the small company there is a greater likelihood of he using 
joint decision-making as a style when new to the job (see Table 1, 
Appendix’C* ).
The supporting evidence tends to support the view that when 
one is a relatively recent job occupant there is a tendency to 
engage in consultation with subordinates. This might arise 
because one wished to discover the rationale behind various 
conventions and practices in the department, to remove uncertainty 
and allay anxiety, and gain the respect of the subordinate. As 
one absorbs the meaning and relevance of techniques and develops 
awareness of critical operations, which is a function of increasing 
time spent in the job, a movement to a directive style is not 
inconceivable. As a result of increasing job familiarity, some 
Chief Accountants manage to secure an improvement in procedures 
which has the effect of facilitating delegation. Perhaps this is 
what Heller and Yukl (op cit) had in mind when they forwarded the 
view that senior managers tended to use more delegation as their 
stay in the job increased. Closer to the main finding discussed 
above, the same authors feel that the longer the time spent by 
first and second line supervisors in their job, the greater the 
tendency to experience a shift from a permissive to a directive 
leadership style. The amended hypothesis should now read as 
follows: the Chief Accountant new to the job is more likely to be
consultative in his approach, but with increased time spent in the
job he is more likely to be directive.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO SPECIALISATION 
AND SPECIALISM
¥e have already noted that specialised accounting sub-systems 
are well established in the finance function. It does not follow 
that each sub-system is managed or controlled by a section head 
who is well qualified in his narrow specialism (see Table 55 
Appendix 1C V). The two hypotheses connected with both specialisation 
and specialism in their individual relationships with decision style 
will now be introduced.
Hypothesis VII A high level of specialisation is
likely to be associated with a 
directive style of decision-making 
behaviour.
Hypothesis VIII A high level of specialism is
likely to lead to the use of a 
less centralised style of decision­
making behaviour.
On reading Table 6.3 (p*141 ) we soon become aware of the relation­
ship between specialisation and decision style. ; We find a
directive style associated with a high level of specialisation, 
and a consultative style associated with a low level of 
specialisation. In circumstances of high specialisation the 
prevalence of formalisation is conspicuous. It does appear that 
the Chief Accountant is active, receiving signals from his 
monitoring devices and other sources of information. He experiences 
a burning need to establish what is going on, he wants to know the 
justification for particular courses of action and frequently he 
offers guidance. His interfering mode of operation applies 
irrespective of whether he is knowledgeable or ignorant of 
operations within his realm of interest. He feels particularly 
threatened by a section head whose expertise he has not fully 
grasped or understood. He is likely to justify a directive style 
on the grounds that the inter-dependent nature of specialist 
activities in his department dictates a firm co-ordinating role 
for him, or that subordinate expectations demand such a style in 
any case. Turning to the hypothesised relationship, there appears
to be no reason why we should not accept Hypothesis VII.
It is not difficult to amass support for this finding.
Worthy (op cit) postulates that the "over-complex, over- 
functionalised organisation structure" requires a directive 
leadership approach. Shaw and Blum (op cit) associate a directive 
style with highly structured tasks in conditions of peak efficiency. 
Likewise Fiedler (1967) found an empirical association between a 
directive style and high task structure when other situational 
variables were also high. Korten (op cit) associates a directive 
style with high job structuring brought about by stressful 
conditions. According to Bass et al (op cit) a tight organisational 
structure is a natural concomitant of a directive style, whilst a 
non-bureaucratic organisational environment bears a relationship 
to a participative leadership style. This is a view not too 
dissimilar to that of Hage and Aiken (op cit). A dissentient view 
is that participation is slightly lower in the less bureaucratic 
small organisation (Payne et al op cit).
Reverting to Table 6.3 (p. 14l) we discover that no 
statistically significant relationship subsists between decision 
style and specialism. Therefore we are forced to reject 
Hypothesis VIII, though we might accept it if it applied to medium 
sized companies only. Viewing this variable in isolation, we 
recognise that the level of qualification of the section head is 
not very high (see Table 5? Appendix *0T) • If it was, we might 
expect to find a relationship between specialism and a consultative 
style. Somewhat unexpectedly this materialises in the case of 
the Chief Accountant in the medium sized company only. But we 
come across a reverse situation when attention is focussed on the 
small company. Here the Chief Accountant often assumes 
responsibility for and direction of a number of sections, so it 
is not surprising to find a relationship between a directive style 
and high specialism (see Table 1, Appendix ’ C1)- When Hage and 
Aiken (op cit) were commenting on the unique predicament of the 
professional in the organisation they probably had not our typical 
section head in mind because they were of the opinion that he 
demands autonomy, and when competent he is consulted by decision­
makers .
When specialism is merged with specialisation and related 
to decision style the previous relationship subsisting between 
decision style and specialisation reappears. It is meaningful 
therefore to speak of a directive style in conditions of high special­
isation and specialism on the one hand, and a consultative style in 
conditions of low specialisation and specialism on the other.
Already we have dealt with an explanation of the former; in the 
latter case a plausible explanation to account for the result is 
that the Chief Accountant needs to be very much involved, through 
exhaustive consultation, in a situation symbolised by low quality 
section supervision and a low level of formalisation. Finally, 
the mediating effect of specialisation on the relationship between 
decision style and non-programmed decisions should be acknowledged.
The end result appears to be an attempt to structure ill-structured 
decision situations when high specialisation prevails by the use 
of a directive style.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO PERCEIVED 
QUALITIES OR SKILLS IN SUBORDINATE
In an empirical study of senior managers in twelve large 
companies in the U.S.A. Heller (op cit) found large differentials 
of skill associated with autocratic leadership styles and small 
differentials associated with more power sharing. This result 
•was obtained after asking respondents whether their jobs required 
more or less of selected skills than their subordinates* jobs.
In the present study the respondent was asked to perceive actual 
and desirable qualities or skills in his subordinate. Therefore 
there is a difference in approach between the two studies. Now 
is an opportune moment to introduce hypothesis IX.
Hypothesis IX When the Chief Accountant perceives
a smaller discrepancy between actual 
and desirable skills or qualities 
in the subordinate he is more likely 
to use a directive decision style.
The opposite is true when he 
perceives a larger discrepancy.
When we examine the statistical pattern in Table 6.4 (p» 14&) 
find that a large skill discrepancy invites the introduction of a 
semi-directive style. A small discrepancy produces a different
effect by invoking a joint decision-making approach. Though the 
direction of this pattern is maintained when types of decisions 
are considered, nevertheless differentiations do arise. In 
conditions of high skill discrepancy in ill-structured decision 
situations the Chief Accountant assumes a more intense directive 
posture. Where he perceives a small skill discrepancy in 
programmed decision situations he is encouraged to seriously 
contemplate, and put into effect, delegation as a style. The 
total picture presented above appears to bear a similarity to that 
portrayed by Heller. Hypothesis IX can now be accepted in its 
present form.
When individual qualities or skills were related to decision 
style, certain items - set out below - occupied a key role in 
influencing the choice of decision style.
- Technical Ability (knowledge, skill and 
current information related to industrial 
accountancy)
- Possession of self-confidence without 
being too arrogant
- Ability to react calmly to pressure of 
work
- Tactful in a delicate situation
- Willingness to pass on information to 
others
To these we could add:
- Knowledge of the problem in hand
- Communicating clearly in writing
- Effective cross-functional liaison
The remaining qualities or skills considered important are listed 
in Figure 6.4 (p* 1^)* The skills referred to appear to be of 
critical significance in an industrial accountancy environment, 
and therefore one could argue it is meaningful to suggest that the 
Chief Accountant reflects or dwells on the adequacy of subordinates’ 
characteristics prior to their involvement in the decision process. 
The crucial importance attached to subordinate skills or qualities 
as determinants of decision style has been already recognised and 
the evidence available appears to be sympathetic to that derived 
from the present study. Yukl (op cit) believes that where the 
subordinate suffers a deficiency in knowledge or skill relevant
to a particular decision, and the superior possesses the 
appropriate talents, a centralised style is justified. A stable 
group that has the skill and experience to take decisions would 
probably find a democratic style most suitable (Uris op cit)•
Trust and confidence in the subordinate was one of the key 
mediating variables in the relationship between leadership style 
and satisfaction noted by Ritchie and Miles (op cit).
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO STATUS,
P O m  AND INFLUENCE
Some of the ingredients of this variable are evident in other 
studies. Fiedler (1967) considers position power as one of the 
three important situational variables in his contingency model.
Pels (op cit) views influence with the boss as a critical variable 
in the leadership situation. For the purposes of the present 
study a hybrid variable was formulated and related to decision 
style. We shall now acknowledge the relevant hypothesis.
Hypothesis X Chief Accountants enjoy a high
level of organisational status, 
power and influence and this is 
likely to be so irrespective of 
the style of decision-making 
behaviour adopted.
Faced with the data in Table 2, Appendix ' C t h e r e  is no doubt 
that the Chief Accountant enjoys a high level of organisational 
power and influence. However, no direct relationship between this 
variable and decision style emerges in Table 6.5 (P* 151 ) *
The observational data points to a tenuous relationship between 
the dependent and independent variable but only after recognising 
the interventionist role of ’respect’. A high level of respect 
is likely to surface where institutional forces bestow on the 
leader the power to act and influence events, though the manner 
in which this is achieved will mirror the true nature of the 
respect gained. In these conditions apparently the Chief 
Accountant feels relaxed, open, and confident in his disposition 
with the strong likelihood of he projecting a permissive oriented 
style. The converse situation of low respect could breed 
symptoms manifest in withdrawal, inhibition, suspicion and
irascibility, and lead to a restrictive oriented style. With 
a certain degree of caution we may proceed to accept hypothesis X..
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO MANAGERIAL 
BEHAVIOUR CHARACTERISTICS
The managerial behaviour characteristics - employee orientation 
and task orientation - bear, a close resemblance to the leadership 
behaviour dimensions - initiating structure and consideration - of 
the OHIO State School. Some would argue that initiating structure 
is complementary to the directive end of the decision style 
continuum, and consideration to the permissive end. This would 
preclude the possibility of being considerate in approach whilst 
being concerned about accomplishing an exacting work target and 
ensuring the means and necessary motivation to bring, it about.
One is therefore inclined to the view expressed by Yukl (op cit) 
that though task oriented behaviour is implicit in initiating 
structure, this is not tantamount to denying the subordinate the 
chance to use his influence in the decisions of his superior.
So one can be directive in managing subordinates towards achieving 
organisational goals and at the same time establishing highly 
supportive relations with them (Weissenberg and Kavanagh op cit). 
Prom an analysis of his empirical data, Kavanagh (1975) concludes 
that the role of the leader does, and is expected to, integrate 
the approaches of initiating structure and consideration. A 
perusal of Table 3? Appendix 1C1,shows that an almost equal 
emphasis is given by Chief Accountants to both task and employee 
oriented aspects of their decision-making behaviour5 this 
completely substantiates the view of Kavanagh. Yukl 
is also of the opinion that there is some relationship between 
consideration and a measure of decision centralisation. We 
shall now direct our attention to an examination of hypothesis XI.
Hypothesis XI Employee-oriented behaviour,
rather than task oriented 
behaviour, is associated with 
decision style.
On reading the data set out in Table 6.6 (p. 153) we soon find 
the only statistically significant relationship pertaining to
the association between delegation and employee orientation*
The next best relationship', though marginally short of significance 
on a parametric test, and significant on a non-parametrie test,
(see Table 6, Appendix ’D ’) lies between a directive style and 
employee orientation. Gan we then assume that the leader who 
delegates, granting his subordinate a fair degree of autonomy, 
professes genuine concern at the individual and group level for 
the human relations aspects of the job? This appears to be what 
the data is suggesting, and this view is somewhat reinforced when 
the other weaker relationship tells us that when the Chief Accountant 
is directive in style he is less considerate in his dealings with 
subordinates. When respondents were given the opportunity to 
express their own views on desirable managerial behaviour 
characteristics overwhelming emphasis was placed on those attributes 
which could be classified as employee-oriented in character. They 
stressed the importance of encouraging self-evaluation and direction? 
promoting autonomy and innovation; encouraging self-development 
and giving impetus to group integration and harmony. Due to the 
high level of standardisation and formalisation in the finance 
function, perhaps there was a lesser need to stress task-oriented 
behaviour. It should be borne in mind that relatively weak 
non-significant statistical associations were found to exist 
between decision style and task-oriented behaviour. Hypothesis XI 
may now be accepted.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO L.P.S., AND 
L.P.S. AND MANAGERIAL CHARACTERISTICS TOGETHER
We have used the L.P.S. as a measure of the Chief Accountant’s 
opinion of his least preferred subordinate, and unlike Fiedler’s 
L.P.C. it is not intended to denote the style or motivational 
disposition of the leader. As an instrument it is practically 
similar to that used by Fiedler and the score derived from its 
use may be more akin to his group atmosphere score than to the 
L.P.C. score. However, it has been suggested that there is a 
similarity between the scales used to measure L.P.C. and the 
group-centred dimension of leader member relations (McMahon op cit). 
We shall now introduce hypothesis XII.
Hypothesis XII A directive style is likely to
he associated with a low L.P.S. 
and a permissive style with a 
high L.P.S.
An examination of Table 6.7 (p» 156) results in the view that 
the high L.P.S. leader, who can be described as warm, friendly and 
open, is more likely to engage in permissive behaviour of a 
delegative nature. His counterpart who receives a low L.P.S. 
rating, and is antithetical in behavioural disposition, is more 
likely to resort to the use of a directive style. The statistical 
pattern seems convincing because of the association that exists 
between negative values and directive styles and positive values 
and permissive styles. ¥e can now accept hypothesis XII.
The existence of a significant relationship between perceived 
skill discrepancy - a semi-personality variable - which we have 
already encountered, together with the relationship between L.P.S. 
and decision style recognised above, lends credence to the 
postulation that personality based factors are influential in the 
leadership situation. The relationship which surfaced after 
relating decision style to L.P.S. is far more conclusive than that 
achieved when task and employee oriented behaviour were related to 
decision style. The interactive nature of employee and task 
oriented behaviour could have been instrumental in preventing a 
more definitive relationship emerging, though employee orientation 
did hava a satisfactory relationship with decision style.
Merging L.P.S. and employee orientation and relating the 
combined variable to decision style (see Table 6.7 p*156) we
achieve a result which totally endorses the individual relationships 
the independent variables have already secured with decision style. 
This suggests persuasively that the human relations oriented leader 
relies impressively on a permissive-delegative-style. Though 
marginally falling short of significance, the negative relationship 
between the combined variable and decision style is inclined to 
suggest that a directive style is associated with a lesser concern 
for the human relations aspects of the job.
Throughout the foregoing discussion high and low L.P.S. 
have automatically been considered synonymous with a permissive
and restrictive orientated leadership style respectively. This 
is a view not totally subscribed to in the literature. Weissenberg 
and Gruenfeld (op cit) challenge the view that the L.P.C. is a good 
predictor of leadership behavioural characteristics and allege that 
a low L.P.C. can be placed in an intermediate position between the 
extreme ends of initiating structure and consideration. Sample 
and Wilson (op cit) cannot lend support to the notion that the low 
L.P.C. leader is generally socially distant and unfriendly. They 
found that the low L.P.C. leader became more human relations 
oriented during the performance phase of an assignment. The high 
L.P.C. leader also reversed his orientation during the performance 
stage. More recent evidence vehemently attacks the validity of 
the L.P.C. as a predictor of leadership behaviour (Graen et al 1971? 
Stinson and Tracy op cit). We now know that Fiedler (1972) 
himself is prepared to concede that the L.P.C. is not a fixed, 
invariate style. Both high and low L.P.C. leaders may vary their 
behaviour in different circumstances. Fiedler quotes the example 
of the high L.P.C. leader who, finding himself in a favourable 
situation, may become more preoccupied with the task and plays 
Mthe role of the responsible, efficient and even officious leader.11 
This appears to be precisely the behavioural pattern of high L.P.S. 
respondents, as far as one can tell from the data which a,ppears in 
Table 6.7-1 (p* 157)- Though there is a striking similarity between 
the L.P.C. and L.P.S., it seems worthwhile repeating that the L.P.S. 
was used as a measure designed to establish the degree of 
psychological closeness between the Chief Accountant and his 
subordinates, and not as a measure of leadership style.
DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO SPAN OF CONTROL
Span of Control is a structural variable which has captured 
the attention of classical theorists, who were primarily concerned 
with its optimum size (Urwick op cit), and present day empiricists 
(Woodward 1965? Child 1973) whose concern extends to how contextual 
variables - technology and size - affect it. Here the concern is
more localised; in effect we are concerned with its impact on the
leadership process. This relationship is hypothesised in
hypothesis XIII.
Hypothesis XIII When the span of control of the
Chief Accountant is wider a 
directive decision style is more 
likely to he used, whereas a 
permissive decision style is more 
applicable when the span of control 
is narrower.
When we turn to Table 6.8 (p. 158) we immediately discern that a 
large span of control is likely to invite a directive style, whilst 
a small span of control attracts a permissive style in the form of 
joint decision-making. This seems eminently credible should we 
accept the validity of pertinent viewpoints expressed by three 
contributors. Hemphill (-1950) could be referring to the size of 
the span of control when he makes the point that as the size of 
organisational groups increases, direction of group activities 
which is leader-centred is associated with members expressing 
attitudes of greater tolerance for this type of leadership. The 
other contributors maintain that larger groups require a longer 
time to reach consensus with less opportunity for members to 
participate, and as a result members experience less satisfaction 
from interactions (Entwisle and Walton op cit). Heller and Yukl 
(op cit) provide empirical endorsement of the above finding when 
they allege that subordinate-centred styles of leadership - 
consultation and participation - were almost dispensed with by 
senior managers when the span of control tended to be large.
They also concluded that delegation was an acceptable alternative 
style in these circumstances. Running against this stream of 
opinion is an empirical observation emanating from Blankenship and 
Miles (op cit). They contend that the greater number of managers, 
with thirteen or more subordinates reporting to them, maintained 
that they frequently depended on their subordinates for ideas and 
initiation of decisions. With a narrower span of control 
managers were less dependent on subordinates. These relationships 
were, however, mediated by organisational level.
Going back to the question of a large span of control, it is 
extremely difficult to envisage a situation whereby a manager, 
having at least thirteen subordinates reporting to him directly, 
can engage in meaningful consultation or participation with each 
individual subordinate. Of course he could meet them as a groups
and exchange- views on that basis, but if many of them are engaged 
in dissimilar tasks this would present real difficulties in trying 
to establish fruitful discussions. These meetings would, then be 
almost tantamount to personalised reporting systems and would 
inevitably be reinforced by more impersonal methods of control.
A further glance at Table 6.8 (p. 158 ) could suddenly make 
one realise that the intervention of type of decision in the 
analysis produces a very, interesting result. One discovers 
that the best prediction of the relationship between decision style 
and span of control materialises when non-programmed decisions, 
including personnel decisions, are considered. The force of this 
finding is felt in the suggestion that when a task decision 
situation is ill-structured, or the decision is a personnel one, 
the Chief Accountant is likely to indulge in a permissive style - 
joint decision-making or consultation - but only if the span of 
control is narrow. Where the span of control is wide and the 
problems confronted are ill-defined, he takes a different view of 
the question of subordinate involvement. Now he appears to 
become more directive in his approach, probably realising that 
power-sharing would be fraught with difficulty because of the 
numerous interactions, based on consultation or participation, 
that would be required. Apparently programmed decision situations 
which are normally well prescribed in a procedural sense are 
unlikely to tax the leader’s span of attention, to the same extent 
as in non-programmed decision situations, when the span of control 
is relatively wide - (as is evident in the area of production 
management when certain forms of standardisation are prevalent) •
This conclusion sounds plausible in the light of a lack of a 
significant relationship between decision style and span of control 
in the context of programmed decisions. A similar line of reasoning 
could be applicable to task decisions on the understanding that 
programmed decision situations make their presence felt in this 
decision category.
There is reason to believe that the wide span of control can 
be instrumental in engendering a remote, detached style with less 
time available for subordinate consultation, and a high incidence 
of formalisation of access to the superior. However, two minority
points of view aligned themselves with the assertions that a 
large span of control is therapeutic by nurturing good working 
relationships with subordinates, and that the calibre of subordinate 
could be a critical factor in determining the manageability of a 
wide span of control. Worthy (op cit) would go along with these 
sentiments when he suggests that the wide span of control makes 
close supervision impossible and devolution of authority and 
responsibility possible, subject to a fair measure of self-confidence 
and personal capacity on the part of subordinates. Other 
constraining influences could hinge on task similarity and 
supervisory competence.
The reaction to the narrow span of control appears to be quite 
different. The narrow span of control is likely to foster an 
informality of approach, greater subordinate involvement in 
problem-centred activity and the release of the superior from a 
somewhat arduous co-ordinating role, allowing him to cencentrate 
more on matters of policy. Entwisle and Walton (op cit) recognise 
that a positive disadvantage of the narrow span of control is the 
likelihood of close supervision and the stifling of initiative.
It was therefore interesting to find Chief Accountants emphasise 
the need to be aware of this danger. We can only hope that 
awareness of the problem of unnecessary interference is the first 
concrete step in action directed at preventing it. Finally, we 
can accept hypothesis XIII. Though hypothesis XIII may be 
generally true we must add forcefully that the type of decision 
encountered mediates the relationship between decision style and 
span of control.
7.10 DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO THE FUNCTIONAL 
ROLE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT
The tendency is to identify the finance function as a staff 
specialism, although Fisch (1961) is of the opinion that an area 
of specialisation such as finance is so vitally important to 
organisational success that it is unwise to treat it as a staff 
function. If he had his way he would bestow on the financial 
controller more authority than he has at present to initiate changes 
to remedy deficiencies in other functions. So he is not too happy
about the advisory role of someone of the status of a Chief 
Accountant. The distinction between staff and line managers is 
not as marked as one might expect• An extreme position is taken 
by Logan (op cit) who maintains it is an obsolete concept.
Heller (op cit) recognises the distinction but concedes that 
confusion surrounds its meaning. In his research he found some 
managers keen to accept the label ’line* because it meant more 
authority to them; in another instance seniority rather than 
function was associated with ’line'. In the midst of the confusion 
many managers choose a combination of both. Thompson (1961) and 
Porter and Henry (1964b) also recognise the distinction and ascribe 
different personality characteristics to line and staff personnel.
In the research instrument the staff/line distinction in the 
classical sense is not intended. Being aware of the staff status 
of finance, one anticipated that some Chief Accountants would act 
solely in an advisory capacity, whilst others would possess direct 
authority to implement their recommendations. Others still would 
find it difficult to be categorical about their role. The person 
exercising executive authority would probably occupy a position 
nearest to that of line rather than staff. In Table 6.9 (p.160 ) 
we see the role embracing direct authority receiving the greatest 
single percentage weight of 42$, but the majority of Chief 
Accountants perform either an advisory role or are unable to 
classify their role in accordance with the descriptions of role 
given. Influenced by Heller's speculation that line rather than 
staff managers would be more directive in approach, the following 
hypothesis was formulated.
Hypothesis XIV The Chief Accountant whose
functional role embraces the use 
of direct authority to implement 
his recommendations is likely to 
have a penchant for a directive 
decision style.
When we examine Table 6.9*1 (p. 161 ) we discern no statistically 
significant relationship between decision style and functional role, 
so therefore we are unable to accept hypothesis XIV.
Dalton (op cit) speaks of the delicacy of the staff line 
relationship whereby the staff specialist has got to reach a
tacit agreement with line- managers so as to foster a workable 
relationship, otherwise there is the danger of line personnel 
seeking to jeopardise proposals with which they disagree. If we 
lend credence to a significant body of opinion critical of the 
accountant's staff role we would almost automatically accept that 
he adopts an autocratic exterior and fails abysmally to establish 
the workable relationship which Dalton speaks of. The role of 
accountants in budgeting comes under strong attack. The way they 
operate budgetary control systems is punitive rather than supportive 
(Argyris 1953)* Dysfunctional behavioural consequences are the 
direct result of the imposition of rigid budgets (Hopwood op cit).
It is a policing mechanism based on inaccurate information 
(Beresford Dew and Gee op cit). According to Fletcher (1972), 
managers complained about the accountants' obstructive tactics and 
the way they divulged information to superiors about budget 
performance. However, the accountants did not get it all their 
own way, for the managers played games with them when purchases 
they wanted to make were being justified.
Outside the narrow sphere of budgeting the accountant has 
also come under fire. He is alleged to assess inadequately the 
needs of management for information (Tricker op cit; Robson op cit) 
he is also accused of not furnishing the right sort of information, 
nor of presenting it in a form which aids rapid comprehension 
(Young op cit; Beresford Dew and Gee op cit). Though struggles 
or friction are inherent in the staff/line relationship (Dalton 
op cit), a specific reference to ill-feeling between accountants 
and managers comes from Woodward (1965) •
Since success and failure of company operations are normally 
presented in financial terms, and the accountant through his 
analysis and presentations highlights areas of economic weakness, 
it is not surprising that on occasions he brings upon himself the 
wrath of other functional managers. Perhaps he overplays his 
policing role, engaging sometimes in selective perception by not 
recognising factors not easily lending themselves to quantification, 
or ignoring factors having future value or relevance.
It is so easy to indulge in platitudes about ideal staff/line 
relationships, free of friction, where the line manager recognises
the advice of the. staff man as hoth valid and genuine and 
experiences little difficulty in accepting it. It is conceivable 
that Teuling's (1971b) interpretation of the role of the effective 
staff man is nearer the truth. He maintains he has to be somewhat 
independent, able to manipulate situations informally and generally 
machiavellian in approach. Bearing in mind the feelings harboured 
by those who find fault with both his attitudes and the quality of 
his advisory services, how does the Chief Accountant perceive his 
own role? Where his formal recommendations are resisted he is 
likely to exercise persuasion, and failing that he is likely to 
activate political processes with the aim of securing some advantage. 
There are situations when his advice is ignored. The novelty of 
this event is likely to prompt him to search for the rationale 
behind such obstinacy, perhaps culminating in a compromise set of 
proposals or a clearer understanding of the contentious issue.
He does not find it difficult to accept bargaining as a necessity 
on some occasions and considers it a legitimate pursuit at his 
level in the organisation. In the face of hardened resistance 
he is likely to invite.a higher authority to intervene and mediate 
or, if necessary, own the problem. In this context he considers 
the main culprits to be marketing or sales managers whose lack of 
good financial sense is conspicuous.
Turning to the minority view, we find the Chief Accountant 
considers himself a pragmatic creature, who believes his bargaining 
strength, can be enhanced by exacting homework. He is prepared to 
concede that failing to have a recommendation accepted at the first 
attempt is not disastrous. Because key commercial considerations 
could come to light, which he did not consider initially, thereby 
improving the quality and accreptability of the second submission. 
Where he is very knowledgeable on a particular issue he is less 
likely to give away ground or retreat in instances conventionally 
accepted as ’grey areas'. Should he possess a special 
relationship with, for example, the Chief Executive, this helps 
him enormously as far as getting recommendations accepted. His 
influence is more widely felt in accounting procedural, rather 
than policy, matters. The above profile is compatible with 
Teuling's interpretation. Whether the quality of his advice is
suspect, or his manner authoritarian, remains uncertain.
A concluding remark based on observations from an empiric:al 
study conducted by Henning and Moseley (opeft), and compatible 
with a lot of what has been said about the functional role of the 
Chief Accountant, seems to be in order.
"The profile of the controller is that of an 
executive with substantial authority in some 
functions and more limited authority in others;' 
with varying degrees of authority in different 
decisions within a function, many times as 
making unilateral decisions and often sharing 
in the making of decisions; perceiving himself 
as having more authority than he is seen to 
have by his superior and peers. He occupies 
a role with great opportunity, yet is both 
ill-defined and fraught with potential 
conflict."
7-11'DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO SIZE
Size of company seems to be a key variable determining or 
•influencing a variety of structural properties of organisation as 
well as behavioural patterns. Both Pugh et al (1969) and 
Child (1973) see it as a critical contextual factor influencing 
structural design. Worthy (op cit) draws a distinction between 
large and small organisations in terms of job stimulation and ,
interpersonal conta,ct, and comes down firmly on the side of the 
small organisation where the incidence of minute specialisation 
and the use of impersonal control mechanisms is that much less; 
and the prospect of higher job satisfaction that, much greater. 
Tallachi (op cit) pursues a not too dissimilar theme by attributing 
to the large organisation a well established division of labour 
and status differentials - unlikely to be found in the small 
organisation - and suggests that the ensuing impersonality is 
likely to promote job dissatisfaction. He expects to find more 
informality and greater job satisfaction in the small organisation. 
This looks almost too idyllic, more so because later one hopes 
to establish that subordinates experience more direction and less 
automomy in the small organisation. Bale (op cit) believes that 
as we progress from the medium to the large company the span of 
control increases. Entwisle and Walton (op cit) feel that 
increasing size has no great impact on the size of the span of
control. The author concurs with the latter view. When 
increasing size of span of control was related to increasing 
company size no material variation was detected. This relationship 
is shown in Table 4, Appendix ’ C'.
A few attempts have been made to relate leadership style to 
size (Blankenship and Miles op cit; Wofford op cit). The manager 
whose style is oriented towards personal security and group 
maintenance is likely to be most effective in the large complex 
organisation (Wofford op cit). The bulk of opinion focusses on 
a discussion of the impact of size of organisation, but what 
influence does size of department have in this respect? Porter 
and Lawler (op cit) believe that the evidence on the relationship 
between size of sub-unit and the relevant variables is more
convincing than that which is said to materialise when company
size is substituted for sub-unit size. However, in the present 
study size of company appears to be the stronger predictive 
variable. But this must not detract from the realisation that 
sub-unit size, in this case size of finance function, is an 
influential variable. Hypothesis XV shall now be introduced.
Hypothesis XV The larger the size of .the
company and finance function the
greater is the likelihood of a
permissive oriented decision 
style prevailing.
On reviewing the data in Table 6.10 (p. 166 ) one can conclude that 
the likelihood of a directive style making its presence felt in the 
smaller company is greater, whilst the reverse situation tends to 
apply in the larger company where permissive styles - joint 
decision-making and delegation - are more likely to reign.
The same is true of the relationship between size of finance 
function and decision style. Hypothesis XV can therefore be 
accepted.
A feature of the large company appears to be the well developed 
accounting sub-systems which certainly create a favourable 
environment for delegation to be practised. Also the prospect of 
finding better qualified staff eager to accept challenge, and more 
willing and able to assume responsibility, is not unique.
Further the decision processes are more complex and lengthy and 
this is likely to force the Chief Accountant to rely on subordinates 
to a greater extent. In a sense all this could have the effect 
of facilitating and actually encouraging the Chief Accountant to 
share decisions with subordinates and feel confident in delegating 
responsibilities. His job as a consequence may be more meaningful. 
Porter (1963a) found that managers in large companies had jobs 
which are more interesting, competitive and challenging. A very 
interesting finding manifests' itself in Table 6.10.1 (p.169 )• 
Without hardly any qualification the message is clear. The Chief 
Accountant in the large company has a very favourable impression of 
the calibre of his subordinate; to use a permissive style therefore 
seems to be a natural consequence.
Size of company also influences the decision style profile 
of the Chief Accountant. This is highlighted in Figure 6.10.1 
(p. 172 ) where the directive and consultative styles vie for the 
greatest popularity, and the popularity of joint decision-making 
and delegation is conspicuous by its absence. The use of a 
directive style is very pronounced in the smaller company. The 
greatest emphasis is given to a consultative style in the medium 
sized company. As established elsewhere, this is the only 
situation where a high level of specialism is related to a 
permissive style (i.e. consultation) and confirms hypothesis VIII. 
In the large company the directive and consultative style tie for 
the distinction of the most widely used style. We can now 
proceed cautiously to accept hypothesis XIX.
Hypothesis XIX Overall the Chief Accountant's
decision style is likely to be 
influenced by the size of the 
company.
Though company size does not permeate a number of the relationships 
the independent variables have with decision style to any marked 
degree, it does have a selective impact as a mediating variable.
In a global sense its mediation influence, and that of finance 
function size, is negligible in the relationships between decision 
style and (i) experience variables, (ii) span of control (see 
Tables 6.10.2; 6.10.4? p-170/l7l).
Therefore we cannot accept hypotheses XVI and XVII presented 
below.
Hypothesis XVI Size of company and finance function
mediates the relationship between 
decision style and the experience 
variables.
Hypothesis XVII Size of company and finance function
mediates the relationship between 
decision style and span of control.
Its localised effect is felt in the following instances. As a 
result of increasing job tenure in the small company a shift from 
a consultative style to joint decision-making is experienced.
A high level of specialism, mostly attributable to the intervention 
and influence of the Chief Accountant, is compatible with a 
directive style in the small company. The influence of high 
specialism in the medium sized company has been noted above. Also 
its mediating effect is noticed in the relationship between decision 
style and hierarchical level. This will be discussed in the next 
section. Finally, there is reason to believe that we should 
distinguish between organic growth in size of the company, which 
is internally generated, and that due to acquisition strategy. 
Apparently the latter is more likely to bring about a variation 
in decision style.
7.12 DECISION STYLE IN RELATION TO LEVEL 
WITHIN THE ORGANISATIONAL HIERARCHY,
RECOGNISING THE INFLUENCE OF SIZE
Acknowledgement of hierarchical level as an independent 
variable of some importance scarcely escapes our notice. In 
distinguishing between different levels on the basis of personality 
characteristics Porter and Henry (1964a) arrive at a general 
conclusion which says that the 'organisation man' is more likely 
to inhabit the lower rather than the higher stratum of the hierarchy. 
Likewise Porter and Ghiselli (op cit) differentiate between top 
and middle managers on the basis of identifiable personality traits. 
Apparently greater higher-need gratification is a feature of 
management positions at the higher organisational level (Porter 1962) . 
Subordinate managers were found to suffer perceptual displacement
towards a higher degree of influence in their superiors’ 
decisions (Heller op cit) . Martin (op cit) maintains that 
decision complexity is a function of hierarchical level.
Weissenberg and Kavanagh (op cit) believe that level within the 
organisation mediates the independence of both Consideration and 
Initiating Structure.
Having established the influential nature of hierarchical 
level, we shall now turn to the hypothesised relationship between 
level within the organisation and decision style.
Hypothesis XX The higher the organisational level
the greater is the likelihood of the 
Chief Accountant exercising a 
permissive oriented style.
The data set out in the second column from the left hand side of 
Table 6.11 (p.173 ) indicates that at the lower hierarchical level 
the likelihood of a restrictive style is prevalent. The positive 
association between level and joint decision-making, though 
marginally short of significance, reinforces the significant result 
by reversing the above trend when the Chief Accountant occupies a 
higher level position. We may now cautiously accept hypothesis XX. 
Empirical endorsement of the above finding is available.
Blankenships and Miles (op cit) report that higher level managers 
were more likely to involve their subordinates in decisions, whilst 
those lower in the hierarchy felt a lesser need to rely on 
subordinates. Heller and Yukl (op cit) associate a less centralised 
decision style with a higher level within the organisation.
A very interesting result is discernible when the localised 
impact of company size is examined in Table 1, Appendix ’C1 •
Here we find that a high level within the small organisation brings 
in its wake a semi-directive style. As we move vertically 
downwards the style becomes directive. So it can be maintained 
that the lower level attracts the more directive style, but in 
any case both positions are associated with restrictive styles.
This pattern changes when we consider the medium and large sized 
company. Permissive styles - delegation and joint decision-making 
respectively - are associated with a higher level organisational 
position in these companies.
Hypothesis XVIII was formulated, following consideration of 
Fisch's (1963) speculative assertion that the relationship between 
level and span of control was mediated by company size. It was 
felt that size might produce a similar effect in the relationship 
between level and decision style.
Hypothesis XVIII Size of company and finance function
individually and combined mediate 
the relationship between decision 
style and hierarchical level.
On a re-examination of Table 6.11 (p.173 ) we see that partialling 
out size of company and finance function on an individual and 
collective basis of the relationship between decision style and 
hierarchical level produces no concrete effect. Therefore we 
cannot accept hypothesis XVIII.
Our attention shall now be directed to the mediating effects 
of level itself. Porter (1963b) found hierarchical level as a 
factor which modified the relationship between size and motivation. 
Of particular relevance to the present study is the view of 
Blankenship and Miles (op cit) who contend'that the relationship 
between size and decision-making behaviour is modified by 
hierarchical level. This appears to be an opportune moment to 
introduce hypothesis XXIII.
Hypothesis XXIII Hierarchical level mediates the
relationship between decision 
style and company size.
The immediate reaction on reading Table 6.11.5 (p. I76 ) is that 
hierarchical level produces no mediating effect whatsoever. 
Therefore one feels unable to accept hypothesis XXIII.
None of the following hypotheses can be accepted due to the 
lack of any evidence to suggest that hierarchical level has a 
mediating role. In hypothesis XXIV blending hierarchical level 
and company to create an independent mediating variable met with 
a fate already encountered above.
Hypothesis XXI Hierarchical level mediates the
relationship between decision 
style and the experience variables.
Hypothesis XXII Hierarchical level mediates the
relationship between skill 
discrepancy and decision style.
Hypothesis XXIV Hierarchical level mediates the
relationship between decision 
style and span of control.
It produces a similar effect 
when combined with company size.
How can we relationalise the failure of hierarchical level as 
a mediating influence? In the first instance we could argue that 
there is rather limited evidence available pointing in this 
direction. Secondly, the evidence that is available is not 
overwhelmingly convincing; it often appears to be inserted as 
an afterthought. Finally, the comparison of levels within the 
organisation in the present research study is confined to 
virtually two senior levels, so the comparative analysis of levels 
is not as meaningful as it might be with an additional level of 
supervision included.
— C \J  u  —
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION
Managerial leadership or decision-making behaviour is a 
well charted and explored area. In chapter 2 a commentary and 
analysis of significant strands of opinion and research evidence 
were undertaken in order to illuminate the striking complexity of 
this area of study. At different stages in its development we 
have witnessed different perspectives on the subject. A 
personality trait approach gave way to a preoccupation with 
leadership style, with the inevitable normative prescription as 
to what constitutes the best or optimum style. In recent years 
the relevance of style as an explanatory concept still remains 
but there is a growing body of opinion which suggests that it is 
only meaningful to discuss style in the context of situational 
variables. The present study was designed with a view to 
making a contribution to the development of situational leadership 
theory.
JUSTIFICATION FOR A SITUATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In recent times democratic leadership or participative 
management has captured the imagination and interest particularly 
of educators and those responsible for management training. In 
the related area of job re-design, job enrichment has been 
enthusiastically received. Both share a common theoretical 
foundation discernible in the proposition that man strives to 
self-actualise. The views of proponents of this school of thought 
are well known to students of management or managerial psychology: 
Herzberg's dual-factor theory, McGregor's theory Y, Argyris's mature 
individual and Likert's leadership system 4« All bear witness 
to the superiority of a leadership style or motivational system 
which appeals to the higher level human needs. These theoretical 
propositions advocate the implication of the total personality in 
the task and are without doubt immensely humane with widespread 
appeal. Their foundation - the force for growth theory of
personality - appears rather shaky and has been the subject of 
a wel1-articulated attack. Nevertheless impressive claims are 
made on behalf of participative management pointing to its 
superiority on the basis of morale and productivity. Though 
heavily endorsed by the findings of survey investigations, the 
superiority of participative leadership is by no means conclusive; 
in fact it is seriously challenged by evidence emanating from 
experimental studies. Speculations derived from the personality- 
based evidence tend to suggest a restrictive style is responsible 
for promoting disadvantageous conditions for the subordinate, but 
eqxially there is the recognition that in certain circumstances it 
may be compatible with the personality disposition of the superior.
A number of participative management experiments or studies 
have been criticised for their lack of consideration of crucial 
factors which ought to be recognised. Also there is a belief that 
the participa/bive process produces some dysfunctional consequences - 
e.g. it promotes anxiety; the frequent interaction may impede 
problem-solving activity. Finally, the universality of the findings 
related to participative management is seriously undermined when 
the impact of cultural variation is recognised. It is then 
understandable why researchers have turned to-an examination of 
situational and structural forces in the immediate environment of 
the decision process in order to seek a better explanation of 
leadership phenomena. Developments in situational leadership 
theory are gathering momentum in North America but there are few 
signs of any activity in this direction in Britain. It is true 
to say that situational theory is still very much at the embryonic 
stage offering tremendous scope for further exploration. It is 
hoped that during its development personality-based factors will 
be kept firmly in focus.
THE PRESENT STUDY
A distinctive feature of the research study conducted by 
the author is the selection of an occupational group' - accountants - 
whose leadership style and situational environment has been 
subjected to close and careful analysis for the first time.
In addition the dissection of decisions into programmed and
non-programmed categories, and then related to leadership style, 
has not been operationalised hitherto. Apart from personnel 
decisions, the decision types are specifically finance in 
orientation, so the leadership pattern that emerges is far more 
meaningful and authentic than that derived from a set of decisions 
common to a number of functional areas. The same applies to the 
measures of specialisation and specialism, but particularly to 
specialisation. The specialisation dimension incorporates typical 
accounting sub-systems. The specialism dimension is somewhat 
crude but along with specialisation is capable of further 
development. Decision type is also open to further development 
and refinement. Regrettably there appears to be a tendency in 
this type of study to select and examine situational factors 
allegedly common to a variety of occupational groups, whilst those 
factors appropriate to a particular group are ignored or receive 
cursory attention. This might be attributable to the manner in 
which the sample is composed; in many instances it cuts across 
different functional groupings. However, one must acknowledge 
that the leadership process itself is often differentiated by 
occupational groups to highlight the different leadership style 
profiles.
A welcome departure in the gauging of leadership style is 
the adoption of a continuum of subordinate influence in the 
leadership process. This seems preferable to the emphasis on 
a bi-polar measure with the accent on extreme positions - 
autocratic/democratic. A useful leadership continuum has been 
put forward by Tannenbaum and Schmidt (op cit), but the 
power/influence continuum postulated by Heller (op cit) had 
particular appeal to the author because of its acknowledgement 
of delegation as a legitimate component of the leadership process. 
One now recognises that delegation cannot be considered unequivocal. 
For the sake of clarity it can be viewed as containing two 
interpretations. On the one hand, it extends to the recipient 
of delegated authority a tremendous amount of autonomy and as a 
consequence has a distinct permissive leadership connotation to it. 
On the other hand, authority is delegated but is done so within 
rather rigid procedural boundaries or guidelines where inbuilt 
control mechanisms are alert, transmitting to the superior a
variety of data on significant organisational happenings or events.
In this sense delegation cannot he regarded as the cxistodian of 
real autonomy. It is almost tantamount to a direction to operate 
within specified procedural guidelines, subject to the referral of 
major items of interest to the superior for his assessment, 
comment or decision. The above distinction surfaces visibly 
from the research evidence and it comes as no surprise to find 
delegation sharing a leadership platform with restrictive styles 
in the context of programmed decisions.
Another interesting feature of the power/influence continuum 
measure is that respondents are informed prior to completing it 
that no one style has preference or superiority over another.
However in the research study we must be prepared to accxept the 
likelihood of the presence of a cultural counter-force vitiating 
the strength of this instruction by suggesting'that it is acceptable, 
and even desirable, to consult or involve subordinates in the 
decision-making process. Perceptual distortion is a real likelihood 
in this instance, perhaps reinforced by personal aspiration pointing 
in the direction of participative management. We must also admit 
that in some circumstances a manager embraces a participative style 
as a conscious act with all the outward manifestations of real 
participation, but in essence it is not legitimate since he has 
already reached an irreversible decision prior to subordinate 
involvement.
A further point worthy of note, which has1 not been acknowledged 
in previous research, is the influential mediating role of decision 
type - particularly the programmed/non-programmed dichotomy - in 
the relationships between decision style and two important 
independent variables - span of control and perceived skill 
discrepancy. The relevance of personality-based factors must 
not be allowed to go unnoticed. The L.P.S. measure focusses 
attention on the psychological distance between the superior and 
his subordinates and has direct relevance to the personality 
disposition of the superior. By way of contrast, the measure 
designed to arrive at the perceived skill discrepancy score 
concentrated on the qualities and skills possessed by the 
subordinates. In both cases significant relationships between 
decision style and 'the two independent variables were found.
Therefore in any future development of situational leadership 
theory it is realistic and worthwhile to emphasise personality 
related factors residing in both the superior and subordinate.
Measures such as the L.P.S. appear to have greater substance 
and relevance when it comes to depicting the behavioural 
disposition - autocratic/democratic - of the leader. It is 
difficult to concede, as is often suggested, that task-oriented 
behaviour is synonymous with a restrictive style. After all 
Likert’s employee-centred supervisor paid a fair amount of attention 
to planning and scheduling. But it appears employee-oriented 
behaviour is compatible with a permissive style. It seems there 
is nothing to prevent the leader, who is psychologically close to 
his subordinates, from concentrating his talents and abilities on 
task-related matters. This was found to be the case in the 
present study.
On reading the relevant literature one gets the impression 
that the accountant as a functional ma,nager is directive in his 
leadership style. Evidence derived from the present study does 
not altogether support this view. When the Chief Accountant is 
presented with a representative set of decisions he places almost 
equal emphasis on restrictive and permissive styles. A direct 
comparison of the single most widely used directive and permissive 
style reveals a minute advantage accruing to the directive style.
There can be no denying the important role played by what 
are essentially structural features of organisation. Size 
assumes a position of particular importance in its direct relation­
ship with the dependent variable, and it retains its position of 
relevance, but to a minor extent, as a mediating variable. There 
is a dearth of evidence indicating a direct relationship between 
size and leadership style. The mediating role of size in the 
relationship between decision style and a situational variable 
appears not to have been previously recognised. Hierarchical 
level is likewise a determinant of leadership style but one 
would place greater confidence in this result if more levels were 
examined. In effect the comparison was between level 1 and 2, 
because a tiny proportion of respondents occupied positions lower 
than level 2. It has to be acknowledged that the incidence of
programmed activity with its constraining influence is that much 
greater at the lower levels. At the higher level it would 
appear these constraints on the manager's freedom are less 
prevalent in a procedural sense, but perhaps this is offset by 
the constricting influence of political and social forces.
Span of control also enjoys a direct significant relationship 
with leadership style. Proponents of participative management 
would undoubtedly find it convenient to ignore its importance.
But it must be recognised that a wide span of control normally 
precludes the possibility of true participation of subordinates 
in superiors' decisions. Finally, a resurrection of interest in 
the staff role of a key operator is perhaps overdue. Finance as 
a discipline has acquired a position of strategic importance for 
the economic welfare of the organisation, particularly in present 
circumstances. It could be argued that the traditional concept 
of staff/line is due for an explosion, if it has not already 
happened. We have seen how fluid and flexible it has become 
from the viewpoint of the functional role of the Chief Accountant.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
With a recognition of the limitations of the research method 
used: the time has arrived to summarise the main findings of the 
study.
1. The Chief Accountant, in a universal sense, places equal . 
emphasis on restrictive and permissive decision styles and 
cannct be regarded as having a significant leaning towards 
the adoption of a directive style. Though a directive
style - *A' - is fractionally the more popular, it is followed 
closely by a consultative style. The least popular styles 
are joint decision-making and delegation.
2. The Chief Accountant resorts to the use of both directive and 
delegative decision styles when confronted with programmed 
decision situations. He modifies his style when faced with 
non-programmed decisions. Here he considers the use of 
consultative and joint decision-making styles.more appropriate. 
Delegation in the above sense is likely to be constrained as
a style by procedural considerations and subject to a fair 
measure of personal or impersonal control.
Task decision situations, which are likely to he influenced 
by programmed decisions, invite both a directive and a 
delegative style. Personnel decision situations, possessing 
non-programmed decision ingredients, align themselves with 
consultative and joint decision-making styles.
When relatively new to the job the Chief Accountant is likely 
to adopt a consultative decision style, but with the passing 
of time he is prone to gravitate towards a directive style.
In the smaller company when relatively recent in the job 
he embraces a participative style which embodies joint 
decision-making.
In conditions of a high level of specialisation a directive 
style prevails. The opposite is true with a low level of 
specialisation where a consultative style is used. Though 
specialism does not have a significant individual relationship 
with decision style, however, a selective relationship emerges 
when the localised effect of size is considered. By combining 
specialisation and specialism and relating them to decision 
style we find a directive style is appropriate in conditions 
of high specialisation and specialism, whilst a consultative 
style applies in conditions of low specialisation and specialism. 
Specialisation produces a mediating effect in the relationship 
between decision style and non-programmed' decisions.
A large discrepancy between perceived actual and desirable 
qualities or skills in the subordinate of the Chief Accountant 
invites the introduction of a semi-directive decision style.
A small discrepancy produces a different effect by opening 
the way for the introduction of a joint decision-making style. 
However, the extent to which a decision is programmed has a 
bearing on the style used. The Chief Accountant assumes more 
of a directive posture in non-programmed decision situations 
when he perceives a large skill discrepancy. He is encouraged 
to use delegation as a style when he perceives a small skill 
discrepancy in programmed decision situations.
7. The Chief Accountant enjoys a high degree of status, power 
and influence. I\fo significant relationship materialises 
between this variable and decision style. As a result of 
the intervention of 'vertical respect', a tenuous relationship 
with decision style may ensue.
8. A permissive style - delegation - is linked to employee-oriented 
behaviour5 conversely a restrictive style reflects a lower 
degree of concern for employee-oriented behaviour.
9. The Chief Accountant who appears to have a warm, friendly and 
open relationship with his subordinates - high L.P.S. - firmly 
embraces a permissive decision style of a delegative nature. 
Those found lacking in this disposition - low L.P.S. - are 
likely to use a directive style. The high L.P.S. leader:,
not unduly worried about the quality of human relations, may 
feel a need to emphasise the task related components of his 
job.
10. A wide span of control, where the number of immediate 
subordinates is large, calls for the application of a 
directive decision style. A permissive style, manifest in 
joint decision-making, is compatible with a narrow span of 
control.. The best prediction of the relationship between 
decision style and span of control arises when non-programmed, 
including personnel, decisions are considered.
11. No significant relationship subsists between decision style 
and the functional role of the Chief Accountant. His 
functional role appears to be ill-defined and devoid of the 
therapeutic human relations approach which is often alleged to 
beset; the staff man's role. Instead reliance is placed on
a mixture of behavioural tactics - directives, persuasion, 
bargaining - frequently culminating in compromise.
12. In the larger company permissive decision styles - joint 
decision-making and delegation . - are more likely to be found. 
The reverse is the case in the smaller company with the 
emphasis on a directive style. An identical pattern emerges 
in the relationship between size of finance function and
decision style. When the decision style profile of the 
Chief Accountant is viewed from the angle of company size 
the following relationships can he seen. The use of a 
directive style is very pronounced in the small company and 
the use of a consultative style in the medium and large sized 
company is very noticeable. In the larger company the Chief 
Accountant views the calibre of his subordinates very 
favourably indeed and it seems natural as a consequence for 
him to use a permissive decision style. In general, size 
of company has a selective mediating effect.
13* A restrictive decision style is likely to reign in the lower
echelons of the organisation but a permissive style is evident 
at the higher levels. However, in the small company this 
pattern is not maintained because a directive style prevails 
at the upper and lower levels, but with greater intensity at 
the lower level.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The evidence derived from the research certainly poses a 
serious challenge to the view that a particular leadership style 
is suitable irrespective of the prevailing organisational 
circumstances. What is suggested is that managers must develop 
awareness of the need to introduce flexibility into their 
management style so that they are able to adapt to differing 
situational and structural demands within their organisation.
For example, a participative style may be suitable when faced with 
non-programmed decisions but unsuitable in the context of 
programmed decisions. Equally if the manager establishes that 
his subordinates suffer a significant deficiency in skill 
relevant to the problem in hand, the only sensible course of 
action open to him in the immediate situation may be to adopt a 
directive style. Of course this could signal a need for training. 
In the domain of organisational design widening the span of control of 
manager at a time when the organisation is committed to the 
adoption and implemented; ion of a participative management scheme 
would not appear to be a wise course of action. Likewise 
stepping-up standardisation and formalisation of work activities
(i.e. specialisation) may not be conducive to the successful 
operation of a participative management scheme. Experiences at 
the .Volvo works in Sweden bear out this point by the implied 
recognition of an inherent incompatibility between acute 
specialisation and a commitment to job enrichment..
In the arena of management training we must recognise that an 
undue emphasis on the interpersonal behaviour aspect of the leader's 
role may not produce the anticipated desirable effects. Therefore 
we have to consider alternative strategies. Perhaps organisational 
engineering should become a more important input component to 
management training programmes. Due to time constraints this 
would leave less time available for the coverage of the inter­
personal aspects of the programme such as process consultation and 
sensitivity training. In the field of management education 
perhaps we should become more adventurous and be prepared to cross 
disciplinary boundaries where we feel justified in doing so.
Efforts along these lines are actively pursued at the present time, 
but the sub-discipline of organisational behaviour - primarily 
a combined sociological and psychological approach to the study 
of behaviour in organisations - is still at the formative stages 
of development. In the light of the impact of the immediate 
organisational environment on leadership processes in the present 
study perhaps its development ought to be accelerated.
Finally, in a climate characterised by a growing awareness among 
professional accountancy bodies of the need to consider the 
educational value and relevance of studying the behavioural aspects 
of accounting, a situational perspective of the leadership role 
of a key financial executive could be considered a valuable 
contribution.
FUTURE RESEARCH
As a first priority it seems worthwhile to continue with 
the development of the decision categorisation process and the 
measure of specialisation. In order to make a better assessment 
of the importance of hierarchical level as a structural variable 
at least three levels ought to be chosen for analysis. An 
interesting development would be the continuation of the line of
enquiry pursued in the present study in other occupational areas 
where situational features - e.g. decision type, specialisation - 
are peculiar to the areas surveyed, and subsequently to carry out 
comparative analysis. I believe it is paramount to establish 
localised determinants of leadership behaviour before searching 
for globalised ones. Delegation as a concept needs to be 
operationalised in a more sophisticated and rigorous fashion in 
order to differentiate between real autonomy and situations where 
autonomy is more apparent than real. Efforts should be directed 
at devising measures to assess the impact of the relevant 
environment on the decision-making process. One cannot deny 
its importance but so far its measurement has presented 
insurmountable difficulties. Finally, an equally intractable 
problem, we should seriously consider tackling the question of 
devising a performance measure for a service function, such as 
finance. Only then can we speak of leadership effectiveness in 
an economic sense for managers in service functions..
APPENDICES
Confidential
For the Attention: Financial Controller
or
Chief Accountant.
Department of Business Studies
and Finance 
Birmingham Polytechnic,
Aston Street,
Birmingham. B4 7HA
(Tel: 021 - 359 6851)
Dear Sir,
Senior Accountants in industiy and commerce are an influential 
"body of people primarily engaged in the interpretation of 
accounting and financial data, and offering a valuable service 
to all levels of management* It is generally acknowledged that 
not enough is known about the various aspects of their jobs.
The aim of this project, which is part of a research programme 
for a PhD. at the Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, 
is to gather information about the management style of the 
Financial Controller or Chief Accountant in relation to a number 
of other important considerations.
The information you provide will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and will no doubt be of value in increasing our 
knowledge of this important area of investigation. You are 
not required to disclose the name of your company, and a copy 
of the synopsis of the findings will be sent to you on request.
Thank you for your assistance.
Yours faithfully,
Eugene F. McKenna, M.Sc, DIA, ACIS, 
Senior Lecturer
Questionnaire No. Col.
(1-3)
You are asked to give a carefully considered answer to each question 
on the Questionnaire.
There are four main types of questions vizs 
First, standard biographical questions.
Second, questions requiring you to RING the number opposite the 
answer which reflects your view.
Third, a question requiring you to give an answer in the form of 
a percentage number.
Finally, a question requiring you to place an X against the 
appropriate answer.
(A couple of questions offer you the opportunity to introduce 
additional observations.)
Please send the completed questionnaire to;
Eugene F. McKenna, Esq.,
Senior Lecturer in Organisational Behaviour,
Department of Business Studies and Finance,
Birmingham Polytechnic,
Aston Street,
Birmingham. B4 7HA
1. BIOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONS
i. Name ............................................... .
Telephone No. (office) .......... .
ii. Year of Birth .................................. ..... .
iii. What age did you leave school  ..........................
iv. Did you proceed to full-time further education ?............
If yes, what type of full-time further education did you 
receive ?
v. List degrees and other qualifications held (use designatory 
letters where appropriate).
vi. In what industiy do you work ?
(Examples of industrial classification: Chemical and Allied;
Engineering and Electrical Goods; Textiles; Publishing.)
vii.
viii.
ix.
2.
A.
Are?.of work ......................
(Example: Finance)
Job Title (brief description of job)
Length of time in present position (no. of years) 
RING the number opposite the appropriate range.
COL. 4
1
2 
5 
4
THIS QUESTION SETS OUT DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DECISION-MAKING 
(A, B, C, D, E), LISTED BELOW, AND VARIOUS TYPES OF DECISIONS 
FOUND IN THE FINANCE AREA. FIRST, YOU ARE ASKED TO EXAMINE 
CAREFULLY THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DECISION-MAKING, EACH OF 
WHICH CAN BE EQUALLY EFFECTIVE.
SECOND, IF YOU HAVE THE AUTHORITY IN YOUR PRESENT POSITION TO 
MAKE THE FINAL DECISION, OR AT LEAST TO MAKE A FORMAL RECOM­
MENDATION THAT WILL USUALLY”BE“ACCEP^7”THEN''F0R'’EACH“RELEVANT 
DECISIONT’LIS^lTVERllAFr’^ r C A ^ T ™  DECISION-MAKING APPROACH 
(FROM A, B, C, D, E) YOU NORMALLY ADOPT. IF ONE OR MORE OF 
THE DECISIONS ARE NOT RELEVANT, PLACE *N0T APPLICABLE* OPPOSITE 
THE APPROPRIATE ITEM.
(WERE YOU TO CHOOSE MORE THAN ONE OF THE APPROACHES FOR A 
PARTICULAR DECISION, THEN SPLIT 100% BETWEEN THEM. IT IS MORE 
THAN LIKELY YOU WILL PUT 100% NEXT TO ONE APPROACH FROM A, B,
C, D, E.)
Own Decision without detailed explanation.
These are decisions made by you without previous discussion or 
consultation with subordinates and no special meeting or 
memorandum is used to explain the decision. (This method 
includes decisions made after consulting with managers at~the 
same_Ievel~or_wIth superlorsTJ
Own Decision with detailed explanation.
The same as above, but afterwards you explain the problem and 
the reasons for your choice in a memo or in a special meeting.
Less than 1 
1 - 5 
4 -  6 
over 6
C. Prior Consultation with subordinate. . ,
Before the decision is taken, you explain the problem to your 
subordinate and ask for his advice and help. You then make 
the decision hy yourself. Your final choice may, or may not, 
reflect your subordinate1 s influence.
- Joint Decision-Making with subordinate.
You and your subordinate (s) together analyse the problem and 
come to a decision. The subordinate(s) usually has as much 
influence over the final choice as you. Where there are more 
than two in the discussion, the decision of the majority is 
accepted more often than not.
E. Delegation of decision to subordinate.
You ask your subordinate to make the decisions regarding a 
particular subject. You may or may not request him to 
report his decisions to you. You seldom veto his decisions.
Type of Decision Decision-making Approach
A
°/o
B
°/o
C
°/o
PJo•H
-P
•p
m
Soo
J4O
•H
D
°/o °/o
l)The decision to examine a historical 
accounting procedure with a view to 
a major modification.
2) The decision to promote members of 
staff in your department who are 
not your direct subordinates.
De
le
ga
ti
on
3)The decision to recommend taking 
legal action on arrears in a 
customer’s account where the 
amount involved is large and 
long overdue.
4)The decision to fix the level 
of cash surplus to he budgeted 
for in the draft cash budget 
(to cover unforeseen 
contingencies)
5) The decision to establish 
guidelines to be used in 
deciding whether variances, 
arising from comparing actual 
with planned performance, are 
worth investigating.
6)The decision to examine the ’age* 
of debtors.
7) The decision to set up or 
review a standard or 
marginal costing system 
which could result in a far 
better breakdown of product 
costs.
8) The decision to encourage 
the resignation or transfer 
of a member of your staff who 
does not report to you directly.
9) The decision to re-categorise 
the costs of products so as
to show more clearly the profit 
margin being made on each 
type of product.
10) The decision to suggest the 
best alternative source of 
funds for the financing of a 
project which has already been 
agreed.
A
°/o
B
%
C
%
D
°/o
E
%
1
i
1
11) The decision to define the 
expected life of a new fixed 
asset for depreciation 
purposes*
12) The decision to revise a 
departments "budget forecast 
as a result of information 
received during the year.
13) The decision to increase or 
decrease the number of 
employees in your department.
14) The decision to set aside 
provisions against "bad debts.
A
%
B
%
C
%
D
%
E
%
3. DEPARTMENTS WITHIN ORGANISATIONS CAN DIPEER IN THE MANNER IN 
WHICH WORK ACTIVITIES ARE SPECIALISED AND CONTROLLED BY 
INDIVrDTJALS OR SECTION HEADS WITH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EXPERTISE.
FOR EACH JOB AREA LISTED OVERLEAF, PLEASE INDICATE THE EXTENT TO 
WHICH IT IS ESTABLISHED IN YOtRDEPARTMENT, AND THE TYPE OF STAFF 
RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING OR OPERATING IT. WHERE AN ACTIVITY 
IS PERFORMED BY ACCOUNTING STAFF OF EQUAL RANK, CHOOSE THE 
INDIVIDUAL WITH WHOM YOU HAVE MOST CONTACT.
RING THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER OPPOSITE EACH ITEM WHICH MOST 
CLOSELY DESCRIBES YOUR VIEW. IF ONE OR MORE OF THESE JOB 
AREAS ARE NOT RELEVANT, PLACE 'NOT APPLICABLE' OPPOSITE THE 
APPROPRIATE ITEM.
Job Area Extent to which Job
Area is Established
Operated or Managed 
by Someone who is:
CARD
4
Col
Ve
ry
 
We
ll
Fa
ir
ly
 
We
ll
Ad
eq
ua
te
ly
No
t 
so 
We
ll
Po
or
ly
Col
Fu
ll
y
Qu
al
if
ie
d
Se
ni
or
Un
qu
al
if
ie
d
Pa
rt
ly
Qu
al
if
ie
d
Ju
ni
or
Un
qu
al
if
ie
d
Credit Control 0) 5 4 3 2 1 (14) 4 3 2 1
Debtor’s Ledger 
& Control (2) 5 4 3 2 1 (15) 4 3 2 1
Sales Analysis (3) 5 4 3 2 1 (16) 4 3 2 1
Monitoring the 
Cash Plow (4) 5 4 3 2 1 (17) 4 3 2 1
Creditor’s 
Ledger & Control (5) 5 4 3 2 1 (18) 4 3 2 1
Capital Expend­
iture Proposals (6) 5 4 3 2 1 (19) 4 3 2 1
Allocation of 
Expenditure into 
’Capital’ and 
’Revenue’ items (7) 5 4 3 2 1 (20) 4 3 2 1
Short-range 
Budget Planning 
and Profit 
Forecasting (8) 5 4 3 2 1 (21) 4 3 2 1
Long-range 
Budget Planning 
and Profit 
Forecasting (9) 5 4 3 2 1 (22) 4 3 2 1
Preparation of 
Final Accounts (10) 5 4 3 2 1 (23)
T
4 3 2 1
Job Area Extent to which Job Operated or Managed
Area is Established by Someone who is:
Qard
4
Col Ve
ry
 
We
ll
Fa
ir
ly
 
We
ll &0•p
1
< Not
 
so 
We
ll
Po
or
ly
Col Fu
ll
y
Qu
al
if
ie
d
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ni
or
Un
qu
al
if
ie
d
Pa
rt
ly
Qu
al
if
ie
d
1
1
Standard or
Marginal
Costing (11) 5 4 3 2 1 (24) 4 3 2 1
Periodic
Management
Reports (12) 5 4 3 2 1 (25) 4 3 2 1
Product or Job 
or Process 
Costing (13) 5 4 3 2 1 (26) 4 3 2 1
4. (i) MANY SENIOR MANAGERS WOULD LIKE TO WORK WITH SUBORDINATES
WHO POSSESS A COMBINATION OP QUALITIES AND SKILLS WHICH 
THEY BELIEVE ENHANCES THE SUBORDINATES* ABILITY TO DO A 
JOB WELL.
YOU ARE ASKED TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE QUALITIES OR SKILLS, 
LISTED OVERLEAP. IN RELATION TO QUESTIONS (a) AND (b) POSED 
BELOW. IP YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE DIRECT SUBORDINATE, FOCUS 
YOUR ATTENTION ON THE SUBORDINATE WITH WHOM YOU MOST 
FREQUENTLY COME IN CONTACT.
THE QUESTIONS REPRESENTED BY (a) AND (b) READ AS FOLLOWS:
(a) HOW MUCH OF THIS QUALITY OR SKILL WOULD YOU CONSIDER DESIRABLE 
IN A PERSON OCCUPYING YOUR SUBORDINATE1S POSITION? (=DESIRABLE)
MIN 1 2 3 4 5 6 ? MAX
(b) HOW MUCH OF THIS QUALITY OR SKILL DOES YOUR SUBORDINATE HAVE?
(^ACTUAL)
M 3 N 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 M A X
(LOW NUMBERS REPRESENT LOW OR MINIMUM AMOUNT'S AND HIGH NUMBERS 
HIGH OR MAXIMUM AMOUNTS)
PLEASE RING THE NUMBER WHICH MOST CLOSELY DESCRIBES YOUR VIEW.
Type of Quality or Skill
DESIRABLE
Rating of Quality or Skill 
ACTUAL
Min Max Min Max
Col Col '
Ability to make rapid 
decisions (27) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (42) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Verbal ability (to 
speak fluently to 
staff at all levels) (28) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (43) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Technical ability 
(knowledge, skill and 
current information 
related to industrial 
accountancy) (29) 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 (44) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Forceful in putting 
forward ideas and 
plans for action (30) 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 (45) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perseverence in the 
face of adversity (31) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (46) 1 2 3 4 5 6
i
7
Sensitive to people*s 
needs (32) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (47) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
|
High level of 
intelligence (33) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (48) 1 2 3 4 5 6
i
7
Imaginative in 
approach to a work 
problem (34) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (49) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ability to readily 
accept responsibility 
for the consequences of 
actions or decisions (35) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (50) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Possession of self- 
confidence without 
being too arrogant (36) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (51) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ability to react calmly 
to pressure of work (37) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (52) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Tactful in a deli­
cate situation (38) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (53) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Willingness to consider 
the other person*s 
point of view (39) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (54) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Type of Quality or Skill Rating of Quality or Skill
DESIRABLE ACTUAL
Min Max Min
Col Col ""
Willingness to pass
on information to
others (40) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (55) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Readiness to accept
new ideas (41) 1 2 3 4 3 6 7 (56) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. (ii) ARE THERE ANY OTHER QUALITIES OR SKILLS IMPORTANT TO YOU BUT 
NOT LISTED ABOVE? IP YES, PLEASE LIST AND RATE,
Max
1
CM 3 4 5 6 7
-
3 4
5. BELOW ARE LISTED CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS WHICH HIGHLIGHT 
ORGANISATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. PLEASE RING THE NUMBER 
OPPOSITE THE ANSWER WHICH BEST DESCRIBES THE SITUATION 
AS YOU SEE IT.
(a) My position offers me considerable latitude 
to deal with major personnel issues
(e.g. reward, discipline, etc.) on my own.
(b) The status attached to my position is 
easily recognisable by subordinates.
(c) The authority to assign, supervise, and 
assess jobs underneath me is a normal 
feature of my position.
(d) By reason of my present position I 
possess a great deal of knowledge about 
the technical nature of subordinates* jobs.
(e) Frequently my Superior consults me on 
matters connected with major decisions.
* If YES, proceed to (f)
(f) Invariably the advice I offer carries a lot 
of weight with my superior.
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes*
No
Yes
No
Col
157)
1
0
(58) 
1 
0
(59) 
1 
0
(60) 
1 
0
(61)
1
0
(62)
1
0
6. BELOW AEE LISTED STATEMENTS HIGHLIGHTING CHARACTERISTICS
WHICH AEE SOMETIMES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BEHAVIOUR OP MANAGERS.
TO WHAT EXTENT DO YOU PERCEIVE THESE CHARACTERISTICS AS A 
MANIFESTATION OP YOUR OWN STYLE OP MANAGEMENT. RING THE 
NUMBER ATTACHED TO THE ITEM WHICH BEST DESCRIBES YOUR VIEW.
a>iH
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I Believe I am responsible 
for promoting a feeling of 
personal worth and importance 
in my subordinate (s).
(63)
5 4 3 2 1
I believe I am responsible 
for encouraging my subor­
dinates to develop close, 
mutually satisfying work 
relationships.
(64)
5 4 3 2 1
I believe I am responsible 
for stimulating an enthusiasm 
to achieve an impressive 
level of performance.
(65)
5 4 3 2 1
I believe I am responsible 
for facilitating the 
attainment of work targets 
or objectives because of my 
administrative and technical 
competence.
(66)
5 4 3 2 1
7. ARE THERE ANY OTHER CHARACTERISTICS NOT LISTED ABOVE WHICH YOU 
PEEL OUGHT TO BE EMPHASISED? '
IF YES, PLEASE SPECIFY.
8. PEOPLE DIPPER IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE! THINK ABOUT THOSE 
WITH WHOM THEY WORK. BELOW ARE LISTED PAIRS OP WORDS WHICH 
ARE OPPOSITE IN MEANING.
PLEASE GIVE YOUR IMMEDIATE FIRST REACTION TO EACH PAIR OP WORDS 
AND DESCRIBE THE SUBORDINATE WHOM YOU PREPER THE LEAST BY 
PLACING AN X IN ONE OF THE EIGHT SPACES ON THE LINE BETWEEN 
EACH PAIR OF~WORDS. EACH SPACE REPRESENTS THE EXTENT TO WHICH 
AN ADJECTIVE PITS THE PERSON YOU ARE DESCRIBING.
This example may help you answer the question.
You would describe someone as slightly weak by placing an X in the 
following position;
STRONG I X
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Pleasant • 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 Unpleasant (1)
Friendly • # 0 0 0 0 0 Unfriendly (2)
Rejecting • 0 0 0 0 0 0 Accepting (3)
Helpful • 0 0 0 0 0 0 Frustrating (4)
Unenthusiastic • ’ 0 0 0 0 0 0 Enthusiastic (5)
Tense • 0 0 0 0 0 O Relaxed (6)
Distant 0 0 0 0 0 0 Close (7)
Cold • 0 # 0 0 0 Warm (8)
Cooperative • 0 0 0 0 0 0 Uncooperative (9)
Supportive • 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hostile (10)
Boring • 0 0 0 0 0 0 Interesting (11)
Quarrelsome 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Harmonious (12)
Self-assured 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hesitant (13)
Efficient 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Inefficient (14)
Gloomy 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 Cheerful (15)
Open 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Guarded (16)
9. AT WHAT LEVEL IN THE FORMAL ORGANISATION STRUCTURE IS THE
POSITION YOU NOW OCCUPY? TO HELP YOU LOCATE YOUR PARTICULAR 
LEVEL TAKE AS AN AID THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINE:
TOP MANAGERS OF A COMPANY OF DIVISION ARE DESIGNATED * LEVEL 1*. 
MANAGERS ONE STEP REMOVED FROM THEM ON THE ORGANISATION CHART 
ARE CONSIDERED TO BE AT * LEVEL 2»; THOSE TWO STEPS AWAY 
CONSTITUTE •LEVEL 3* i AND SO ON.
PLEASE RING THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL NUMBER.
Col
(17)
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
10. PLEASE INDICATE THE NUMBER OF SUBORDINATES YOU ARE DIRECTLY 
RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPERVISING BY RINGING THE NUMBER OPPOSITE 
THE APPROPRIATE RANGE.
Col
(18)
Less than 3 1
3 - 6 2
7 - 10 3
Over 10 4
11. APPROXIMATE SIZE OF FINANCE FUNCTION (NO. OF EMPLOYEES). 
RING THE NUMBER OPPOSITE THE APPROPRIATE RANGE.
Col
(19)
Less than 15 1
1 6 - 3 1  2
32 -  60 3
Over 60 4
12. APPROXIMATE SIZE OF COMPANY (NO. OF EMPLOYEES)• 
RING THE NUMBER OPPOSITE THE APPROPRIATE RANGE.
Col
(20)
Under 500 1
500 -  2000 2
Over 2000
13. PLEASE RING THE NUMBER OPPOSITE THE STATEMENT WHICH BEST 
DESCRIBES YOUR ROLE WITHIN THE COMPANY.
(a) As the representative, or acting for the 
representative, of the Finance Function I 
act in a purely advisory role to other 
functions (e.g. Production, Marketing) without 
•possessing direct authority to implement my 
recommendations•
(h) As the representative, or acting for the 
representative, of the Finance Function £ 
•possess direct authority to implement ny 
recommendations of an accounting and finance 
nature in other functions (e.g. Production, 
Marketing).
(c) Neither (a) or (h) reflect the real situation 
as I see it.
Col
(21)
Thank you for your cooperation.
I would very much appreciate any further comment on the topics 
covered in this questionnaire.
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Table 1
Age Distribution of Respondents
Age
Distribution
Percentage Humber of Respondents
Total Sample *n=209 Interview Sample ’t'n=32
f fo
30 7.2 3-1
0 1 o 43.1 62.5
41 - 50 34.9 ' 28.1
> “ 51 14.8' 6.3
* The age range is 23 to 64 and the median average 
age is 40
+ The age range is 29 to 61 and the median average 
age is 37
Table 2 
Age Respondents left School
Sample Type Median Average Age
Total Sample n=209 I6i
Interview Sample n=32 17
Table 3
Number of Respondents who received further education 
and possess various qualifications
Education/
Qualifications
Percentage Number of Respondents
Total Sample n=209 Interview Sample n=32
$ f
Further Education 13.9 18.7
Recognised Professional
Qualifications 84-2 87-5
Degrees 11.0 15.-6
Diplomas • 4.3 9.3
Table 4
Respondents with Recognised Professional Qualifications 
analysed by Professional .'Title
Percentage Number of Respondents
Professional Title *Total Sample n=176 ^Interview Sample n=28
* 1o
Chartered Accountant 63.7 60.7
Cost and Management 
Accountant 27.8 21.4
Certified Accountant 11.4 14.2
Chartered Secretary 6.8 7.1
* 16 Respondents bore two professional titles and
1 Respondent bore three
+ 1 Respondent bore two professional titles
Therefore the total percentage figure exceeds 100$ 
in both cases
Table 5
Distribution of Respondents by Type of Industry
Percentage Number 
of Respondents
Standard Industrial Classification
Total
Sample n=212
Interview 
Sample n=32
f  • fo
Mining and Quarrying • 9
Food, Drink, Tobacco 9-9 12.5
Coal and Petroleum .9
Chemical and Allied 7.5 6 .2
Metal Manufacture 3.3 6.2
Mechanical Engineering 10.4 9.4
Instrument Engineering 2.4 3.1
Electrical Engineering 9.4 12.5
Vehicles 2.4
Metal Goods not specified 
elsewhere . 3.8 6.3
Textiles 4*2
Leather Goods and Furs .6
Clothing and Footwear 2.8 3.1
Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement 2.8 3.1
Timber, Furniture 2.4
Paper, Printing, Publishing 8.9 9.4
Other Manufacturing Industry 5-7 6.3
Construction 4.2 9.4
Service and Distribution 16.0 9.4
Miscellaneous 1.5 3.1
Table 6
Area of Work of Respondents
Area of Work
Percentage Number of Respondents
Total Sample n=212 Interview Sample n=32
1° fo
Finance 63.2 75-0
Finance and
Secretarial 19-8 15.6
, Finance and
Administration 17.0 9.4
Table 7 
Job Titles of Respondents
Percentage Number 
of Respondents
Title Classification
Total
Sample n=209
Interview 
Sample n=32 *
$ 1o .
Chief Accountant 22.9 31.3
Chief Accountant and Company 
Secretary 14.4 9.4
Chief Accountant and Director 2.9 9-4
Financial Controller 20.1 21.8
Financial Controller and 
Company Secretary 2.4 9.4
Financial Director 15.3 3.1
Financial Director and 
Company Secretary 6.2 9-4
Miscellaneous, e.g.
- Director of Accounting
- Financial Planning Manager
- Company Secretary and
Administrative Manager
- Group Accountant 15.8 6.2
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Table 8
Time Spent by Respondents 
in Present Position
Number of 
Tears
Percentage Number of Respondents
Total Sample n=212 Interview Sample n=32
-< 1
1°
15.6
1°
18.8
1 - 3 36.3 46.9
4 - 6 21.7 21.8
> 6 26.4 12.5
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Table 2
Endorsement of Status, Power and Influence
n=212
Organisational Characteristics Percentage Score
1o
Position possesses considerable * 
power 75.9
Status attached to position is 
conspicuous 98.1
Supervisory authority is 
evident 98,6
Awareness^ of technical features 
of subordinates’ jobs 81.1
^Influence with superior 91.0
*If influential, advice carries 
a lot of weight 85.8
Source: Q5 in
Questionnaire
Table 3
Index of Managerial Behaviour Characteristics
n=212
Type of Characteristic Index
Employee Orientation:
1. Promote feelings of 
personal worth 80
2. Encourage subordinates to 
develop close and satisfying 
work relationships 80
Aggregate (l + 2) 80
Task Orientation:
3. Concerned about meeting 
performance standards 85
4« Arranging the right work 
conditions to meet work 
targets 83
Aggregate (3+4) 84
Source: Q 6 in 
Questionnaire
Table 4
Span of Control as a 
function of Company Size
n=212
Company
Size
Span of Control
< 3 3-6 7-10 >*•10
Small 6.8
i°
59.3
*
13.6
1o
20.3
Medium 7.0 55.8 8.1 29.1
Large 6.0 58.2 14.9 20.9
Aggregate 6.6 57.5 11.8 24.I
Source: Q 10, 12 in
Questionnaire
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Table 5
Index of Specialisation and Specialism
n=211
Job Area
Specialisation
Index
Specialism
Index
Credit Control 87 ■58
Debtor’s Ledger and Control 87 55
Sales Analysis 82 50
Monitoring the Cash Plow 85 70
Creditor's Ledger and Control 84 54
Capital Expenditure Proposals 75 66
Allocation of Expenditure into 
'Capital' and 'Revenue' items 86 64
Short-range Budget Planning and 
Profit Forecasting 86 74
Long-range Budget Planning and 
Profit Forecasting 69 70
Preparation of Final Accounts 94 74
Standard or Marginal Costing 58 49
Periodic Management Reports 89 72
Product or Job or Process 
Costing 60 49
Source: Q 3 in
Questionnaire
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A COMPARISON OP RESULTS ACHIEVED BY 
USING (a) PEARSON1S PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT (b) KENDALL*S TAU RANK ORDER 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
Table 1
Correlation between Decision Style 
and Experience Variables
Experience Variables
Decision
Style
n=212 
Job Experience
n=209
Age
Pearson Kendall Pearson Kendall
A a.15 • 133 .07 .03
B i • o —j -.06 -.10
~coo•l
C -.12 1 i • O -.04 o•1
D -.01 -.03 .04 .05
E -.01 -.06 .02 -.03
1 = p .05
2 = p .025
3 = p .01
Source: Q 1, 2
Questionnaire
JC3wL X  X l X V O / X i V  J-/
Table 2
Correlation between Decision Style 
and Specialisation and Specialism
n=211
Decision
Style
Specialisation Specialism
Pearson Kendall Pearson Kendall
A
1
.15 .07 .04-
CMo•l
B
O
Jo•1 ’Sj-
O
•1 i • t—* o -.08'
C -.11* 1 • o CO .06 .05
D 1 • o CO 1 • o CO .01
Oo
•
E
C
"-
O
•1 in0 •1
o
•i rHO•!
1 = p -ci ,05 Source: Q2, 3 in
2 = p <  .025 Questionnaire
Table 3
Correlation between Decision Style, 
with regard to decision type, 
and Specialisation
n=211
Specialisation
Decision Style
Type of 
Decision Jk B C D EPear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Fon-programmed
X
.15
/
.08
/
-.11 -.07 l • o —4 -.06 .01 -.01 -.01 -.06
Programmed .05 .04 .02 .00 -.08 -.07 -.02 I • o Co -.01 .00
1 = p c  .05
2 = p-c .025
Source: Q2, 3 in
questionnaire
Table 4
Correlation between Decision Style, analysed 
by decision type and aggregate decisions, 
and Perceived Qualities or Skills 
in subordinate
n=212
Perceived Skill Discrepancy
Decision Style
Decision
Type
A B C D E
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Programmed -.03 -.03 .11* .05 .02 .06 -.02 -.05 -.ll1 -.06
N 0 n-pr 0 gramme d 1.11 •07 .07 .03 -.01 .01 -.19*
O
-.11 -.01 .00
2. X x &Personnel .13 .09 .03 .03 -.00 .01 -.14 -.09 .01 -.06
Task .01 .02 .12; .06 .00 .03 -.13 -.10^ -.08 -.01
Aggregate •05 .04 .12*
3
.13 .00 .03 ,-.18*
3
-.12 -.07 -.03
1 = p-w< .05 Source: Q 2, 4 in
2 = p«< .025 Questionnaire
3 = p-^ .01
Table 5
Correlation between Decision Style 
and Status, Power and Influence
n=212
Decision
Style
Status, Power, Influence
Pearson Kendall
A .02 .03
B .04 .06
C
0
 •1
0
 •1
D .02 .01
E
CO0•l 000 •1
1 = p<i .05 Source: Q 2, 5 in
Questionnaire
Table 6
j&Jfc'Jt'JSKJJIA JJ
Correlation between Decision Style and 
Managerial Behaviour Characteristics
n=212
Managerial Behaviour Characteristics
Decision
Style
i and ii 
Employee Orientation
iii and iv 
Task Orientation
i, ii, 
iii, iv
Pearson Kendall Pearson Kendall Pearson Kendall
A -.10 -.08' -.01 -.00 -.07 -.05
B
00O• .05 .04 -.00 .07 .04
C — .06
itn
0»l -.03
0•l -.06
0
 •1
D .06 .02 -.01 -.00 .03 .01
E .12^ .05 .05 .06
O
NO• .06
1 = .05 Source: Q 2, 6 in
Questionnaire
Table 7
Correlation between Decision Style
and L.P.S.
n=212
Decision
Style
L.P .S.
Pearson Kendall
A -.12y -.06
B 1 • 0 -.01
C .06 .03
D ,03 .04
E .1Z* .07
1 = p«^ - .05
2 = p .025
Source: Q 2, 8 in
Questionnaire
Table 8
Correlation ‘between L.P.S. and 
Managerial Behaviour Characteristics
n = 212
Managerial Behaviour Characteristics
Opinion of 
Least Preferred 
Subordinate
Task Orientation Employee Orientation
Pearson Kendall Pearson Kendall
L .P .S • .193
3
.11
COo• .05
3 = p-C #oi Source: Q 6, 8 in
Questionnaire
Table 9
Correlation between Decision Style, 
with regard to Decision Type, and 
■ Span of Control
n=212
Span of Control
Decisions
Aggregate Programmed
Mon-
programmed Personnel Task
Decision
Style
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
Pear­
son
Ken­
dall
A
3
.16
3
.11 .04 .03
4
.21
4
•15
M-
.35 .26 .07 .05
B -.04 -.02 — .06 -.05 -.01 .01 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.01
C -.08
1
-.08 -.01 -.03 -.09 -.0 6 -.11*
X
-.09 -.05 -.05
D -.11;
*
-.10 .05 .01
Z
-.14
3
-.12
3
-.17
3
-.14 -.02 -.06
E -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.01 .03 -.05 -.02 .01 .01
1 = p .05 Source: Q 2, 10 in
2 = p #025 Questionnaire
3 = p -<.01
4 = p —^ .001
*—
Table 10
iLFPEbbXX D
Correlation between Decision Style 
and both Company and Finance 
Function Size
n=212
Size
Decision
Style
Company Finance Function
Pearson Kendall Pearson Kendall
A -.13* -,/V*-.10 -.15* -.123
B -.10 -.06 -.05 -.01
C .08 .06 .06 .04
D .12; .09* .12/ .10*
E .I?3 .133 .15* .11J
1 s p-< *05 Sources Q 2, 11,
2. = p -< .025 in Questionnaire
3 = p .01
Table 11
Correlation between Decision Style 
and Organisational Level
n = 212
Decision Level
Style Pearson Kendall
A -.12y -.09*
B .05
oo•
C .01 .01
D .10 .04
E .03 .05
1 = p-c *05
2 = p-< .025
Source: Q 2, 9 ±n
Questionnaire
Gonfidential
For the Attention: Financial Controller
or
Chief Accountant
Department of Business Studies
and Finance,, 
Birmingham Polytechnic, 
Aston Street,, 
Birmingham. E4 7HA
(Tel: 021 359 6851)
l° n g
Dear Sir,
You may recall receiving a questionnaire towards 
the end of June which posed a number of questions 
about the nature and context of the job of the Financial 
Controller or Chief Accountant. Perhaps for one 
reason or another you felt unable to participate in the 
study at the time..
However, if you are still interested in the survey,.
I sincerely seek your cooperation and participation 
by sending the completed questionnaire to me as soon 
as possible. As a teacher of undergraduate students 
planning to pursue a, career in accountancy, I believe 
the information you provide, which will be treated 
in the strictest confidence, will have real ediicational 
value and ultimately I hope s'ome practical ramifications.
Yours faithfully
Eugene F. McKenna
Name:
Title: .........................
Company: ..... .................
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE
1. What differences do you see between the job of the Financial Controller 
and that of the Chief Accountant?
2. Is it likely with an increase in the number of years spent in one job,
such as yours, for one to change or modify the approach to making decisions 
or managing subordinates?
3. Could you briefly describe your style of management (as explained in
Questionnaire) when a decision for which you bear ultimate responsibility 
is
1) Clearcut or routine e.g. taking action on customers arrears
2) Complex or uncertain, or 
non routine
e.g. setting guidelines for
investigation of variances, 
promoting staff.
When a section is highly, specialised (e.g. credit control, budgeting) 
and is headed by a member of your staff who is well qualified in that 
area, how do you go about managing in such circumstances?
Would you adopt a similar style of management towards a section not 
highly specialised with a less qualified person in charge?
What sort of qualities or skills do you look for in a subordinate 
before you are prepared to involve him, through consultation, 
participation, or delegation, in decisions for which you bear 
responsibility?
Some people maintain that if a job in a company offers one enough 
power , influence with and respect from both a superior and subordinate, 
then this could have a favourable influence on ones choice of management 
style.
If the above description fits your job, how does it affect 
your management style?
If it does not, how do you see your job and briefly describe your 
management style?
8. Have you ever had the experience of your style of management 
changing as the number of subordinates reporting to you increased 
or decreased.
] If so, in what way did it change?
] If you had such an experience and your style remained constant, 
to what do you attribute this uniformity of style.
9. Can you envisage a situation where a variation in the size of the
finance function or the size of the company leads to a change in the 
style of management of the Financial Controller or Chief Accountant.
] If yes, how can you explain it.
If no, why should the style remain the same in such circumstances.
How restricted is your authority in your present position when it 
comes to getting production, personnel or marketing managers to do 
what you think is financially desirable?
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